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Because of the pressure of other responsibilities it has become necessary for WARREN QUANBECK to retire as book editor and for PAUL LINDBERG to retire as circulation manager. The latter has served as circulation manager since 1952, and by action of the editorial council his place has now been taken by LOWELL SATRE, of Luther Theological Seminary in St. Paul. The former has served as book editor since 1953 and will continue in this capacity for the first two numbers of the current year, when by action of the editorial council he will be succeeded by ARNOLD CARLSON, of Augustana Theological Seminary in Rock Island.

To our retiring colleagues: Hearty thanks for faithful cooperation in countless and unremunerated labors. To our new colleagues: Hearty welcome to active participation in our common enterprise of providing a medium for theological conversation.—EDITOR.

The Call to Die and to Live

By John W. Bachman

THE Bible is full of shocking statements. By the time we have heard them over and over again, however, and perhaps have studied and explained them and even preached from them, we ourselves may be almost immune to their shock. There is that danger with the text, "Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me" (Mark 8:34). These words are so familiar that they have lost their sharpness. There is something about them that is a little out of place anyway in this twentieth century. The only crosses we know are gold or bronze ones; we have never seen a cross actually used for anything but decorative or liturgical purposes, and the idea of self-denial is foreign to this age. So we speculate about what Jesus really meant by the words without ever being jarred out of our complacency. Our Lord is issuing a clear call to those who would follow him, but like preoccupied children we pay little attention to what he says.

In each generation there are some who take these words seriously, who hear in them a clear call to die. We think immediately of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who wrote boldly, "When Christ calls a man, he bids him come and die," and who, when the time came, went steadfastly on the way to be executed and died, we are told, with admirable calmness and dignity. We remember Kaj Munk, whose body was found in a roadside ditch in Denmark soon after he preached a series of defiant sermons while his land was under Nazi occupation.

I think in this connection of a distinguished scholar and radiant Christian gentleman, Professor Z. K. Matthews of South Africa, who was a visiting professor in this country several years ago. While here he spoke frankly of the crucial dangers facing his beloved native land. On one network telecast he spoke with such obvious authority, concern, and good will about the explosive situation in Africa that all of the workers in the large studio where the telecast was originating—technicians, program assistants, and talent waiting to appear on other segments of the program—all stopped what they were doing to watch and hear him, and that does not happen often. There was a rare moment of genuine

solemnity in that studio when, at the conclusion of the interview, he expressed sorowfully the opinion that things would probably have to get worse in Africa before they could be expected to get better. He has since returned to his home and within the past several months has been arrested on a preposterous charge of treason. For him, at least, things will get worse before they can get better.

But these are unusual, crisis situations—in wartime Europe and in South Africa today. And have I not been speaking of fanatics? After all, there were many preachers in Germany and Norway who survived the war, and there are many churchmen in South Africa who are not under arrest. There are, of course, persons with martyr complexes who seek death out of their own peculiar sort of pride, but we have every reason to believe that this is not a description of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Kaj Munk, or Z. K. Matthews. For most of us it is a dangerous, evasive lie to label such people fanatics. We do so primarily because we are unwilling to face up to our Lord's demands.

This is not to say that he always demands of us a single, physical death. Luke records the quotation as calling us to take up our cross *daily,* and this is not to explain away the call to die or even to make it easier. Under some circumstances dying daily may be more difficult than dying once. But this is what we are called to do and there may be many different ways of doing it.

The American Lutheran pastor in Montgomery, Alabama, risking the bombing of his home in the service of his people, knows one way of dying daily. An inner-city pastor who risks the wrath of some of his eloquent contributing members to make clear that all people from a changing neighborhood are welcome in a genuinely Christian congregation knows a slightly different form of death. A suburban pastor, struggling to become more than a combination of a business manager and a spiritual cheerleader for a middle-class social club, knows still a different form of death. If we are at all sensitive to the call of God we shall not be in the ministry very long before we discover still different ways of dying daily.

This begins to sound rather gloomy. After all, things are not so bad these days. Our nation is not actively at war, we are enjoying a high level of prosperity, the ministry is a very respectable profession, and there is a lot of interest in religion in America just now. Instead of

forcing ourselves to pray, "Give us this day our daily cross," perhaps we should be looking on the brighter side of things.

Our text, along with the call to die, speaks also of the saving of life, "Whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's *the same shall save it*" (Mark 8:35). Our Lord spoke often of life and of his mission to bring us life in abundance. If what we have here is not really a call to die but a call to live, our task of passing it along to others would seem to be much more pleasant. This generation, like every other, has a longing for life, as witnessed by such titles as *Getting the Most Out of Life, Stay Alive All Your Life, Lust for Life,* and *Life Begins at Forty.* The titles are essentially misleading, but all recognize that there is an elusive quality about life. It is not enough just to exist; there must be something more. Some of the keenest observers of our generation—novelists, playwrights, and poets—are convinced that most people today are missing out on life. We are told that this is the age of anxiety, that our people are torn by tensions and demoralized by disillusionment. We read that twentieth century man is a creature of conformity, racing along on a treadmill to oblivion. In the midst of these frustrations and tensions there are many people outside as well as inside the church who acknowledge the truth behind the question, "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

Every pastor knows many people who are searching pathetically for a life that has some ultimate value and meaning. Every human wants to hear a call to live, and we want to transmit such a call to others, but in our eagerness we must not overlook the caution, "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it." *Without the cross the call to live is nonsense.*

We are ever alert to find a simple skeleton key to the door of life. We are so eager to "live it up" that we keep busy dreaming up all sorts of schemes to enable us to achieve life.

Men would like to think that if only they could be good-hearted, law-abiding citizens and follow a few simple psychological principles, they and their families would be healthy and prosperous and their chrome-plated, neon-lighted, wonder-drugged world would be at peace. This is probably the most popular so-called religion of our time, but it is as far from Christianity as the most ignorant superstition of the world's remotest areas.

Even some ministers become peddlers of spiritual tranquilizers in-

stead of preachers of the Gospel. Heavenly hucksters are busy turning out books and magazines offering people a "spiritual lift." Most of the writings are profusely illustrated elaborations of the composite formula, "Every day in every way I'm getting better and better until some day I'll be the master of my fate, the captain of my soul." These may be interesting experiments in self-hypnosis; they are not even remotely Christian. There are many persons joining with Peter in rebuking Christ for speaking of the necessity of going up to Calvary. They also stand on Calvary shouting, "If thou be the Christ, come down from the cross!"

We Lutherans, of course, are more inclined to think that it was all right for Jesus to die—even necessary—but that is not for us; after all, we are saved by grace through faith! But there is always the danger that we may be resorting to a little selective orthodoxy to rationalize a very old heresy. We should like to believe that it is possible to experience the justification of sin without the justification of the sinner. We should like to think that if only we could go to church regularly enough and use the right words in our confessions, we would get along beautifully with everyone in this world and the next. Thus are our treasured doctrines perverted until they go no further than Browning's lines, "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world." Aside from the poetic quality of the lines, and despite the fact that there is an element of truth in them, as a complete description of life they are nothing but a piece of sentimental claptrap. All is *not* right with the world, and the cross is the eternal reminder of the fact. Without the cross the call to live is nonsense.

So we are driven back to the call to die. But the appeal of the call to live persists and we are bound to wonder, Is not the call to die just a far-sighted plan to live? We have said that we are called to die daily, we are called to give up our selfish desires, our pride. That sounds a little like enlightened self-interest. It may remind one of the slogan, "The life you save may be your own." "Honesty is the best policy." If you want to win friends and influence people you must go half way. But these are only self-centered attempts to restate the call to live. The call to die is not just prudent restraint of selfishness in order to get ahead. The call to die demands more than half-hearted self-denial, more than selective sacrifice. The call to die is a call to give up unconditionally. And *without the cross the call to die is impossible.*

One of our students experienced this with particular vividness

while working in the East Harlem Protestant Parish. East Harlem is a section of New York which is one of the most congested, crime- and disease-infected areas in the world. Many of our students work there on internships, or what we call field work. One of them was working with young people of the neighborhood and had come to be respected and trusted by them. Two of the young people came to his room at the seminary one night and dumped their lives in his lap. Duke and Mala were dope addicts who had been sent to the Lexington Narcotics Hospital and released from there, but they were back on dope within a short time after their return to New York. They had some inkling of their predicament but did not know where to turn for help other than to Bill, the seminarian. He agreed to go with them and live with them until they got "unhooked" from the drug. He stayed with them until they seemed to be on their way to recovery. There came a time when they had to go out on their own, and he arranged for them to get jobs many miles from New York in a small city in New England. He kept in touch with them and with their pastor, who reported that they were getting along quite well, although they were associating with some persons of doubtful character. Months passed with no change in the situation, and then one night there was a phone call for Bill from the New England pastor. "I have bad news," he said. "It's Duke and Mala. They are in trouble, serious trouble. They were caught red-handed knocking out a night watchman and they are suspected of a robbery which occurred several nights ago. I thought you should know in case you would want to try to do anything for them."

What was Bill to do? What would you have done? Of course, he wanted to wash his hands of the whole affair. He wanted to say, "I've done all that could possibly be expected; there are other things to do now," but he was called to die to that desire to escape. Of course, he wanted to moralize and say, "They are ungrateful and incorrigible and they don't deserve any more help," but he was called to die to that form of pride. He was called to be the servant of a pair of ungrateful Harlem dope addicts. In human terms there was nothing to hope for, no apparent call to live but only a stark call to die. In human terms it was impossible to answer that call, but Bill answered it anyway. He went to Duke and Mala, not in an effort to obstruct justice, but to help them get a fair trial to assure them that he would come to them even in prison. How could he answer the call to die? Bill explained it something like

this: "In East Harlem there is a church and in that church is preached a gospel. At the heart of that gospel is a cross, for God loves us even when we crucify him." It is he who calls us to take up the cross and follow him.

We are called to love the unlovely not so that they will love us or become better citizens; we have no assurance that they will do either. We are called to serve those in need and suffer with those in sorrow not in order to improve our statistical records or hasten the day when our congregation will become self-supporting; neither may result. We are called to die not as a calculated risk but as a total risk based solely on faith in Christ and in response to his initiative.

The call to take up our cross *is* impossible to answer except for him who first took up his cross. In that cross we know that he has seen our depravity. In forgiveness he has reconciled us to God. He has brought us back into the relationship for which we were created, the relationship which alone is life. Because of his death, our dying daily becomes possible and significant. Because he "suffered, was rejected, was killed and rose again," our *call to die is the call to live.*

Without the cross the call to live is nonsense; without the cross the call to die is impossible. In the cross the call to live and the call to die are *not two calls but one,* the one call which is basic to every other call. We are called to die with Christ in order that we may also live with him.

When this one call becomes clear to us, it must be made clear by us. This is not easy. It never was. Jesus had difficulty making it clear to his disciples, and yet he counts on us to make it clear to the people whom we are called to serve. It is literally a matter of life and death.

Part of our difficulty is a matter of language. In our studies we acquire a technical, theological vocabulary which is extremely important for our academic discipline. Used with precision it can contribute to our thinking and to our exchange of ideas, but carelessly used it can, instead, be an escape from thinking. In our preaching and our teaching we need to be able to translate our theological vocabulary not only for the sake of our listeners but to be certain that we ourselves know what we are talking about! Reinhold Niebuhr recently remarked that "the ordinary student will be fumigated of his esoteric vocabulary by the winds of common sense in about two years after he leaves the seminary."

This is no plea for over-simplification nor for a reduced level of

scholarship. In our modern congregation we encounter more and more people who are giving serious thought to the deepest problems of existence, and to make clear to them the call will require all the scholarly discipline of which we are capable. Many of our ministers complain that they do not have enough time to read as many books as they would like; this is a real problem, but I am not so fearful about the men who *complain* of this situation as I am about the occasional minister who *boasts* that he never has time to read a book.

The problem of making one call clear goes far beyond vocabulary and intellectual understanding. Presenting the call is not only a matter of reporting historical events but of witnessing to them with an urgency, immediacy, and relevance which demand response, whether of acceptance or rejection. Basically, of course, this is the work of the Holy Spirit, but this fact cannot be used as an excuse for us to avoid the responsibilities entrusted to us.

Our words are important, but so are our actions, our attitudes, and everything about us which communicates our convictions—or our lack of them. We may proclaim with all oratorical vigor the significance of the cross and resurrection for all mankind, but if we associate only with the "nice" persons in our community, the others—the ones with whom Jesus associated regularly—may say with utter frankness, "To hell with that church," and their words may be more prophetic than profane. The call to live and the call to die, which are made one in Christ, must be made clear by us.

There are those who think of the call to the ministry as an invitation to a profession much like other professions—one which is slightly underpaid but which is certainly not overcrowded; one which offers considerable prestige and a reasonably comfortable living, usually a nice home, new car regularly, and good opportunity for advancement. But perhaps we are more likely to tremble with a sense of unworthiness. If that is the case, Thornton Wilder has a humorous reminder of a profound truth which is very applicable. Many years ago Thornton Wilder wrote a short play concerning the flight into Egypt. He used three speaking characters: Mary, Joseph, and the donkey Hepzibah. Herod's soldiers are not far behind the fleeing family, but Hepzibah, carrying Mary and the child, refuses to hurry until Mary reveals the identity of the child. Then Hepzibah sees her task in a different light and, according to Wilder's admittedly impossible stage directions, "the pyramids

fly by," but not until Hepzibah has voiced the most profound statement ever attributed to a donkey. She says, "Well, well, it's a queer world where the survival of the Lord is dependent upon a donkey." So it is. It is a queer world where you and I are enlisted in the unfolding of God's purposes.

But it is a wonderful world, too, where we can know in the cross God's love for us, incompetent and sinful though we are. Secure in that love we can set about our work with a zest which comes from knowing not that we are capable but that God is capable of using even us.

God calls us to call others. What a frightening burden! What a glorious responsibility! There is something of both, even as the Christian life seems to be full of strange mixtures of joy and sorrow. Several years ago our family was vacationing in a little New England village where the electrical system was most unreliable. The first brilliant flash of lightning or strong windstorm put all lights out. We soon secured a supply of candles and kept them ready for use. My wife and I did not know what our sons thought of this experience until one day when we had been away from the cottage on an outing until dusk and encountered a storm on our way back. As we drove through the rain the children began speculating as to whether or not the lights would be out when we reached the house. Our younger son first inquired as to whether candles were available and after being assured that they were he said, "Then I hope the lights are out. It's fun to be afraid when we're together."

When we face the responsibility of communicating God's call to others, there is bound to be a mixture of anticipation and hesitation. But in the presence of God and in the community of those who are reconciled to him and to one another, we can know joy in the midst of inevitable sorrows, we can know the life that grows out of dying daily. "Whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it."

Seven Types of Offense

By Geoffrey Clive

For instance, I have often been *careful* to take offense at something—not for any good reason, but merely because I wanted to. Gentlemen, you yourselves know that if one takes causeless offense—the sort of offense which one brings upon oneself—one ends by being really, and in every truth, offended.—Dostoyevsky, *Letters from the Underworld.*

SINCE the Enlightenment a great deal of literature has concerned itself with the "offended" individual who for one reason or another, or for no reason at all, is affronted by the world. Leopardi and the sheer tedium of existence, Hardy and the moral neutrality of nature, Kierkegaard and the religious neutrality of Christians in Christendom, Nietzsche and Flaubert with their resentment against middle-class culture, Kafka and Camus evoking the absurdity of existence—all these are expressions of "offense" elicited by the now familiar patterns of alienation and uprootedness in modern life. They are distinguishable though not separable from the strains, stresses, slights, and insults which perennially incline mankind to assume the role of the victimized. Moreover, as Dostoyevsky in particular so shrewdly observed, we have an infinite capacity for feeling offended even where we cannot put our finger on any specific cause, but like the sickness of the hypochondriac this type of offense is no less real for being intangible and possibly imaginary.

In what follows I propose to explore seven forms of "offense" that have manifested themselves over and over again in human experience and reflection. My focus on nineteenth century and contemporary literature is motivated by the peculiar relevance of this notion to major currents of thought which gained momentum right after the French Revolution. This peculiarity, I should like to emphasize, does not presuppose that at any time some men were not out of joint with the way things were going or unaware of passing through a crisis. Inasmuch as rationality involves self-transcendence, certain underlying tensions that make for "offense"—between life and death, for instance—are inescapably present. But the ontological grounds of offense do not collide with its

prevalence and persistency in recent times. The predominance of negativity characteristic of the modern critical spirit undoubtedly helps to account for this state of affairs.

As so many things, the term "offense" has come into general intellectual usage in recent years by way of theology and, more specifically, through the writings of Kierkegaard. In *Training In Christianity* and *Attack Upon Christendom* he contrasts the offense of the Cross with the diluted and sentimentalized faith of his contemporaries. The offense of the Cross rests for him essentially on the incompatibility of the way of Jesus (to the Cross) with the natural instincts and desires of unredeemed man. His major point seems to be that the kind of self-fulfillment humanists and hedonists had advocated since the Renaissance, sometimes as being complementary to the Christian religion, on other occasions in ignorance of it, is at best tangential to the suffering and self-denial implicit in New Testament Christianity. Above all, Kierkegaard insisted on honesty. It was not so much the perennial fact that most men do not want to be Christian which inspired his polemic as what he felt to be the nefarious nineteenth century bourgeois hypocrisy whereby they pretended to a faith and salvation that was radically remote from their accustomed way of life. So Kierkegaard, with bitter irony and Socratic exaggeration, sets out to show how unnatural and unreasonable and unforgiving Jesus really was when compared to the religious tolerance and *laissez faire* philosophy of life of the middle classes.

It is not necessary to go along entirely with Kierkegaard's Christology to be grasped by the power of his argument. That it is not easy to become a Christian may or may not have been a commonplace in the age of the catacombs, but the possibility of its being arduous appears to have been pretty well overlooked by the middle of the nineteenth century. Even the devout Evangelicals in their fervent moral earnestness hardly acknowledged any discontinuity between their highly civilized piety and the bliss of things to come. Thus E. M. Foster in his beautiful domestic biography of his great-aunt, Marianne Thornton, tells us that many Evangelical families, as they prayed together in their decorous homes, had strong expectations of being reunited (after death) under similar circumstances. Later on I shall return to a closer examination of Kierkegaard's usage of "offense." In the meantime it is well to keep in mind that the *particularism and exclusivism* connected with the

Christian notion of offense are hardly unique to it. Interestingly enough, the most ardent nationalists in the nineteenth century were often the most liberal Christians as well. In other words, they could envisage otherworldly salvation for everyone so long as he was respectable, like themselves, but really to succeed in this world you had to be a Prussian or an Austrian or a Frenchman. Similarly, there were many who found *faith* in miracles or divinity offensive but who did not hesitate to worship Napoleon, the educational process as soteriological, or the future of the white race. Not uncharacteristic of man, therefore, is his ambiguous attitude toward offense: while accepting it wholeheartedly in one sphere of life he repudiates it with equal vigor in another for being "non-liberal."

What is perhaps the most basic and recurring type of offense derives from *unsatisfied desire*. A child who does not get his will and bursts into tears, a man unrequited in love, a woman not provided with all the things she thinks she ought to have are each instances of a kind of unfulfillment which appears to be part and parcel of the human condition. Whether we show or suppress the fact, all of us profess cravings that by the very nature of our circumstances cannot be satisfied. The reason for this may be either that what we want for ourselves is unattainable or that it is bad for us and we are denied by others for our as well as their own or the common good. Whereas the head may come to recognize insatiable appetites and blind desires for what they are, our whole nature tends to be offended regardless. We are convinced at the moment of frustration that we ought not to be frustrated, whatever the nature of our demands upon reality. With respect to the offense of unsatisfied desire, it matters little whether or not the desire expressed can be judged legitimate. An old man brooding over his lost youth is as offended by the passing of time as a Romantic hero waiting for opportunity to open. Stifled vanity can be as painful as hunger cramps.

Since the satisfaction of one desire often results in the emergence of another, philosophers have spoken of the paradox of unsatisfied desire, meaning that to be human is to be perpetually dissatisfied—saturated or athirst. Both the boredom which follows on satisfaction and the anxiety which attends realization bear witness to the overall frustrated condition of mankind. I am not concerned here with the evidence for or against the truth of this generalization except to point out that since the middle of the eighteenth century down to the present it has been ac-

cepted as a first principle by virtually all the major writers and thinkers. Kant based his arguments for God and immortality on the bifurcation of the natural and noumenal aspects of our nature. Even where our intentions to become virtuous in this life are forceful, we lack sufficient time to realize their end. Only in some indefinite future state may we be made whole again, rewarded in accordance with what we are. The great Romantic poets and novelists and their innumerable disciples have repeatedly sounded this Kantian theme, to be sure in their own distinctive terminology. No literature but modern is equally filled with persons who feel one thing but think its opposite, pining for death while clinging to life, revolting against order in the name of order, loving freely to secure eternal love. Whereas the offense of unsatisfied desire has its roots in the universal experience of frustration, its acuteness in modern thought stands out as a special datum. Ordinarily this form of offense has little poetic or religious significance. The majority of adults accept it without too much fuss as a necessary condition for staying alive unless it is directly identifiable with social injustice. With most of our unsatisfied desires we learn to say to ourselves: after all, life is not a fairy tale. A good deal, though by no means all, of the raving and ranting in Western poetry and prose after 1750 is due to idealized adolescence. Certainly few tragic figures make their appearance in it.

A more reflective type of offense is that of *unconnected matters of fact*. Man need not reflect to have inordinate or frustrated desires, but understanding the world as meaningless, unjust, indifferent, or malevolent presupposes some deliberation on experience beyond, in Dostoyevsky's phrase, "the capacity for receiving impressions." Metaphysics and religion have served for thousands of years—alas, in vain—to remove this particular "offense" from our apprehension of reality. The order-imposing mind of man cannot tolerate an external world seemingly devoid of all purpose and design if not hostile to human realization of any sort. Nature's neutrality and outright opposition to our ends is an affront especially to the moral faculties. Elaborate ontologies and theodicies notwithstanding, Job's position on this dilemma has proved itself as most in accord with our actual experience of suffering, evil, and senselessness. Without the tensions of faith (yet another form of offense) there is no answer, there are only encounters between individuals and their destiny, many of them unintelligible like Job's, which must be met spitefully or piously, but in either case with courage to live on. Some

men have resigned themselves to the unaccountable facets of experience, though rarely without a note of bitterness or disenchantment entering into their lives as a result. Others have assumed that it is entirely up to us what we make of life. Thus meaninglessness is attributed to our failure to make things meaningful by developing the appropriate attitudes toward them: if you don't expect anything you won't be disappointed. No doubt individuals have been enabled to sustain the hardest blows in this manner, yet it remains difficult to see how the daemonic aspects of human contingency and history, for example, are resolved by calling them something else or pretending they do not exist. For unless we are prepared to suspend our notions of righteousness and goodness in the face of brute fact, the incommensurability of what objectively transpires with alternate more sensible possibilities remains as an irreducible datum. From an abstract point of view, everything may be seen to conspire together to produce the greatest quantity of good, but such a vision, even where seriously entertained, fails to bridge the chasm between life and thought.

Unable to go along with the rationalists, empiricists, and naturalists who, roughly starting with Hobbes, made the offense of unconnected matters of fact a pseudo-problem in philosophy, many of the existentialist thinkers decided on it as the cornerstone of their philosophizing. Thrown into a world they experienced fundamentally as blind and deceitful (in spite of Bishop Butler's *Analogy*) since the traditional arguments and consolations were no longer efficacious, they desperately strove to evolve a new religion. As the offense of unsatisfied desire in modern literature is symptomatic of a pervasive Romanticism which may be said to have reached its seminal point with Rousseau, the offense of unconnected matters of fact is, in its radical manifestations since the Enlightenment, an outgrowth of an uninterrupted spiritual crisis. Dostoyevsky's novels are filled with characters who, with little expectation of finding any answer, probe relentlessly, even masochistically, the mysteries of human existence. The hero of *Letters from the Underworld* is, taking due account of his personal pathology, the conscience of modern thought. Either he tries to ignore what he hates to be bothered with or he indulges in the wildest speculations and actions, meanwhile despising himself on both counts. But apart from the extremes toward which the offense of unconnected matters of fact has gravitated in Marx's alleged scientific philosophy of history, in the aberrations of much modern art

and music, in the devil-worship of the French symbolists and the appeal of theosophy, it has always been present in human life. So long as man thinks, he must rebel against his fate of finding himself in an incomprehensible order. Because he had faith Job did not develop a philosophy of the absurd, though he was quite familiar with the kind of experience that gave rise to it in Camus. Only recognition of unconnected matters of fact for what they are (Hume), and their acceptance for human existence (Freud and psychotherapy), can theoretically eliminate this offense. But it is extremely doubtful that human beings will ever act accordingly, or even that they should. If man is self-transcending, such acceptance, while mitigating suffering of one variety, will accentuate another through guilt. For how can a creature not solely of this world absolutize it without self-betrayal? The tragic drama is unthinkable without this offense. *Oedipus* and *King Lear* have as their common theme the mystery of abused innocence.

The offense of *particularism and exclusivism* is familiar to everyone who, justly or arbitrarily, has been excluded from a group: to the schoolboy ostracized by the regular gang on account of his frailty, to the proletarian worker snubbed by his white-collar foreman, to the nonconformist consigned beyond the pale of salvation, to the discriminated member of a so-called "inferior" race. In nineteenth century thought Marxism, racism, nationalism, imperialism, and the Romantic ideologies as well made much of the differences which set groups and individuals apart, even encouraging elites which, it came to be argued, were predestined to lord it over those unfit to determine their own destiny. While this type of thinking was patently opposed to the democratic ideal, its hold on all classes of Western society should not be underestimated. Bizarre class consciousness was not confined to the British, the Socialists, and the Ultra-royalists, nor can its pervasiveness be accounted for merely on political and economic grounds. The novels of Thomas Mann, Thackeray, Proust, and the great Russian writers clearly indicate the unreasoning pride which often motivated the offensive behavior both of the aristocracy and of the middle classes. Whether it was the idealization of making and preserving fortunes, of talent necessarily distributed to but a few, of a genteel way of life or hereditary line, it invariably exceeded most bounds of decency and compassion for those who did not belong. Marx with his vindictive hatred for the bourgeoisie hardly stood on stronger moral footing than the enemy he worked to depose.

Tolerance in the modern world was never the simple phenomenon so many liberals took it to be.

Interestingly enough, the same class which developed a just reputation for snobbery and intense nationalism was prepared to extend the blessings of Christianity to anyone with a sound moral sense. It was largely against this attitude toward salvation that Kierkegaard launced his attack on Christendom. Why was it, one wonders, that the very people who stimulated particularism and exclusivism in literature, politics, and society were unwilling to face up to the straight and narrow path spelled out in the New Testament? An answer that suggests itself immediately is that people are esoterically oriented only toward those aspects of their lives which concern them ultimately. Today there are still many Christians who on the one hand cannot abide the notion of a closed salvation but on the other will not even listen to anyone not fully sharing their political and cultural presuppositions. This inconsistency between the acceptance of particularism for certain spheres of activity and its repudiation for others is, I am sure, an illuminating clue to our present spiritual condition. The ideal of making everything worthwhile accessible to everybody is fine so long as it is kept in mind that not everybody desires everything worthwhile, and beyond that many are prone to corrupt and distort what they cannot understand.

The offense of particularism and exclusivism is, like the other types already delineated, a universally present feature of human existence resting on the obvious proposition that all men are unequal in many respects and that their lives by choice or dire necessity reflect this inequality at every turning. Far more exacerbating than natural inequality are the varieties imposed on individuals by society. In either case resentment, jealousy, rebelliousness, and hatred are recurring moods aroused in those outside of something they feel they ought to be in on. Whether or not this common reaction against the esoteric is warranted by the facts must be decided on the merits of each case in accordance with principles that are rarely self-evident. If this were under discussion here, one would have to show, for instance, in what sense an organization is entitled to act prejudicially in selecting its members. Immediately relevant are particularism and exclusivism as elements in the Christian scheme of redemption and in religion generally. Kierkegaard undoubtedly is guilty of his customary exaggeration in assigning paramount

significance to "offense" as a pre-condition for being grasped by the meaning of the Cross, but there can be no question of its being a central motif in the New Testament and not absent from the Old. Following Christ as depicted in the Gospels is hardly commensurate with yielding to a natural instinct, nor are the facts related therein free from paradox and questionable moral sensitivity. Jesus was not a popular hero. If he suggested in some of his sayings that all of mankind might be saved, in others he made it plain that only those could enter the kingdom who chose to accept his terms for doing so, making it quite clear that he did not expect the majority to take that option. He offended against family feeling in the treatment of his mother, against natural knowledge in his performance of miracles, against moderation in his censoriousness toward the barren fig tree, against justice in not explaining himself before Pilate. Add to this the Christology implicit in or decorating the Gospels—Christ as at once exalted and humiliated—and there cannot be much doubt that most of us would feel like Ivan or the Grand Inquisitor if our experience of Christianity were anything but vicarious.

In building up his case against bourgeois Christendom Kierkegaard virtually ignored those features of New Testament Christianity which, it might be said, deepen the offense even further than his indictment is apt to disclose. Thus Jesus not only denied the world but came to give life here and now; not only did he accept suffering but ministered to relieve it; not only did he single out the poor, hurt, and insulted for his attentions but he defended the relative luxury of having his body well cared for, contrary to the evangelical communism of some of his critics. In brief, Jesus is invariably more complex and less intelligible than even his profoundest interpreters make him out to be. Kierkegaard was right in his insistence that those who are not offended by him at all cannot bear witness to his truth, but the offense he concentrated on in his analysis circumscribed but one of many discernible layers. A corrective should not be expected to take the place of a balanced view, and Kierkegaard brilliantly surmised that a balanced view of everything, including the Christian faith, had become the chief idol of his generation, behind whose respectability many hid from confrontation and commitment. Considering the fact that he addressed himself to a Christendom in which everyone felt Christian by virtue of consumption and belonging, his attack was very appropriate.

Particularism and exclusivism are so easily abhorred these days

that they require a defense. I have already mentioned the inconsistency of liberals who cry out against any "chosen people" and then talk only to one another. More important, it seems to me irrefutable that nothing great is everybody's cup of tea. Be it the Buddhist, the Christian, or the Socratic way of life, it is folly to suppose that it exercises a universal claim. When such a claim is put forward in their name it must properly be judged as potential rather than actual. The possibility of becoming a Christian is an act of grace freely bestowed, never a necessity. Religions do compete with each other for our allegiance, and the ensuing tensions set up by this embarrassing situation in our minds must be struggled with as other tensions must be. If everyone naturally sought salvation, all religions would be superfluous. And the same, incidentally, applies to the domains of education and art. Mainly because an individual is offended by his own ignorance does he set out in quest of authentic knowledge. And many men obviously are not thus offended. Not everybody loves Bach and Shakespeare, but why should the non-lovers be envious of those who do and the lovers condescending toward those who do not? The worldly tragedy of Christianity and other "narrow ways" has been to translate genuine particularism into persecution. But there is no inevitable connection between them. Kierkegaard, for example, never voiced a theological hatred of non-Christians. He could not abide Christians who pretended to be what they were not. What they actually were was their own business. Men will always will different ends, and it is sad but not improbable that what most of them desire will bring neither happiness nor peace. The illusions and lies that alienate nations and individuals do not cancel the real differences between them. Each of us is offended, genuinely so, by his loneliness in a dangerous world.

A fourth type of offense, closely tied to the last, is that of *saintliness*. Analogous to the anticipations of boredom aroused in our mortal natures by the Christian heaven is the pique and cynicism with which we are apt to regard purity of heart in a fellow human being. The complete absence of ulterior motives is even more difficult to fathom than the ways of the devil. Dostoyevsky's classical representations of innocence in Prince Myshkin, Sonia, and Father Zosima emphasize the uneasiness they stirred up in those they sought to help. Individuals who refuse to be measured by our common standards of compromise and accommodation make us feel inadequate and therefore angry in spite of the fact that we may secretly revere them. This is especially true of

saints who are not the saintly-hero type, whose external appearance and occasional eccentricity of behavior seem to belie their status. The note of ill-suppressed glee in our frequent admission that to be human is to err, that everyone has his faults, that without our weaknesses we would be uninteresting, is inescapable. Not only is the uncompromising idealist impractical and clumsy as he goes about his affairs, but he seems to misunderstand matters so much of the time. The Grand Inquisitor knew what he was talking about when he remarked that the ecclesiastical establishment had done an infinitely superior job in organizing the means of salvation than Jesus would ever have done. No wonder he found his reappearance on earth such a nuisance. And so would we. Saintly conduct is basically unintelligible. It always implies a transvaluation of values which collides with common sense and habits. Hence Kant dissociated a holy will from moral beings. God alone is purely good, beyond good and evil. But in Christianity the Word became flesh, and mortal saints became a possibility. Perfectionism wounds us where we are most vulnerable, in our assumption that a life regarded as respectable by the best minds and standards of the day should not be subject to sudden revision. Aristotle's golden mean is difficult enough to live up to as it is. Goodness exceeding that is "offense," save in a wish or in a dream.

Though an extreme form of unsatisfied desire, the offense of *death* deserves special mention because, more unmistakably than any other "stage on life's way," it exposes human contingency. Men are often judged by how they died, and our attitudes toward death are a reliable index to what we really believe life is for. It is virtually impossible to pose a metaphysic on the point of death. Tolstoi in *The Death of Ivan Ilyitch* has given us the deepest view of death in all modern literature: Ivan's unwillingness to face it, his terror when it can no longer be got out of his mind, his desperate clinging to familiar surroundings, however oppressive they were under ordinary circumstances, the merciless finality of his end—these are universal reactions to the phenomenon. What is so offensive about death, apart from the pain and suffering which often accompany its coming, is the implicit threat of meaninglessness. Why make so much fuss about living if all must come to this? Death does in fact tend to make us look ridiculous with our petty worries and commotions, our preoccupation with trifles as if our lives depended on them. Even where death is experienced as

the gateway to possible eternal life, it does not lose its sting as an inescapable limiting concept for our mortal selves. Socrates is reported to have died cheerfully, but his friends were distraught and Plato caught their mood in his marvelous account.

How powerfully death brings home to us the proneness to accident attending our most carefully laid plans, the brutal interruption of the highest love pledged unto eternity, the instability of our firmest foundations. Stoicism and certain varieties of modern naturalism do not recognize death as offensive. Everything which lives dies as naturally as it came into being. But man is not merely natural. He knows that he must die, as Pascal put it, and hence death for him is qualitatively different from death for a flower or a dog. Moreover, the cultivation of equanimity, imperturbability, and aloofness does not alter the objective character of death as the irreversible separation from life as we know it, whatever comfort these virtues may give us in accepting it courageously. Since the Enlightenment many thinkers have questioned the traditional priority attached to abidingness and permanence as necessary conditions for real experience. Why not enjoy the fleetingness of each moment, including the moment of death? Everlastingness is undramatic in any event. But human beings who do not wish to be separated from those who love them and whom they love, who Hamlet-like are more anxious about the unexplored than the experienced mysteries, find small comfort in the consolations of common sense. For death strikes us as at least a little bit uncommon-sensical. Although Christianity is the religion of the Resurrection, death, the human death of God, is the pivotal event in the Gospels. And Jesus himself dying on the Cross was offended by death: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

Critics of Romanticism and its next of kin, existentialism, like to point out that the crisis-thinking of the twentieth century is but another in a series of literary celebrations of adolescence going back to the end of the Enlightenment period. In other words, so their argument runs, being unable to take things at their face value, you wax emotional over them and become prey to a vicious circle of false hopes, fears, regrets, and faiths. If only Blake, Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, Tennyson, Camus, and their disciples would suppress some of their *infinite passion* and gaze on reality with the sanguine coolness of a Hume, they and we would have been spared a great deal of superfluous pain. This line of criticism is not to be confused with the conventional strictures on

sentimentality and overwroughtness, nor does it fall under the kind of doctrinaire naturalism which views man as the most intricate machine on earth. The offense of *infinite passion,* the dialectical contrary of the offense of unconnected matters of fact, is quite compatible with the recognition of man as a self-transcending creature, so long as this element of self-transcendence is kept in check, not allowed to intrude more than indistinguishably in our apprehension of things. Whereas those offended by unconnected matters of fact will pay the greatest attention to what they feel something ought to be rather than to the thing itself, those who are offended by infinite passion will concentrate on the latter, suspending or compartmentalizing their individual responses as much as possible. Thus they assert the relative irrelevance of our longings and cravings to a world view in opposition to the idealistic, the Romantic, the Christian, and the existentialist who maintain that without these longings and cravings there would not be any inquisitiveness in the first place, so that, however we apprehend something, it is perforce colored by our passional and volitional nature. If kowledge, especially of what engages us profoundly, has not something of the unity of subject and object Hegel insisted on, it comes to resemble the famous "night in which all cows are black." On this point, by the way, Christian reflection during the nineteenth century was rightly indebted to German Idealism. No wonder, then, that Kierkegaard without Hegel is unthinkable.

The offense of infinite passion, though a desirable corrective to certain excesses of Romanticism, has given rise to a cult of objectivism which is pernicious in its own way. What Ortega y. Gasset called the dehumanization of man is in part this attempt to isolate the idealizing and emotive faculties from apprehension posited as purely cognitive. The counterpart of the Romantic who thinks with his heart and feels with his head is the analytical historian, sociologist, composer, or what have you who appreciates with his senses and understands with his brain as if any such bifurcation in human experience were ever actual. Much of the dryness and dreariness in contemporary music and scholarship can be attributed to a fear and revulsion from the creative powers of man. He who is deeply offended by Keats's imagery or a Schumann melody (and there are many today) is inclined to condemn subjectivity as ruinous and deceiving. But why? Is it not partly because he is afraid to come to terms with his own subjectivity, like the middle-aged Goethe

turning his back on the best of his lyrical poetry? Seen from Mars, the twentieth century scene is probably no more absurd than the high Middle Ages, but for a human being living and thinking in either period, this is hardly the question. The offense of infinite passion, in modern life, is an inverted escapism from the problem of meaning, an escapism whose wide currency and respectability in our day is by way of rationalization curiously linked with the phenomenal successes of the natural sciences. Even where man seeks to understand himself as pure object, he remains subject, "listening with the third ear." And in so far as he is subject, he is infinitely passionate because that is his nature. Plato, whom few would accuse of Romanticism in the bad sense, resorted to myth to bridge the gulf between the world as it really seems to be and the world in which man has his being. Biblical revelation is a variant of this fundamental human need for redemption. It can only be temporized at the price of flashing a detachment that easily degenerates into insensitivity. The offense of infinite passion to be genuine requires the offense of unconnected matters of fact as its handmaiden. Together they describe man's ambivalent relationship to this world.

The seventh and final type of offense I should like to distinguish is the *offense of faith,* not only of the Christian faith, which in recent years has become familiar enough through the Barthians, but of faith in general. Faith in the sense of trust and confidence is already offensive to us because the struggle for existence discourages and tends to make it look ridiculous. The shrewd and worldly man trusts nothing and nobody save a lucky break. Though this is merely a manner of speaking and is strictly speaking untrue, any movement of faith is opposed to sheer calculation, while getting along well in this world depends primarily on the systematic pursuit of self-enlightened interest. Of course, the individual who prides himself on not trusting anybody or anything unless his evidence is all in, besides being inconsistent, cuts himself off from a great number of experiences, such as love, that are inconceivable within a strict Machiavellian framework. Hume, James, and Santayana, none of whom can be accused of religious orthodoxy, have commonly affirmed the indispensability of faith, be it in the existence of the external world, in the possibility of happiness, or in a realm of essences integral to reality. But modern man in particular, as James rightly saw, is reluctant to profess any greater degree of faith than is essential for him to get along. Our recoil in religion from dogma, in

science from certainty, and in morals from commitment are all parts of the same nexus of tentativeness and relativism which after a liberating phase threatens to tyrannize over us in turn. In James's apt phrase, we have reached a point where we would rather be damned than make a mistake. This is as evident today in the kind of pedantic scholarship that lays primary stress on a correct presentation of footnotes (accuracy over subject matter) as in much of contemporary philosophy (the right use of language over having anything to communicate). If one's faith is confined to the primitive concepts of a system, one should not expect to say anything, and certainly one should not deprecate faith, for then even the primitive concepts disappear and one has absolutely nothing.

Blind faith, meaning acquiescence in unexamined propositions as true, has justly been contested with vigor in modern thought since the seventeenth century. But faith as the admission of dependence on presuppositions and data without which we could not begin to be critical, as willingness to trust another human being though his trustworthiness is beyond the pale of strict determination, faith in the Jamesian sense (where evidence by itself is inadequate to decide) of taking a risk on a forced option, and faith in the Kierkegaardian sense of a heightened level of spirituality attained only by a leap, by tearing ourselves away from what is comfortable and accustomed, continues to make claims upon us. Nothing great is in fact accomplished without faith. Without it we could not get seriously married, or plan a long-range project, or devote ourselves to a hopeless cause of whose rightness we are unshakably convinced. Faith in these instances means risk-taking, putting oneself out, short of assurances of success or gain, becoming interested in spite of indifference. Its offensiveness lies precisely in the insecurity inseparable from it. Jesus performed miracles only for those who laid themselves open to grave disappointment and mockery by believing in him. If desperation is great enough, the offense of faith may become preferable to the offense of death; on the other hand, suffering and anxiety frequently strengthen disbelief. Job's wife has not been alone in believing in nothing any longer. Thus even the appeal of Jesus through miracles was far from obvious. It is common-sensical not to believe in miracles or miracle-workers, especially when things look terrible.

The offense of faith, then, is rooted in our preference for security and predictability to venturesomeness and contingency. We do not relish unprecedented confrontations that may compel us to scrap our

whole mode of existence. To be sure, faith in what makes us content with ourselves and enables us to pursue a single course without interference, we spontaneously realize in our activities. As soon as faith means following a will other than our accustomed one, we shrink away from it, often into an all too plausible suspiciousness and worldly caution. Faith in Jesus as the Saviour of mankind presents special problems over which theologians, notably Kierkegaard in modern times, have pondered deeply. My point is that the radical offense which the great Danish thinker stressed in his interpretation of New Testament Christianity may be unique in degree with respect to the infant-God helpless in the cradle and with respect to Christ thirsty on the Cross, but not in kind with respect to others. The foolishness of the Cross is an archetype foolishness of which many lesser instances can be found in human experience. How many leaps into the dark must we take each day in order to get through it? The mere recognition that appearance is not reality constitutes offense enough.

The seven types of offense are always with us. It is our attitude toward them, both individually and as members of groups, which helps illuminate the ethos of an era. Still in the minds of many today, science will gradually remove the offense of unsatisfied desire; aided and abetted by liberalism and democracy it will transform this world into an inoffensive gadget-paradise. Death, if not conquered, will be indefinitely postponed, class differences will disappear, frustrations will evaporate, faith will be proved beyond doubt (thanks to the philosophy of religion), saints and prophets will be venerated during their lifetime (also geniuses—true ones, that is), and all passion will be directed toward constructive and manageable enterprises. Aldous Huxley has vividly shown us how deodorizers and remarkable improvements in sanitation have in fact exterminated many traditional offenses. But even should the ideal society of the future come into being, there remains Dostoyevsky's Underground Man: "Gentlemen, you yourselves know that if one takes causeless offense—the sort of offense which one brings upon oneself—one ends by being really, and in every truth, offended."

The Suomi Synod's Stream of Living Tradition

By Walter J. Kukkonen

LET us understand at the outset that a concern for tradition need express neither unwholesome conservatism nor unwholesome provincialism, although that possibility is ever present and must be recognized as a real danger. To speak of a tradition is simply to recognize the historical character of the Christian faith. To begin with, over against non-Christian traditions ours is a Christian tradition. Futhermore, in speaking of the Protestant tradition we speak of something in which we also share. Within the Protestant tradition there is the stream of Evangelical Lutheranism, which also defines the bounds of the Suomi stream. However, to identify these two by saying simply that the Suomi stream is an Evangelical Lutheran stream, which statement in itself is very true, is to ignore important historical facts and factors. On the other hand, and as a consequence, it is impossible to say that the Suomi stream is the Evangelical Lutheran stream, thereby denying the Evangelical Lutheran character of other traditions.

We may approach the problem of tradition from several sides. Let us note but two of them. There is the side that has to do with the interpretation of revelation as the source or origin of the truth content of Christian faith. Christianity in general considers divine revelation as the source of all knowledge of God. The manner in which the church answers the question of general and special revelation contributes in an important way to the development of tradition within that church. The Roman Catholic tradition operates with a doctrine of revelation which includes the writings of the fathers, the decisions of councils, and the pronouncements of popes as infallible authorities on doctrine. Within Protestantism we have the tendency to soft-pedal creeds and confessions, and this, ironical as it may seem, has given birth to a multiplicity of creeds and confessions, including a Lutheran confessional position. But even within Lutheranism there is difference of opinion as to the function of the confessions.

It is a well known fact that nearly all the sects of Christendom, even as the major churches themselves, claim allegiance to the Bible.

It often appears, in fact, that instead of uniting the various streams of tradition with the church, the Bible has created more of them. Of course, it is not the Bible that has divided the church but the way in which men have understood and interpreted its message. In most instances the culprit has been a naive, unhistorical, and unbiblical confusion of revelation and tradition, God's action and man's response. The most dangerous form of dogmatism is that of the man who claims to have no dogmas, only the Bible. Thus the most important aspect of the problem of revelation is the attitude, theoretical and practical, toward the Bible. Ultimately, this problem turns out to be one of hermeneutics.

The other side from which we may approach the problem of tradition is that of emphasis upon particular doctrines or facets of divine revelation. Even though churches may agree in regard to the total content of revelation, there yet remains the problem of the relationship between various doctrines, the problem of emphasis. Even a casual reading of the Letter to the Romans and the Letter of James makes clear that there is in the *corpus doctrinae* of the Bible a doctrine of faith and a doctrine of works. It is not sufficient to accept both *per se,* to say simply that both faith and works are necessary. The real question is one of relationship, which comes first or which is basic. Are we to accept the position of Roman Catholicism or that of the Augsburg Confession? Both demand both! Again, take the doctrines of justification by faith and sanctification. In the matter of the relationship between faith and works in a general sense, all of Protestantism stands over against Roman Catholicism. That does not mean, however, that all Protestant churches are therefore agreed in regard to all aspects of the relationship between justification and sanctification. Hermann Sasse writes: "Although both churches hold that justification by faith is a doctrine without which the church cannot exist at all as a true church, the *place* of this article of faith in the sum of Christian doctrine differs in such a way that Lutherans and Reformed also give it a different meaning."[1] Christ himself is concerned with the problem of relationship or emphasis when he says, "But seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" (Matt. 6:33). After all, he himself has taught us that there is such a thing as a Christian doctrine of daily bread, even as there is a doctrine of the kingdom of God.

In defining the Suomi stream of tradition we shall view the con-

1 Hermann Sasse, *Here We Stand* (Minneapolis, 1938), p. 111.

tent of revelation from the side of distinct emphases. In general, all the religious movements that have had a part in the development of this tradition have been faithful to the confessions of the Lutheran Church. The problem has not been one of rejecting or accepting this or that doctrine but of emphasizing one or another.

Lest we become proud in regard to ourselves or impatient in regard to others, we need to bear in mind that in discussing our tradition we are talking largely, if not exclusively, of our response to the revelation of God and not of that revelation. And yet, though our talk is about our response, our concern should be with God's revelation. The stream of tradition, like a stream of water, has two component parts, the water and the bed. The amount and nature of the water depends primarily and largely upon the source of the stream; the nature of the bed depends upon the terrain and soil through which the stream flows. For this reason the Nile is different from the Niagara, and the Missouri as it flows across the prairies is different from the Colorado working its way through Grand Canyon. Without pressing the analogy too far, may we suggest that our purpose here is not to stand beside the Niagara or the Colorado and, admiring the tremendous gorges, feel sorry for the farmers dwelling on the banks of the Nile and the Missouri. Nor, standing beside the Nile and gratefully acknowledging the tremendous fertility of the soil for which her waters are responsible, are we proposing to pity the farmers who receive no such blessing from the Niagara. Ours must not be the interest of a tourist or a scientist but of a person whose eternal livelihood depends upon the waters of the stream beside which he has his dwelling and who has the tremendous responsibility of channeling those waters to others. But can we not learn something about the water of the stream by comparing notes with others who live beside similar streams? As we stand on the rim of Grand Canyon we learn something about the tremendous force, destructive or helpful, of a stream of water. This we can hardly learn beside the banks of the Nile, where our lesson is in fertilization.

Having said this, we need to be reminded that the Christian faith is not thereby reduced to an empirical phenomenon pure and simple. True, the stream is often colored and otherwise affected by the soil through which it flows, so that we may say: "We recognize that Christianity makes itself at home in various cultures and takes a coloring from them. We believe that every nation will bring its tribute to the

common treasury of Christian faith and life."[2] But it is preposterous to attempt "to explain the Christian religion by any theory of 'social conditioning.' "[3] In the words of Alan Richardson: "The social expression of the Christian religion has varied considerably along with the variations of social custom and economic structure; but it is not true to say that the central affirmations of the Christian faith have themselves changed with changing social and economic developments."[4] The problem of tradition remains as long as the Christian church lives from the Word of God in the world.

Non-Theological Factors Associated With Suomi Tradition

Much as we may dislike the fact that Suomi has been long and consistently an immigrant church and much as we may hate to admit that our efforts to reach the non-Finnish unchurched in our communities have been spasmodic and feeble, we need to recognize without any embarrassment that we are closer to the Church of Finland than any other Lutheran church in America to her parent body, both in regard to time—barely half a century has elapsed since our forefathers emigrated from Finland—and in regard to ties, which have been strong throughout the years and have grown stronger since World War II.

The Suomi Synod, like every other Lutheran body in America, originated as an immigrant church and its purpose was to minister to the spiritual needs of the Finnish immigrants. The first effort by Finnish immigrants to organize a congregation was a joint one with Swedes and Norwegians in 1867 in Houghton County of Upper Michigan. Nine years later the Finns had the congregation largely to themselves, and when the Norwegian pastor left they joined the newly organized Finnish congregation in Calumet in calling a pastor from Finland. When the Suomi Synod was organized in 1890, nine congregations were represented. Within ten years the number had grown to 49 with a total membership of 12,000. By 1910 there were in the synod 120 congregations with a total baptized membership of over 27,000. Another decade later a kind of high-water mark was reached with 163 congregations and over 36,000 baptized members. The 184 congregations in 1928 represent the highest figure in the history of the synod. Many of these

2 "Report of the Lund Conference on Faith and Order," p. 20.
3 Alan Richardson, *Christian Apologetics* (London, 1948), p. 71.
4 *Ibid.*, pp. 70 f.

congregations have died and new ones have been organized, but the fact remains that the 1956 figure stood at 159 congregations. The baptized membership in 1928 was slightly under 32,000, and it dropped to 24,000 in 1934. The present figure is 34,193.

It is quite evident, then, that our synod has depended almost entirely on Finnish immigrants for her members. With the exhaustion of this supply and a relative decrease in the birth rate, the baptized membership decreased as noted above during the 1930's. Failure on the part of congregations to inaugurate English work meant that many of the young people, especially young married couples, were lost to other Lutheran congregations. It is significant that even at present the ratio of attendance at Finnish and English services on a given Sunday is 4 to 7, and that more congregations use Finnish than English at their business meetings. This is important from the point of view of our tradition, for it means that the process of Americanization was greatly decelerated. In terms of our tradition our synod is even closer to the Church of Finland than her age would warrant.

Another factor that demands our attention is the geographical origin of the waves of immigrants that reached American shores during the formative years of the synod. The early immigrants came largely from Northern Finland. Prior to 1882 the total number of immigrants from Finland was about 12,000. During the following decade, however, over 36,000 came from the provinces of Vaasa and Oulu alone. At the end of the last century three-fourths of all Finnish immigrants were from the province of Vaasa. During the first decade of the present century they continued to number about 50 per cent of the total.

In addition to representing a certain geographical area of Finland, the immigrants also came from the rural areas of the country, so much so that the problem of immigration was by and large a peasant problem. During 1907 and 1908 only about 12 to 14 per cent of the immigrants were from the cities.

The full significance of these factors becomes clear in the light of the social and economic conditions that prevailed in Finland around the turn of the century. Antagonism toward Christianity had been in evidence among the educated, especially the Swedes, since 1880, but it did not burst into open flame until the country-wide strike in 1905, which the laboring class organized for the purpose of gaining seats in the Finnish diet. Prior to 1896 the labor movement in Finland had de-

veloped along peaceful lines, but that year the "red spirit" began to make itself felt. The Social-Democratic party, organized in 1899, received over 300,000 votes in the general election of 1907 and gained over 80 seats in the diet, thus becoming the largest party block. In 1903 the labor party had adopted the program of the Social-Democrats of Germany, including its theoretically neutral but practically antagonistic attitude toward organized religion. With the aid of their own newspapers and assisted by the general press, and employing itinerant agitators, the advocates of Marxist socialism spread their doctrine into every corner of the land.[5]

Among the immigrants who came from Finland during these critical years were representatives of the socialist movement. In this country they continued their agitation against capitalists and the church and antagonized not only large segments of communities but also the Finns who had come earlier and did not share their views. This division of the immigrants into two hostile camps was keenly felt in the work of the church for many years.

> The wave of atheism which rolled here from Finland during the early decades of the present century created a period of frost. Hundreds and thousands of adherents of this movement came into our midst, and with them came representatives and agitators of outright atheism. This was a killing frost of ungodliness, which spread like an epidemic and poisoned the very atmosphere, smothering the good seed in the hearts of a large number of people. Atheistic propagandists are always very active. Buildings costing tens of thousands of dollars were erected in all the larger Finnish communities. They became the centers of activity which spread antagonism toward Christ and his church. As this took place at a time when our work was in its early stages, it is a wonder that it did not disappear entirely. And it would have disappeared had it not rested on the rock of Christ, which even the gates of hell cannot move.[6]

In the light of these later events, it appears providential that the bulk of the Finnish immigration came from the provinces of Vaasa and Oulu, which were the strongholds of the religious revivals, and from among the peasant population.

To understand the Finnish tradition we need to know something about the Finnish nature or spirit as such.[7] One of the outstanding characteristics of the Finns is their deep desire for independence, which shows itself in patriotism, love of freedom, and a sense of pride. The negative aspect of this trait is divisiveness. Tribal wars, class conflicts,

5 Martti Ruuth, *Kirkon elamaa Kotimaan kuvastimessa* (Helsinki, 1949), pp. 6 f.

6 Alfred Haapanen, "Kirkkokuntamme Suomi-Synodin 50-vuotismuistoja 1890-1940," *Riemuvuoden julkaisu* (Hancock, Michigan), p. 18.

7 Eino Sormunen, *Omalla pohjalla* (Porvoo, 1944), pp. 39-46.

and religious controversy have all taken their toll among the Finns in America as well as in Finland.

Another Finnish trait is perseverance, the ability to rise in a difficult situation above the natural human limits of endurance and achievement and to make the impossible possible. Then there is also a deep respect for knowledge, the power of the spirit, and the influence of the word. Finland is the world's most literate country. The confessions of the Lutheran Church are used by many for daily devotions. With this desire to read goes a meditative and contemplative spirit. Finns are given to reflection. The average Finn is more of an introvert than an extrovert. Not what is on the surface but beneath the surface is important.

All these characteristics are reflected in the religious spirit of the Finnish people. It is particularly in its religious manifestations that the contemplative spirit reveals its greatest depths. The Finnish religious spirit is that of "a poor, miserable sinner" who has a great God.

Before we leave these non-theological factors, we need to note the influence of the geographical environment. Located as she is in the area of the Arctic Circle, with her southernmost tip on the same latitude with Greenland, Finland knows from bitter experience the somber truth of the words, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." Long and cold winters followed by short and uncertain growing seasons make it necessary for the Finnish farmer to carry on his struggle for existence against heavy odds. He whose daily round is a hand-to-mouth existence must of necesity often ask concerning that hand. This is particularly true of that area of Finland from which most of the immigrants came.

The two most distinctive features of the Finnish landscape are the extensive forests of pine and spruce and the lakes and countryside seen in the light of the midnight sun. Aleksi Lehtonen sees both of these features reflected in the Finnish religious faith. "Strangers remark that our Christianity is solemn and profound as well as heavy. There is continuous asking after salvation. There is a deep sense of sin and personal unworthiness. There is longing inexpressible, born in the gloomy huts and sung along wearisome journeys. But the same soul also reflects the unutterable festive spirit and joy of the Christian faith, even though it be but periodically—along the way, as it were."[8]

8 Aleksi Lehtonen, "Kristillisyys kansallisluonteen heijastamana," *Pyhilta tulilta, Suomen Kristillisen Ylioppilasliiton julkaisuja,* XXX (1928), pp. 75 f.

Finally, for centuries Finland has been the battleground of long and bloody wars. Russian czarism and communism have both hovered over Finland like dark storm clouds, periodically showering death and destruction upon the people. Faced with such gloomy prospects the Finns have not been able to get by with an easy religion.

These, then, are some of the factors that have played a part in creating the Finnish tradition. The question which we in this country must answer is to what extent such a tradition is dependent upon a certain external environment and to what extent the attempt should be made to preserve that tradition under entirely new and different circumstances. We shall not concern ourselves with that question.

The Headwaters of the Suomi Stream

What has been said of the Church of Finland must also be said of the Suomi Synod, namely, that "a proper understanding and appreciation of Finnish church life are not possible without some knowledge of the religious revivals which took place more than a hundred years ago."[9] Without question, the headwaters of the Suomi stream of living tradition are in Finland. The immigrants brought with them a religious faith which even in the new homeland has given a unique quality and emphasis to the life of the church. To understand this religious faith we need to know something about the religious atmosphere and environment out of which these people came.

Some have tried to trace Finnish Christianity, as it comes to expression in the revival movements, particularly in the pietistic stream, to the reformer of Finland, Michael Agricola (d. 1557).[10] Understandable and justifiable as that may be, it is hardly necessary for our present purpose to back that far into the history of the Church of Finland. We do need, however, to give some attention to the important events and persons of the so-called Earlier Awakening. It was this movement that introduced Pietism into Finland.[11]

9 Toivo Harjunpaa, "The Significance of Revivals in the Church of Finland," *The Lutheran World Review,* I (1948), p. 18.

10 Cf. Olavi Tarvainen, *Herannyt ennen heranneita* (Turku, 1944).

11 To an American the word "Pietism" has connotations which easily lead to a misunderstanding of Finnish Pietism. Cf. W. A. Schmidt, "Der finnische Pietismus," *Lutherische Rundschau,* II (1953), pp. 213-215: "Without doubt Finnish Pietism is essentially an expression of pietistic religion. In it the individual's personal faith-relationship to Christ is of the essence. . . . However, to describe more closely the nature of Finnish Pietism, we must make special

Pietism is often described solely in terms of reaction to Orthodoxy.[12] To a large extent it was the institutionalism, legalism, and intellectualism of Orthodoxy that paved the way for the emphasis on personal faith and life which characterized Pietism. When seen with the eyes of Pietism, Orthodoxy appears as a frozen stream, correct in form but lifeless. This, of course, is not the whole picture; Pietism, too, finds it difficult to see beyond its prejudices. The fact is that the period of Orthodoxy in Germany produced the great hymns of the Lutheran Church. Side by side with "orthodoxy" there was also "orthopraxy." Thus Pietism was not just a reaction to admitted weaknesses of Orthodoxy but also a continuation of a movement of life that called for expression in the total religious outlook. The writings of many men of the period of Orthodoxy represented an aspect of Orthodoxy that is ignored if the typical pietistic evaluation is accepted. These men, along with many others, paved the way for Pietism. In fact, even Luther must be included among the forerunners of Pietism.

Pietism entered Finland as three streams: the churchly Pietism of Spener and Francke, Herrnhutism, and radical Pietism. Unfortunately, it was the radicals who introduced this movement of personal piety. Their bitter and often unreasonable condemnation of the church made it difficult for those who came later and sought to reform the church along the lines of Halle Pietism. The failure to distinguish between the radical and churchly movement on the part of the orthodox leaders of the church postponed the acceptance of the wholesome fruit of Pietism. It was the stream of practical churchly piety, which fed on the writings of Arndt and Scriver and others, that prepared the way for Pietism and kept it from disappearing entirely during the period of bitter opposition from the orthodoxists. The richest fruit of this Earlier Awakening are gathered in the postils of Nohrborg (d. 1700?) and Wegelius the Younger (d. 1764), and in the writings and hymns of Abraham Achrenius (d. 1769). Achrenius appeared on the scene during the years when the influence of Herrnhutism was waning and members of this movement had become the object of persecution for their "easy faith." His great contribution was to direct the lay spiritual movement of

note of several details. Its principal feature is its strong theocentric orientation. In matters of salvation man can receive nothing unless it is given him by God. . . . For faith is not possession but hope. Before God man remains but a sinner, and this he must see ever more clearly."

12 Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology* (London, 1945), pp. 11 ff.

southwestern Finland past the reefs of radical Pietism and the shoals of hyper-evangelicalism into the channel of churchly Pietism.[13]

The polemic of the pietists was directed largely against the one-sided and intellectually formulated doctrine of justification of Orthodoxy. The pietists longed for more personal faith and life within the church. They read the theme of Lutheranism as "The just by faith shall *live*." The view of Orthodoxy was intellectual, that of Pietism voluntaristic and dynamic. Orthodoxy isolated its forensic concept of justification from repentance and sanctification and placed it under guard of correct doctrine and churchly custom, while Pietism had regeneration and sanctification as guardians of justification. The grace of God remained central, but it became personal and relevant through repentance and sanctification. Here is the essential meaning of the Earlier Awakening.[14]

The movement which had its origin in the work of Count von Zinzendorf also found its way into Finland as the third stream of Pietism. Herrnhutism, as this movement is called, came as a wholesome reaction against some of the excesses of Pietism, particularly its legalistic leanings. It sought to correct weaknesses of Orthodoxy in its own way by calling attention to the great objective facts of atonement. In Finland the followers of Zinzendorf were never many in number, and as an organized movement it ultimately disappeared entirely, but the evangelical emphasis it introduced never was completely lost. Today it continues to live in the evangelical movement associated with the Lutheran Gospel Society of Finland.

Throughout the lean years of Rationalism the spiritual life enkindled by the Earlier Awakening continued to smolder, especially in southwestern Finland and along the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. Among the clergymen of this period associated with the movement were Bjorkqvist (d. 1809), whose postil was widely used during the Later Awakening, Ignatius (d. 1827), and Rancken (d. 1831).

The Later Awakening had its beginning in three areas of Finland: northern Savo, where the first leaders were two laymen, Juhana Lustig (d. 1850) and Paavo Ruotsalainen (d. 1852), the latter of whom became the outstanding lay leader of all Finnish Pietism; northern

13 Erkki Kansanaho, *Hallen pietismin vaikutus Suomen Varhaisempaan herannaisyyteen* (Helsinki, 1947), p. 107.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Karelia, under the leadership of a minister, Henrik Renqvist (d. 1866); and the provinces of Vaasa and Oulu, where the leaders were two ministers, Jonas Lagus (d. 1857) and Niilo Kustaa Malmberg (d. 1858). Professor Bring of Lund has said of Paavo Ruotsalainen:

> After Luther one can mention but few men who have delved so deeply and elementally as Ruotsalainen into those peculiar problems which are part of the evangelical concept of faith. . . . A country such as Finland, perhaps the most deeply Lutheran land in the world, whose piety and church life can in certain respects be an example to other lands, ought generally to make its important religious writings available to others. When there is a giant such as Ruotsalainen, the like of whom it is difficult to find in other countries, it seems to me a great loss to all evangelical Lutheranism that his letters and notes, which have been gathered from his belongings, are not available in other languages.[15]

It is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of Ruotsalainen's theology, for in typical pietistic fashion he accepted the theology and confessions of the Lutheran Church while concentrating his attention on the problems of faith and life on the personal level. "The unfathomable depravity of the human heart, the infinite depth of God's mercy, the continuous growth of the awakened to the knowledge of God in ever deeper poverty of spirit—that, as a matter of fact, is a succinct statement of the theology of Paavo Ruotsalainen."[16]

The movement headed by Renqvist broke early from the main stream of Pietism, largely because of a different emphasis on prayer, particularly the form of prayer. Later another division occurred, with the evangelicals under the leadership of F. G. Hedberg (d. 1893) organizing the Evangelical movement. The final break between Hedberg and Ruotsalainen was occasioned by a different emphasis on the matter of assurance of salvation. Hedberg placed the stress on the objective aspect, Christ in the Word, while Ruotsalainen emphasized the need for the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. Except for this difference in emphasis on the nature of faith, both shared the general concern of Pietism for personal Christianity. Their followers have often forgotten this fundamental fact.

Unrelated to the above streams of the Later Awakening there appeared, during the middle of the nineteenth century among Finns in northern Sweden, a religious movement that is called Laestadianism, after its founder Lars Levi Laestadius (d. 1861). This revival move-

15 Lennart Pinomaa, "Paavo Ruotsalaisen henkinen perinto," *Teologinen Aikakauskirja*, XLVI (1941), p. 162 f.

16 Auk. Oravala, *Paavo Ruotsalainen* (Porvoo, 1932), pp. 178 f.

ment had its start in Laestadius' efforts as a minister among the Lapps to free them from the bondage of sin, especially drunkenness. When Laestadius himself was converted to personal faith, his work took on new meaning. Among his many followers and lay assistants was Juhani Raattama (d. 1899), who introduced into the movement its peculiar feature, the use of personal confession and absolution by a fellow believer (Laestadian). The Laestadians to this day teach that every believer has the right to serve as a priest and to absolve a sinner of his sins. And the popular opinion is that only a person so converted is really a Christian.[17]

Soon after the middle of the nineteenth century Finnish students of Johann Tobias Beck introduced his teachings in Finland. The leaders among them were Adolf Kihlman (d. 1904), A. W. Ingman (d. 1877), and Gustaf Johansson (d. 1930). The biblicism of Beck came as a wholesome and welcome complement to Pietism, and was openly received particularly by ministers who were seeking a theology to go with their Pietistic religion. Noteworthy is the fact that the areas which were most strongly influenced by Halle Pietism, namely, Wuerttemberg and Finland, also yielded to the theology of Beck. This combination of Pietism and biblicism provided several outstanding leaders for the Church of Finland, the foremost among whom was Gustaf Johansson, who served his church as professor, bishop, and archbishop from 1899 to 1930.[18]

It has been said that while in Sweden Pietism became the forerunner of the free church movement, in Finland it meant the beginning of a revival within the church. This is due in large part to the fact that, as Osmo Tiilila points out, "even academic theology in Finland has continually taken great interest in questions pertaining to the way of salvation."[19]

The greatest Finnish systematician of recent years—if not of all times—is Antti J. Pietila (d. 1932).[20] He is an outstanding example of the influence of the revival movements upon Finnish theology. His background was Laestadian, but he showed deep appreciation for the

17 Cf. A. Zidbaeck, *Pohjolan suurin maallikkosaarnaaja* (Helsinki, 1941).

18 Yrjo J. E. Alanen and Osmo Tiilila of the University of Helsinki have done much to perpetuate the work of Gustaf Johansson and to interpret his theology. Cf. Alanen, *Gutaf Johansson,* Porvoo, 1947, and Tiilila, *Uuden elaman etiikka,* Helsinki, 1940.

19 Tiilila, *A Hundred Years of Systematic Theology in Finland,* Theologica Fennica, IV (1949), p. 35.

20 Cf. Eino Sormunen, "Antti J. Pietila teologina," *Vartija,* XLV (1932), pp. 213-221.

insights of Pietism. It has been stated that with Pietila there came into the theological faculty at Helsinki a strong portion of Finnish piety.[21] The three-volume Christian dogmatics written by Pietila—the manuscript of the third volume was completed the day before his death—occupies an important place in the library of nearly every Suomi Synod pastor.

Factors Determining the Course of the Suomi Stream

The Laestadians—or Apostolic Lutherans, as they are called in this country—organized the first Finnish Lutheran congregation in America. It is significant that in spite of their early arrival and otherwise relatively large numbers, they have not to this day been able to organize a church or synod as such except for fellowship and common counsel. The congregations have had to rely on lay preachers or ministers who have had some theological training in seminaries of other churches. They have no organized program of home missions, and they have no missionaries abroad. By and large Laestadianism continues in America, too, as a revival movement. Herein lies its strength and weakness; strength in regard to concentration on the spiritual life of the people, weakness in regard to promotion and perpetuation of its ministry.

From the very first the Laestadians in general have boycotted the Suomi Synod churches, and continue to do so to this day, though to a lesser degree. Similarly, the followers of Hedberg dissociated themselves from the Suomi Synod and organized the Finnish National Church. Thus the effort of the Suomi Synod to preserve in this country the breadth of spirit of the Church of Finland has not achieved its goal of one Finnish Lutheran Church in America, for two of the four revival groups have refused to cooperate, and the representatives of the third group are very few in America. There is therefore much truth in the criticism of outsiders that the Suomi Synod is largely pietistic. This it has become, to the degree that it is so, by the simple process of

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 214 f.: "The Christianity represented by Pietila is experiential Christianity and as such it is related on the one hand to Erlangen theology and on the other hand to the popular Christianity of Finland, particularly to that form in which he had received it in the staunch Laestadianism of his childhood home." To this section of our study we add the note that keen interest in the works of Luther, exhibited by all of the revival movements, kept them within wholesome bounds and within the Church of Finland. Modern Luther study in Finland has discovered the close affinity of the deeper insights of these movements to the central discoveries of Luther.

elimination. It is very possible that if the three groups had recognized their common Evangelical Lutheran heritage and their common interest in personal faith and piety—at the same time granting each other the privilege of a distinct emphasis—the Finnish Lutheran Church in America would today have a membership of a quarter of a million.

However, the fact that the Laestadians and the evangelicals formed their own congregations, thereby nullifying to a large degree the efforts of the Suomi Synod to gather all Finnish Lutherans into one church, does not mean that the Suomi stream was deprived of the benefits of these two movements. The Laestadian emphasis on confession and absolution and the evangelical stress on the great objective facts of atonement are not missing in the Suomi tradition, even though their extreme emphasis has by and large been prevented by the wholesome influence of other emphases in a free atmosphere.

When the first National Lutheran congregation was organized in Calumet, Michigan, at the same time that the Suomi Synod was founded, two reasons for refusal to unite with the Suomi Synod were given: first, a fear of the power granted the clergy and the consistory by the constitution of the new synod, and, second, a dislike on the part of the evangelicals for the episcopal polity of Eloheimo and the Beckian theology of Nikander.[22] Both of these men were elected on the consistory of the new synod. That the second reason was not of great weight is evident from the fact that this same National congregation sent the first call to Nikander, in spite of his Beckianism,[23] and finally was served by Eloheimo, who a few years prior to receiving this call had organized his own church with himself as bishop.

It appears that the primary motive for organizing the National Church was the desire to have a church with a very congregational polity, comprising a homogeneous fellowship of members of the evangelical movement. It is an irony of history that today the National Church is less congregational in polity than the Suomi Synod and for years has had nothing to do with the evangelicals of Finland, who have always been welcome in the Suomi Synod. At the first discussion meetings between ministers of the two groups, held in 1913-14 for purpose of merging these churches, it was not found necessary to discuss doc-

22 *Evankelis-luterilainen Kansalliskirkko, Ensimmaiset 50 vuotta* (Ironwood, Michigan), 1949, p. 8.

23 J. K. Nikander, "Silmays kirkkokunnan 25-vuotiseen toimintaan," *Juhla-Albumi Suomi Synoodin 25-vuotisjuhlan muistöksi,* 1890-1951 (Hancock, 1915), p. 21.

trinal matters at all. The effort at union floundered on practical issues. Not until the meetings in 1935-37 and again in 1952-54 did doctrinal differences attract attention. True, differences of emphasis had been apparent all along, but only against the background of Missouri Synod orthodoxy did they become differences of doctrine.[24]

At present the traditions of the two groups are so divergent that any form of union is very unlikely, except as the Missouri Synod draws closer to the National Lutheran Council bodies and the National Church follows in her wake.

Just as the refusal of the Laestadians to join Suomi Synod congregations did not deprive the synod of the wholesome emphasis of that movement, so the organization of the National Church did not seal out the influence of the evangelical movement. Many evangelicals have made the Suomi Synod their spiritual home. Pastors representing this movement are to be found on the clergy roster. It has again been demonstrated that no church has a corner on the Word of God or any facet of it. No theological system can comprehend the truth perfectly and in its entirety. Perfect agreement in doctrine is possible only if there is perfect understanding of the truth of revelation or if imperfect understandings match perfectly. Since neither is possible, it is futile to attempt church union on perfect agreement in doctrine.

In the light of subsequent events it was providential that the leadership of the Suomi Synod during its early and formative years fell into the hands of J. K. Nikander (d. 1919), a man who received his theological training in Finland in an atmosphere of living faith and personal piety but who did not formally identify himself with any of the revival movements since he sought to understand all of them. We can hardly over-emphasize this fact as far as the tradition of the Suomi Synod is concerned. It is unfortunate that the story of the founder of both the Suomi Synod and Suomi College and Theological Seminary still waits to be written. His story is the very heart of the story of the formation of the Suomi tradition.

24 The first attempt on the part of the National Church to merge with the Missouri Synod took place in 1922 as a result of an introduction by men of the free church group in Finland who were studying at the St. Louis seminary. For many years this was a burning issue in the National Church and for a time threatened to cause a split within that already small body. In 1938 the training of ministers was officially begun at Concordia Theological Seminary, Springfield, Illinois, with the establishing of a Finnish department and the calling of a Finnish instructor. This work has had tremendous success. As a result the National Church is today in many instances more orthodoxist than the Missouri Synod itself.

Among the founding fathers of the Suomi Synod must be listed also K. L. Tolonen and J. J. Hoikka. Tolonen was born in Finland, arrived in Ishpeming, Michigan, in 1888, where he served as pastor until his death in 1902. After returning from an eight-year ministry in Africa, Tolonen served as a traveling preacher of the Finnish Missionary Society for twelve years, during which time he preached in every church in Finland. This wide acquaintance with the Church of Finland fitted him in a unique way for his work in America, as did also his experience as a missionary in Africa.

J. J. Hoikka was the first Finnish pastor to receive his theological training and ordination in America. Coming to this country as a young lad, he enrolled at Augustana College and Theological Seminary and was ordained into the ministry by the Augustana Synod in 1883. For a number of years he served both Finnish and Swedish congregations as a minister of the Augustana Synod. He was elected to the consistory at the first convention of the Suomi Synod in 1890, together with Nikander, Eloheimo, and Tolonen, and joined the Suomi Synod in 1904. His American education and the years of service in the Augustana Synod determined in a special way his contribution to the young Suomi Synod.

Specific Aspects of the Suomi Tradition

In this discussion of specific aspects of our Suomi tradition we shall cover as adequately as possible certain areas of inquiry suggested, even though a separate section is not devoted to each of the areas.

1) *Relationship to Pietism.* From what has already been said it is evident that the Suomi tradition is by and large pietistic. The significance of the influence of Pietism, as well as its extent, can best be seen if we attempt to answer from the Suomi point of view some of the key questions raised by Pietism.[25]

The first question is that of regeneration. It is part of our pietistic background that much emphasis is given in our preaching to repentance, that work of the law which makes of man "a poor, miserable sinner." Such repentance is and is not a prerequisite of living faith. It is, inasmuch as the heart of the faith-relationship to God is forgiveness of sins; it is not, inasmuch as forgiveness is of God's prevenient grace. In many instances the words "conversion" and "regeneration" may be

25 Kansanaho, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-193, has a good summary of the theology of Pietism as it comes to expression in the Earlier Awakening of Finland.

used nearly synonymously, with the attention focused on the fact of living faith. Usually, however, repentance is used to mean daily repentance, a vital aspect of living faith, and then regeneration is related to Baptism and means the initiation by divine act of the faith-relationship to God. But since the life of faith is one of daily repentance and daily forgiveness, the real significance of Baptism is not in a theoretical past tense (I was baptized) but in a living present tense (I am baptized).

The use of personal absolution is a vital element of all Finnish Christianity. It is not restricted to the formal or liturgical use in the public worship of the church. Its place is rather in personal cure of souls. The same intention of Pietism is evident also in the attitude toward the Lord's Supper. This sacrament must not be related to church custom and polity but to the spiritual needs of the believers in Christ. All coercion must be removed from the celebration of the sacrament. This is no doubt one reason why the Suomi Synod has not listed communicant members in its statistical report until very recently. There is, of course, the danger that this effort to relate the beneficial partaking of the sacrament to the spiritual needs of the people will cause some of the more conscientious to hesitate coming to the Lord's table. In our preaching and pastoral ministry we must recognize this possibility. It must be kept in mind at all times that the sacrament is not a good work of man that makes him a Christian but a good work of God which keeps him in faith.

A vital part of the problem of regeneration as raised by Pietism is the question of *theologia regenitorum*. With its emphasis upon the "inner call" the Suomi Synod follows the pietistic tradition at this point also. Personal experience of salvation, ability to care for souls, and spiritual insight and wisdom are prerequisites for the office of the ministry for which theological training and faithful observance of forms and customs, necessary as they may be, are no substitutes. That this is the view of our synod is evident from the bylaws of the church. It follows that strong emphasis is placed upon *theologia regenitorum* inasmuch as the subject matter of theology cannot be received simply intellectually but must be understood from within or received through personal faith in its divine Subject. Theology is in a deep sense "science of the heart." In the words of Luthardt, *"Oratio studium theologiae inchoat, meditatio continuat, tentatio consolidat."*[26] We believe that our

26 Luthardt-Jelke, *Kompendium der Dogmatik* (Heidelberg, 1948), p. 2.

tradition follows both Luther and the earlier representatives of Lutheran Orthodoxy.

A second question raised by Pietism had to do with sanctification. In contrast to the orthodoxist clear-cut separation of justification and sanctification, faith and works, in the interest of *sola gratia* and *sola fidei,* Pietism saw the close and vital relationship between justification and sanctification from its vantage point of living faith. Pietila makes the significant statement that no greater or more serious error has been made in the history of Christian theology than when the new life was divorced from faith and justification.[27] In justification God works faith, and the believer is born anew. It is a psychological impossibility, says Pietila, for the believer and justified one not to be also regenerated, and conversely. "In reality there is here but one event under consideration: the creation of faith, a new relation to God."[28] He who believes also lives. True, the saving act of God is an *actus purus,* independent of man's merit or efforts, but it is not a merely forensic event, for it involves the individual in his relationship to God and his fellow men. Sanctification, then, becomes the mirror which reflects justification, a sign of living faith. There is both the "Christ for us" and the "Christ in us." The motive of the life of holiness is love, which stems from faith, for the love of God for us becomes in us our love for fellow men. Faith and love are the whole of Christianity. In a world of sin, where a Christian never gains sinlessness, this life of holiness takes on the form of a struggle against sin.

The extreme forms of the struggle against the world, asceticism and moralism, are not characteristic of Finnish Pietism. Not *imitatio Christi* but *conformitas Christi* is the essence of the Christian life. It is significant that our synod has been unable to take an absolute stand, for example, against the use of tobacco or alcohol, even though in significant instances both are conspicuous by their absence. Their use is not looked upon as evidence of Christian liberty, yet a person's attitude toward them must be an expression of his inner faith life.

Our theology can be called *theologia viatorum.* God is not just Someone whom we expect to meet over yonder but Someone whom we have already encountered here. Our supreme purpose in life is not the reward at the end of the journey but faithfulness along the way. The

27 Antti J. Pietila, *Kristillinen dogmatiikka,* III, p. 428.
28 *Ibid.,* p. 428.

eschatological hope serves to sustain the Christian in his struggle against sin and for God's will. A theology that emphasizes the struggle or conflict of the Christian life cannot make "certainty of salvation" its key doctrine. The believer will be saved if he continues in Christ, but there is the danger of falling from faith and of dead faith. This is typical of Finnish Pietism. Only God, the heavenly Father, can be trusted. He may lead his child through darkness and hell (*resignatio ad infernum*), but he is a good and wise Father. Christian certainty can only be certainty of God's faithfulness. The confession of the believing sinner must remain, "I believe, Lord, help Thou mine unbelief."

A third question of Pietism has to do with the seat or locale of faith. Because of its emphasis upon the will, the Pietistic view of Christian faith and life is voluntaristic. When related to an atomistic concept of man, this emphasis upon the will quickly leads away from the Lutheran understanding of salvation. Pietism avoided the error of both mysticism and Roman Catholicism, which means leading with human decision and following with grace as heavenly fuel, by understanding salvation as the gift of God and grace as forgiveness of sins and relating both to the Word of God. The distance between the holy God and the sinner is never erased. Life is to be viewed in its totality; faith involves all of life.

Pietism directed its initial criticism against the organized church. In the main, however, as has been pointed out, Finnish Pietism has been churchly in the best sense of the word; it has fought for the church against the church. The Lutheran Reformation is unfinished business. The church must welcome wholesome criticism from both within and without, and relate it to God's concern for his people. Only as the individual and the church are rightly related to God in repentance and faith can the will of God become the will of his people. It is significant that evangelical mission work and deaconess work were born on the soil of such "subjective" Christianity which emphasized personal repentance and sanctification.

Not just because of this primary concern with the individual in his God-relationship but also because of the very nature of the problems of an immigrant church, the Suomi Synod has hardly entered the realm of social action. Perhaps too naively it has assumed that a believing Christian will also recognize his responsibilities as a member of his community and a citizen of his country. This error, of course, is not so

serious as the opposite one, which sends unregenerate men to reform society. It must be said, however, that Finnish Christianity has always stressed faithfulness in the fulfillment of one's calling. In this it is in the best Lutheran tradition.

Finally, Pietism raised the question of the church. The pietistic conception of the church is "low churchly." With its strong emphasis upon the spiritual priesthood of all believers, Pietism had little interest in the dogmatism and formalism that characterized the church of Orthodoxy. The church lives from the *successio fidelium* and not from a *successio episcoporum*. The effort of the pietists to make the church of the clergy into a church of the people did not succeed, but in Finland it resulted in a rapport between the two which has had a wholesome effect on the entire church, including theology. Pietism's concern with the faith-life of the believers as the real essence of the church, in contrast to the external organization, led on the one hand to the practice of "a church within a church," which brought Christians together for mutual edification, and on the other hand to a more friendly attitude toward other Protestant Christians.

In its understanding of the church the Suomi tradition is pietistic. Above correct doctrine and form we place living faith; doctrine and form are in the service of faith. Not the establishing of a pure church but the preaching of the Word of God to as many as possible is our objective. In regard to liturgical practice, forms of worship, and clerical vestments, there is perhaps too much latitude, but the problem is never liturgical or non-liturgical. The emphasis given to preaching and the prevalence of informal meetings which include preaching also point to a low-church conception of the church. Against this background we can understand the difficulty we have experienced in adding "special" evangelistic meetings to our calendar of activities. We cannot countenance evangelistic "membership drives," most of our preaching is strongly personal, calling for repentance and personal faith, and we rebel from all anthropocentric attempts at converting people.

2) *Conception of the Word of God.* The influence of the pietistic revival movements and of Beckian biblicism is discernible in our conception of the Word of God. It is significant that during the more recent meetings and discussions with ministers of the National Church, the "bone of contention" was the doctrine of the Word of God or, as the orthodoxist view states it, the doctrine of the Bible. The ministers of

the National Church could not understand the position of the Suomi Synod, for they could not reconcile it with the doctrine of verbal inspiration. At the last meeting between the committees of the two churches the following preamble was agreed upon. We include it *in toto* because of its value as a statement of the Suomi Synod position in regard to the Word of God and the Confessions.

> The National Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (Suomi Synod), aware of their common background, cognizant of overlapping areas of responsibility, and above all acknowledging Jesus Christ as the only Lord and Savior, and taking his will and admonition to Christian unity seriously, express the earnest desire to establish altar and pulpit fellowship for mutual edification and for the glory of God.
>
> They recognize, however, that any altar and pulpit fellowship that is not fostered and sustained by a mutual faith in and loyalty to the Lord Jesus Christ neither glorifies the Lord nor edifies the church. The following Mutual Statement of Faith is intended as an expression of such faith in and loyalty to Christ. Furthermore, they make known the fact that this and any statement of faith must be in harmony with the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. They believe that the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the inspired and inerrant Word of God in which God continues to this day and age to speak through the prophets, apostles, and evangelists. They also openly acknowledge their acceptance of the Confessions of the Lutheran Church as contained in the Book of Concord, particularly Luther's Small Catechism and the Unaltered Augsburg Confession, as a faithful exhibition of the teachings of the Holy Scriptures.[29]

In the course of the discussions with the National Church it became evident that the positions of the two groups were, very generally speaking, the positions of Orthodoxy and Pietism. The men of the National Church emphasized that God spoke (wrote) the content of the Bible through his inspired writers and that this book of inspired and infallible writings is the sole source of all true doctrine which the church is called to proclaim. The Suomi men, on the other hand, placed the emphasis upon the fact that God continues to speak through the writings of his servants of old, which represent the sole primary witness to the great act of God in Christ, and that this book of writings is the source of the message of repentance and forgiveness (*kerygma*) which we are called to preach. As long as God speaks through the message of the Bible, it is really beside the point how men were able to write God's Word. But if God no longer speaks through the Bible, the most orthodox doctrine of inspiration serves no purpose. In the final analysis, we stand here before a mystery related to the mystery and miracle of the incarnation.

29 *Yearbook of the Suomi Synod*, 1954, p. 140.

From the viewpoint of living faith, the doctrine of the Word of God is, first of all, an aspect of the doctrine of the means of grace. In fact, the two may be said to be the same doctrine viewed from two standpoints. Thus we need to distinguish between the Word as revelation and the Word as means of grace. When we speak of the latter we are not speaking simply of the Bible. In the words of Pietila, "The Word as means of grace is the Word as used by the church, its proclamation, its hymns, its benedictions and blessings, and even its often inadequate instruction of its youth in the home and school."[30] This Word as means of grace fluctuates with the life of the church, and it can never be simply identified with the Word of the Bible. It represents a kind of extension of the incarnation, God condescending to the level of man, speaking to man as he needs to be spoken to and as he is able to receive the Word. The church needs both, the normative Word of revelation and the Word which adjusts itself to the changing human situation. This Word as a means of grace is not a general Word of God, but God speaking to a specific human situation. Regardless of the form of that Word, it becomes a means of grace when the individual becomes aware that now is God's time for me. God is addressing me, demanding that I answer him.

As to the relationship of the Word as means of grace to the Bible, we say, to begin with, that it is the biblical Word. The church does not interpret this to mean, however, that its task is simply to publish and distribute the Holy Scriptures and to teach the people to read them. People must understand what they read, and to that end interpretation is necessary. Thus when we say that the Word as means of grace is the biblical Word, we mean more than that it is in outward conformity with the words of the Bible. We mean that it is in harmony with the basic thoughts and intentions of the Bible and is motivated by the Spirit of the Bible. A message or sermon filled with Bible passages may not be biblical at all, while one with no direct quotations may be entirely biblical.

The Word of God as revelation cannot be simply identified with the Bible. At the same time that we underscore the primary role of the Bible in the realm of special revelation, we must not overlook the fact that in principle we must acknowledge a revelation alongside the Bible. God speaks to men in a variety of ways in and through history, even

30 Pietila, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

though the comprehension of this revelation is possible by the faith created by the biblical message of Jesus Christ with which this revelation is in full harmony. The view that ignores this form of divine revelation is in danger of falling into the heresy of deism.

The doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible is a witness of the church to the fact that the Scriptures mediate the revelation of God, not just speak about it. This doctrine, then, is a statement of faith. It is futile to attempt to convince unbelievers by external or formal means that the Bible is divinely inspired. One must be a partaker of the revelation and inspiration to know where that revelation and inspiration have operated. Faith and revelation are correlative concepts.[31] The witness of others as such is incapable of convincing a person of the inspiration or even real significance of the Bible. It is misleading to ask one to choose between the two statements, "The Bible is the Word of God" and "The Bible contains the Word of God," for both are correct. The latter is correct because not all that the Bible contains is of equal significance as Word of revelation, and the former because the Word of God in the Bible cannot be formally distinguished from the word of man, for the one permeates the other, forming an inseparable unity. In the Bible *all* is divine and *all* is human.

The problem is essentially one of hermeneutics. From the point of view of faith certain principles are fundamental. First, the Bible must be interpreted Christocentrically. We are dependent upon the Bible for our knowledge of Christ, but we are dependent upon Christ for our understanding of the Bible. Using this *analogia fidei* biblical interpretation can surrender neither to mysticism nor to philosophy. It must seek to discover the true content of the Bible, that word or message which the Bible has for mankind in general and the church in particular. To this end the literal and historical meaning of the various writings in their totality must be sought. But the interpreter of the Bible must be more than a linguist or historian. He must also be a believing Christian, who in his heart and conscience is bound to Christ, the revealer of the Father and his own personal Saviour.

3) *The Confessions.* The attitude of the church toward its tradition reflects its relationship to the church of earlier generations. A complete denial of all tradition would be equivalent to religious individualism or vagabondage. Generally speaking, the Lutheran Church

31 Cf. Pietila, *Kristillinen dogmatiikka,* I, pp. 349 f.

considers the confessions, which are at the very heart of her tradition, as *norma normata,* while the Bible alone is *norma normans.* We recognize the normative character of the Bible and make it our highest standard of faith and life because we take seriously the historical nature of our faith. The God who was in Christ, the real object of our faith, directs our attention to a specific period in history, to a particular geographical area, and to an elect group of people. Christian truth is not general religious truth. The Gospel speaks of things that never have entered nor ever will enter into the mind of man when it speaks of Christ who "suffered under Pontius Pilate." We would not know about these events connected with Christ, we would not know about Christ, had not men, who saw with eyes of faith what happened, written down "that which they had heard, which they had seen with their eyes, which they had looked upon and touched with their hands." What they saw and heard they proclaimed to others: this lies at the very heart of the Bible, especially the New Testament. Thus the unique, historical character of the incarnation gives rise to the Christian doctrine of the Bible as the highest norm of faith and life. To ignore the Scriptures is to take lightly the supreme act of God. There is no God but him who was in Christ, and there is no Christ but him to whom the Scriptures bear witness.

The confessions of our church direct our attention to the Scriptures and their witness to Jesus Christ. Since the Bible we have is the Bible we know and interpret, it is important that we listen to the confessions of those who have gone before us. For a Lutheran this means particularly listening to the confessions of those who, under God, became the fathers of his church. But the confessions cannot take the place of the Bible, for they must build on the biblical witness to Jesus Christ. And so we consider the confessions as secondary standards; the Bible alone is primary.

The historical approach to the confessions recognizes that the church which produced these statements of faith was engaged in a life and death struggle with regard to certain central truths of the Christian faith: the doctrine of justification by faith and the doctrine of the Bible as the sole norm of Christian faith and life. These questions demanded the most earnest attention of the Reformers, and so in regard to them—and those vitally related to them—the confessions have significant authority. The vital character of the issues at stake make the

Lutheran confessions of monumental significance. In matters which lie more on the periphery of the area of crucial concern, the confessions have less value. Other elements in them, which belong in the realm of general human knowledge, have no particular importance at all. Thus a certain amount of freedom must be granted in the use of the confessions. They must not be made a *lex doctrinae*.[32] At the same time, however, members and especially ministers and teachers of the Lutheran Church are bound to the confessions, for the church is also an empirical organization or institution that must protect itself by clearly defining its confessional stand. In making this demand especially of its ministers and teachers, the church does not bind consciences, for it does not say, cannot say, that he who is not a member of the Lutheran Church is not a Christian.

The light and life of the confessions are the light and life of the Bible. They are not an agent alongside the Bible but an assistant that leads to an understanding of the message of the Bible. By their constant practical help they point to the continuity of God's activity among his people and make it possible for one generation to enter more fully into the inheritance that previous generations have handed down.

4) *The Place of Doctrine and Tradition in the Life of the Church.* We have already indicated to some extent what place doctrine and tradition occupy in the life of the Suomi Synod. We shall at this time elaborate on what has been said or implied.

The Laestadians, we might say, have consistently accused the Suomi Synod of lacking "orthopraxy," while the National Church has charged it with lack of concern for "orthodoxy." To the Laestadians we have said that we are not "methodists" and have no desire to cut the pattern for the Holy Spirit to use in leading men to Christ. What have we answered the National Church?

The several discussions which ministers of the two churches have had have revealed conflicting conceptions of the place of doctrine and tradition in the life of the church. Against the background of Orthodoxy ministers of the National Church have recently stressed that agreement in the doctrine of the Gospel is absolutely essential for pulpit and altar fellowship, also prayer fellowship. But by the doctrine of the Gospel they do not mean the Gospel as such but a certain *ordo salutis* with strong emphasis upon the doctrine of universal redemption or

32 Pietila, *op. cit.*, I, p. 417.

justification (the whole world is saved) and baptismal regeneration. It is very significant that, in the instance of those who lack the pietistic background with its emphasis upon the Christian experience of repentance and faith, this doctrine of the Gospel operates in the form of a logical syllogism: "The whole world was saved by the death of Christ. I am a part of this world. Therefore, I am saved." Or, "The Bible says that 'he who believes and is baptized shall be saved.' I believe and I have been baptized. Therefore, I am saved." Faith then becomes assent to a doctrine of the Gospel, and since only the Holy Spirit can create this assent, the sole task of the church is to preach and teach this doctrine of the Gospel. What we have here is an effort to reproduce the position of seventeenth century theology with its intellectual conception of faith, to which Pietism came as a strong and successful reaction. Implied is the futile effort to turn back the calendar and to deny three hundred years of history of the Lutheran Church. What place does tradition have? The answer is self-evident.

In the light of all this we understand the insistence of the National Church that the Suomi Synod must rid itself of the several conflicting revival movements which still are represented in its midst. As we have seen, hard as it tried, the Suomi Synod was unable to keep the Laestadian and evangelical movements in its fold, except to a degree. It was unable to do in America what the Church of Finland had accomplished. But, as has been pointed out, elements of both of these movements are still to be found within the synod. The bulk of its membership, however, is from the pietistic revival movement or else from groups that were not directly associated with any of the revival movements. The demand of the National Church, then, is that the Suomi Synod rid itself of all pietists—in other words, of all who are not evangelicals. It has itself got rid of all conflicting movements by identifying itself with one of them and outlawing all others.

In the Suomi Synod there is no similar identification of the Gospel with a certain doctrine or theory of atonement. The message of the Gospel is a message of forgiveness of sins which creates the faith in (by) which it is received, that is, in which it means the creation of a new life-relationship to God. Thus the great gift of Baptism is forgiveness of sins, which means the initiation of a covenant relationship with God in the fellowship of the church. To sustain this relationship Christ has given his church the sacrament of Holy Communion, the gift of which

again is forgiveness of sins. But forgiveness of sins has no meaning or relevance among the righteous, the whole, and those who have never strayed. Christ came to seek and to save the lost, to call sinners to repentance, and to heal the sick. Through the Word of God the Holy Spirit creates that existential situation in which the Gospel of forgiveness becomes meaningful and relevant to the individual. The call is to repent and believe the Gospel, to turn from sin and rebellion to God. Both repentance and faith involve the total personality, not just the intellect.

Doctrine is in the service of the Gospel; theology in the service of the church. We do not preach just doctrine, but doctrine represents the content of our proclamation in conceptual form. Doctrine is the form in which the Gospel is preserved and transmitted. Doctrinal preaching, and there is a place for that, is needed that believers may grow in the intellectual grasp of the meaning and implications of their faith in every direction. A church that preaches doctrine rather than the message makes it difficult, if not impossible, for people to come to repentance and faith. But a church that ignores doctrine makes it well nigh impossible for people to grow into mature Christians.

A church that substitutes doctrine for the message of the Gospel, thereby intellectualizing faith, must inevitably freeze its stream of tradition. This is the reason why certain periods of church history—for example, the first century or the fourth or sixteenth or seventeeth—have been made normative. An intellectual concept of faith and a static concept of history go together, for both are informed by a deistic idea of God and a docetic view of the Bible. Our concern with tradition must not, therefore, be a concern with tradition at all.[33] Tradition will continue to live and change as long as that stream of life in God through Christ which created it to begin with continues to flow. We must honestly face the fact that there will be changes in tradition, stemming from changes in culture and circumstances of environment, even geo-

33 Cf. R. Prenter, "A Lutheran Contribution," *Biblical Authority for Today,* ed. Alan Richardson and Wolfgang Schweitzer (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 110: "The tradition of the church is the recollection of earlier occasions on which the Word of the living God was heard and God himself was actively present. But in order to bear witness to the revelation of God, the church must hear his living Word at all times, here and now. Hence tradition is never an absolute, infallible truth which can be passed on as it stands, but a recollection of previous occasions which may be used to interpret—but only to interpret—what is heard here and now. Tradition is only a means of interpretation, a relative authority, a *norma normata.* The *norma normans* is the living Word of God itself."

graphical. The Suomi Synod, too, has at times attempted to freeze certain aspects of its tradition. This is one reason behind efforts to preserve the Finnish language and customs within the church, to cling to peculiar forms of stewardship and polity, and to prevent changes in liturgical practices and forms. As was pointed out earlier, we can preserve our tradition only if our first concern is with the revelation of God in Christ and not with the human response to that revelation.

Plato, Philo, and the Author of Hebrews

By James H. Burtness

SINCE the first centuries of the Christian church, there have been serious questions concerning the origin of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is primarily to the modern period, however, that we owe the view that the author of this epistle was deeply influenced by Platonc idealism and by the philosophy of the Alexandrian School, particularly the writings of Philo.

Hugo Grotius was perhaps the first, in 1644, to point out the close connection between Philo and Hebrews 4:10. In 1750, Carpzov published a volume of *Sacrae Exercitationes in S. Paulli Epistolam ad Hebraeos ex Philone Alexandrino.* J. J. Wettstein, in his *Novum Testamentum Graecum* of 1752, also pointed out these parallels. The rationalistic critics of the nineteenth century saw Alexandrianism written all over the epistle. Baur regarded it as a Judeo-Christian product intermixed with Paulinism and spiritualized by an Alexandrian mentality. Ménégoz, in his *La Theologie de L'Epitre aux Hebreux* of 1894, concluded that the author was a Philonian converted to Christianity. At the end of the last century the dependence of the epistle upon the religious philosophy of Philo was considered to be a secured result of literary criticism. Typical of this period are the following statements by Pfleiderer and von Soden:

> The Hellenistic basis of the Epistle to the Hebrews, its dependence in thought and word upon the Book of Wisdom, and especially upon Philo, is so obvious that there is not the smallest room for doubt upon the matter.[1]

> It marks the definite entrance of Alexandrianism into the sphere of Christianity. By Alexandrianism we mean that strange amalgation of Jewish religion and Greek philosophy which was gradually brought forth chiefly in Alexandria during the last century before Christ, and at the time of St. Paul was consummated in the teaching of the famous philosopher Philo of Alexandria.[2]

In the 1920's Moffatt wrote that "the philosophical element in his view of the world and God is fundamentally Platonic."[3] Scott, although he saw a tension in the epistle at this point, was basically of the same opinion when he wrote that "the epistle is intimately Greek, not only in its style, but in its fundamental think-

1 Otto Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity,* trans. by W. Montgomery (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1910), p. 282.

2 Hermann von Soden, *The History of Early Christian Literature,* trans. by J. R. Wilkinson, ed. by W. D. Morrison (New York: P. G. Putnams Sons, 1906), p. 249.

3 James Moffatt, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), p. xxxi.

ing. The writer is steeped in the idealism which had colored all Greek philosophy since Plato."[4] There have been more cautious voices, notably those of Davidson, Weiss, Westcott, Milligan, Zahn, Bruce. Yet, generally speaking, the great mass of scholarship has recognized, if not a direct influence, at least a close relationship between the Epistle to the Hebrews and Plato and Philo.

The interesting thing in our day is that this position, built up for over a century into an accepted result of New Testament investigation, is being vigorously challenged. The eschatological framework which is now acknowledged to be so essential to an understanding of the Synoptic Gospels is being seen as also constitutive to the expression given to the *kerygma* by the author to the Hebrews.

In order better to understand the nature of the eschatological interpretation, it will be helpful to look back briefly to the arguments which have been offered for the Platonic or the Philonic interpretation.

Every scholar seeking to establish the essentially Alexandrian nature of the epistle has brought to the study his own emphasis and insights. Yet there are certain patterns discernible in the argument and certain points of agreement as to where one ought to look for evidence of Platonic and Philonic influence. Five areas most commonly alluded to are the nature of the language, the Logos doctrine, the Platonic doctrine of ideas, the concept of faith, and the use of the Old Testament.

The linguistic argument centers around a rather impressive number of parallels between Hebrews on the one hand and Plato and Philo on the other. These are not only words, but phrases and sentences often so close that it is very difficult to maintain that they could have been put together in complete independence of one another. Because these parallels are readily available in the commentaries,[5] and because we shall be referring to several of them in connection with other arguments, we shall not go into any detail at this point.

The argument centering around the Logos doctrine begins with the fact that the problem of the Greeks in regard to God was a metaphysical one: How can God, who is pure essence, pure being, and who can have nothing whatever to do with the finite and the created, have any dealings with men? The doctrine of the Logos is first seen in Heraclitus, and is later elaborated by Anaxagoras, who spoke of a supreme intellectual principle which was active in the world and yet above it. Both Aristotle and Plato built their systems on this assumption that God is a creative intelligence who brought order out of chaos. But neither Plato nor Aristotle succeeded in resolving the dualism between earthly objects and heavenly

4 Ernest F. Scott, *The Varieties of New Testament Religion* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), p. 223.

5 See F. W. Farrar, *The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews* (Cambridge: University Press, 1883); William Leonard, *The Authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews* (London: Burns, Oates and Washburne, Ltd., 1939); C. Spicq, *L'Epitre aux Hebreux* (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1952).

ideas (Plato) or between the Unmoved Mover and the material world (Aristotle).

The Stoics developed a monistic philosophy in direct opposition to the dualism which had been characteristic of Greek philosophy since Anaxagoras. Going back to Heraclitus for the metaphysical basis of their philosophy, they brought back the term Logos to designate their God, who dwelt both in the physical world and in the souls of men. The Logos is here the Universal Reason who pervades the whole world and links together the past, the present, and the future.

A further step was taken by Heraclitus, author of *Questiones Homericae,* who named Hermes as the only God who could be identified with the Logos. Hermes then came to be regarded as an intermediary between the supreme God and men, which was the position of the Logos in the Alexandrian philosophy. The Logos, however, is always a lesser God, the supreme God remaining far removed from the created world. Philo sought to bring together the Jewish Scriptures and Greek philosophy, and the Logos played a central role in his system as the link between the timeless and immutable God and the material world.[6]

It is this Logos of Philo and the Alexandrian theology which so many scholars have seen in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Pfleiderer boldly states that all the characteristics of the Philonian Logos are transferred by the author of Hebrews to Christ.[7] George Holley Gilbert puts it this way: "It is now widely recognized that this conception of Christ is essentially Greek. To understand it we must go back to Philo and from Philo to the Greek philosophers. What they said of the Logos furnished the writer of Hebrews the materials which, under the influence of the historical Christ, he wrought into his conception."[8]

Parallels between the Christ of Hebrews and the Logos of Philo are seen particularly in the prologue, but also in that the Christ of Hebrews takes on the attributes of the Philonian Logos as superior to the angels (1:4-14), as suppliant (5:7), as sharp penetrator of hidden things (4:12).

Perhaps the most striking parallel observed is that both the Logos of Philo and the Christ of Hebrews are spoken of as high priests and, more than this, that the obscure Melchizedek is taken as the type of the high priest and that both his name and the place of which he is the king are allegorized.

Heb. 5:10, 7:2, "being designated by God a high priest after the order of Melchizedek." "He is first, by translation of his name, king of righteousness, and then he is also king of Salem, that is, king of peace."

Philo (*De Leg. Alleg.* iii. 26), "For the Logos is a 'Priest,' &c., who as he proceeds to say, brings righteousness and peace to the soul, and has his type in Melchizedek, 'the Righteous King' and the King of Salem, i.e. of Peace."[9]

6 Cf. Edwin Kenneth Lee, *The Religious Thought of St. John* (London: S.P.C.K., 1950), pp. 74-89.

7 Pfleiderer, *op. cit.,* p. 284

8 G. H. Gilbert, "The Greek Element in the Epistle to the Hebrews," *American Journal of Theology,* XIV (1910), pp. 521 f.

9 Farrar, *op. cit.,* p. 41.

Another argument centers in the Platonic doctrine of ideas.

For Plato, truth was the knowledge of reality, of being, of essence, which is permanent, unchangeable, eternal. But the world perceived by our senses cannot be the true world, for it is always changing and is thus mere illusion. In order to have genuine knowledge, one must know the permanent and unchangeable essence of things. Conceptual knowledge is true knowledge, sense knowledge brings us only the fleeting, the particular, the accidental.

According to Plato, the ideas or forms are not mere thoughts in the minds of men or of God, but actually exist as substances in and for themselves as the original, eternal archetypes of things which we perceive with our senses. The universe is conceived by Plato as a logical system of ideas, or archetypes, which form an organic unity, subsumed under the highest idea, the idea of the Good. Particular, perceivable objects are then merely imperfect copies or reflections of these eternal patterns.

The Platonic doctrine was modified somewhat by Philo, who sought to bring it into agreement with Jewish religion. Philo remained a convinced Jew, but "the 'great' and 'most holy' Plato was, for him, the master whom he cited ever and again."[10] In the dualism of Philo, as in that of Plato, the Highest could have no direct contact with matter. But there were intermediary and incorporeal powers, "ideas," which constituted an intelligible world, an ideal pattern or model of which the world of the senses is an image, a shadow.

It is this fundamentally spatial antithesis between the visible and the invisible, the earthly and the heavenly, the world of copies and the world of the ideal, which many scholars have taken to be the basic view of reality which lay behind everything the author to the Hebrews has to say.

Eric Rust, for instance, in a study of the concept of history in the epistle, says that the author ". . . borrows extensively from the Philonic contrast between the earthly and the heavenly, the shadow and the substance, the pattern and the reality. He sees history as a shadow of the eternal world, the best things within it built upon the pattern of things heavenly and pointing beyond themselves to those realities of which they are but types and symbols."[11]

J. Cambier, in an interesting monograph on this problem, concludes that the phrase *menousin polin* denotes the stability of heavenly realities. The faithful are to find their strength in the heavenly gift of Christ, the heavenly cultus, the heavenly altar, by separating themselves from all that which is earthly in order to attach to Christ, the high priest who resides in heaven. The *menousin polin* is an

10 Hans Lietzmann, *The Beginnings of the Christian Church*, trans. by Bertram Lee Woolf (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), p. 93.

11 E. C. Rust, *The Christian Understanding of History* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), pp. 174 f.

expression of the stable reality of the heavenly world which is in opposition to the earthly world.[12]

When the author speaks of *hupodeigmata tōn en tois ouranois* and *antitupa tōn alēthinōn,*[13] there is no doubt but that he is using words which are frequently used by Philo and which seem to express the antithesis between heavenly realities and earthly copies. Because of similarity of expression, a person going, for instance, from the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* to Hebrews would have little difficulty in thinking that he was moving in the same world of ideas.

The fourth argument which is generally put forth is that the concept of faith in Hebrews bears marked similarities to that of Philo.

For Philo faith has an all-important place in the theory of knowledge. But faith is very difficult, attainable only in ecstatic moments, and only by the truly great men after considerable effort. In keeping with his fundamentally Platonic dualism, faith involves for Philo the denial of those things perceived by the senses, the realization that the visible world has no real existence. Genuine faith, then, implies turning away from the sense-world to the invisible God. Faith is here essentially a starting point. From the conviction that the world of truth and reality lies beyond the senses, one is able to move on to greater knowledge and to greater spiritual growth.

When Scott places chapter eleven of *Hebrews* against the background of the Philonian concept of faith, he concludes that "the affinity between the Philonic conception and that which meets us in the Epistle is unmistakable."[14]

The opening verses, particularly the phrases "faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen" (v. 1) and "that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear" (v. 3), are perhaps most often laid hold of to show the influence of Philo. But the very method of listing the great heroes of the faith as examples to be followed was one dear to Philo. Weight is added to the argument when the author speaks of Jesus as the "pioneer and perfecter of our faith" (12:2).

There are two areas in the use of the Old Testament which are generally alluded to in pointing out Alexandrian influences on the Epistle to the Hebrews. These are the view of inspiration and the allegorical method of exegesis. It will suffice on the view of inspiration simply to state that both authors hold God to be the true author of the Scriptures and regard the human author as quite inconsequential and passive.

The story of the allegorical method of Alexandria, and particularly of Philo, is well known. It was used in the service of the amalgamation of Platonic idealism

12 J. Cambier, *Eschatologie ou Hellénisme dans l'Epître aux Hebreux* (Serie II, Fasc. 12; Louvain: Analecta Louaniensia Biblica and Orientalia, 1950), p. 37.

13 Hebrews 9:23, 24.

14 E. F. Scott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1922), p. 177.

and Hebrew religion. Plato's ideas found expression in sharp, clear-cut, abstract propositions. The Jew, on the other hand, thought in pictures and looked for the content of a message to be enshrined in an image. Gregory Dix neatly characterizes the difference as one of "form" and "formlessness."[15] In order to make the Old Testament understandable to both Jew and Greek, Philo took the allegorical method of interpretation to be the only correct one.

It has been contended by many that the method of interpretation of the author of Hebrews is essentially allegorical. Eric Rust states that "the author handles the Old Testament allegorically and borrows heavily from the Philonic contrast between the earthly and the heavenly."[16] Cambier attempts a more guarded conclusion but actually says the same thing when he asserts that it is possible to speak of Platonic allegorism in Hebrews in the sense that the author uses Platonic categories to express the actual uselessness of the Old Testament in view of salvation.[17] In speaking of the influence of the Alexandrian School on the epistle, Ménégoz says that it is especially in the allegorical interpretation of Scripture that this influence is to be seen. He further points out that Hebrews employs the allegorism of Philo, not that of the rabbinical schools.[18]

The points at which allegorism is most often detected are the author's treatment of Melchizedek in 5:6, 10, 6:20, and 7:1-3, his play on the word "rest" in 3:7-4:13, and on "sojourner" in 11:8-16.

These five points, then, constitute the basic argument for Platonic and Philonic influence on the Epistle to the Hebrews. It remains now to examine the argument and to see whether or not it can stand in the light of recent investigation.

In regard to the language of the epistle, there is practically no evidence to point to a direct influence from Plato. But the evidence brought forth to substantiate a close affinity between it and the language of Philo is considerable. This direct or indirect influence from Philo is surely not to be excluded on chronological grounds.

Since Philo was already an old man when he took part in the Jewish embassy to Gaius Caligula in A.D. 39, most or all of his books must have been in circulation for at least twenty years before the Epistle to the Hebrews was written. It is certainly logical to assume that his works would have found their way into the Jewish diaspora. It is thus not at all impossible that the writer of Hebrews had read some of Philo's works and consciously or unconsciously borrowed vocabulary, phrases, and expressions from him. Spicq concludes after a very extensive examina-

15 Dom Gregory Dix, *Jew and Greek* (New York: Harpers, 1953), p. 12. Cf. Thorleif Boman, *Das Hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954).

16 Rust, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

17 Cambier, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 f.

18 Eugene Ménégoz, *La Theologie de l'Epître aux Hébreux* (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1894), pp. 215 f.

tion of the language that "it is psychologically impossible that the themes and schemes of thought, identical with the two authors, do not show a borrowing."[19] Similar vocabulary can be explained as a result of the two authors' living in a similar milieu. But direct parallels, such as their treatment of Melchizedek, certainly point to some kind of linguistic influence on the writer of Hebrews from Philo or from the Alexandrian School. Whether this influence is direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious, it is impossible to say. But the existence of it can hardly be denied.

We saw that the argument for influence from the Logos doctrine of Philo centered primarily in the description of Christ in the prologue, the Melchizedek passage, and a few others. Granted that the linguistic parallels seem to be very close, it is soon seen that Hebrews and Philo are worlds apart when one looks at the message which the words convey.

The Logos of Philo has for its background the philosophical dualism of Plato. If Philo at times seems to ascribe personality to the Logos, as when he calls the Logos the high priest, it is still true that the approach to God is always an intellectual one. According to Scott, the Logos of Philo "is nothing else than the divine reason, which by its operation in the human soul acts as intermediary between God and man. Inasmuch as we share in this higher principle we are able to transcend the bounds of our earthly nature and to participate in the life of God."[20]

The Christ of Hebrews is quite different. The description of him has for its background the primitive Christian eschatology, a temporal framework rather than the spatial orientation of Platonic idealism. While the very function of Philo's Logos is to mediate to man a God who could otherwise have nothing to do with the created, the Christ of Hebrews is himself the God who identifies himself with his creation. Nowhere else in the New Testament is the humanity of Christ pictured in a more vivid way. Having had the same origin as his brothers (2:11), he partook of flesh and blood (2:14), that is, was made like his brothers in every respect (2:17), even to the extent of being beset with weaknesses (5:2) and being tempted in every respect as we are (2:18, 4:15). He was called by God as was Aaron (5:4), and learned obedience (5:8), being made perfect through suffering (2:10), during which he prayed with loud cries and tears (5:7), until he finally tasted the suffering of death (2:9).

Philo could never have described his Logos in words such as these. It could never have been flesh and blood. It belonged to a different world. The insistence of Hebrews on the significance and reality of the historical life of Christ can be understood only in a context which is thoroughly eschatological, in which Christ comes to usher his own into the new age. If it is true that the writer of Hebrews describes Christ in some places with expressions similar to those used by Philo

19 Spicq, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
20 Scott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews,* pp. 164 f.

:o describe the Logos, and that they share a common allusion to Melchizedek, it s also true that this is as far as the similarity goes. E. F. Scott has well said :hat "when we try to correlate his [the author of Hebrews] doctrine of the high-priesthood of Christ with the speculative idea of the reconciling Logos, we involve :he whole teaching of the Epistle in a hopeless confusion."[21]

The argument revolving about the Platonic doctrine of ideas has it roots in Plato's conception that the world perceived by our senses is not the real world but is mere illusion, an image of the real world of idea, form, pattern. When Plato speaks of the visible and the invisible, the earthly and the heavenly, the phenomenal and the real world, he is speaking in terms of a spatial dualism. Is this what we find in the Epistle to the Hebrews? The majority of modern commentators have thought so.

However, it is interesting that the argument seems to follow a pattern. First, it is seen that in some places the author of Hebrews speaks of earthly things as shadows, copies of heavenly realities. This is particularly true in chapters 7-9. The linguistic parallel is assumed to carry with it an identity of content, that is, Plato's two worlds are seen in the epistle. From this point it is a short jump to the place where one takes terminology which is borrowed from Jewish eschatology and apocalyptic and places a Platonic content in it. It becomes a vicious circle. When language sounds Platonic, linguistic parallel means parallel thought. When language is eschatological, a linguistic parallel does not mean a parallel thought, for the author is actually using it with Platonic content. In order to come out with the desired result, the method shifts to accommodate the facts.

Cambier is a good example of this method. He takes Heb. 13:14 as the key to the epistle and then takes great pains to show that, although it seems to be thoroughly eschatological, it is actually Platonic.

> There is a great difference between the heavenly city of Jewish apocalyptic, which continues as the heavenly Jerusalem in glory and splendor, and the heavenly things of the epistle which present no continuity with earthly things, but are something entirely different. The traditional formulae of apocalyptic subsist, but their significance is modified. For example, he speaks of future things, but the word 'future' does not connote its original significance; it is rather an appellative which expresses above all that the things are heavenly; the qualitative aspect "heavenly" substitutes itself for the temporal aspect "future."[22]

One can find practically identical statements in Dodd[23] and Eric Rust.[24] Having decided from linguistic parallels that the basic orientation of the epistle is Platonic, it is possible for them to find Platonic idealism even where the language is purely eschatological.

21 *Ibid,* p. 165.
22 Cambier, *op. cit.,* p. 37.
23 C. H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 45.
24 Rust, *op. cit.,* pp. 174 f.

A mediating position is that of Scott. He takes the Platonic language to have Platonic content, depicting two worlds, and the eschatological language to have eschatological content, depicting two ages. The interpretation is that there is a tension in Hebrews, as in Philo, between Judaism and Greek philosophy and that this shows that the epistle has its origin in the middle period of theological development between Paul and John.[25] The difficulty with this position is that it stems from outmoded evolutionary presuppositions and operates with an entirely too wooden concept of language.

Is it not basic to any sound interpretation that words are assigned meanings primarily by their *use in context?* Does it not make more sense to move from the total message of the epistle to the words rather than from isolated words to total message, as the commentators have so often done? When we read the epistle we see that it is rooted in the historical cultus of God's chosen people, in what God has accomplished in the past, and that it points forward toward the consummation of his purpose in the future. God had spoken in earlier times through the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken through his Son (1:1, 2), who has appeared once for all at the end of the age but will come again a second time to save those who are eagerly waiting for him (9:26-28). Some have already tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come (6:5); in fact, those who hold their first confidence to the end actually share in Christ (3:14). Therefore we should encourage one another, and all the more as we see the Day drawing near (10:25), for here we have no lasting city, but we seek the city which is to come (13:14).

It is the opinion of this writer that any connection between the Epistle to the Hebrews and Platonic idealism is essentially linguistic. "Jesus is primarily [in Hebrews as elsewhere in the New Testament] an actor in the eschatological drama of redemption rather than a mediator standing between the real and phenomenal worlds; rather a priest who makes atonement for the sin of mankind than a Gnostic mediator who procures their passage from the material world to the spiritual."[26] When the total framework of the epistle is seen to be an eschatological one, isolated linguistic parallels to Plato lose a good bit of their impressiveness.

Again in regard to the concept of faith, it is possible to point out similarities of language and of style between Hebrews and Philo. Yet there is little similarity in the two concepts of faith. For Philo, faith is something having to do with

25 Scott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews,* pp. 102-121.

26 C. K. Barrett, "The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews," *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology,* ed. by W. D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge: University Press, 1956), p. 389. Cf. Otto Michel, *Der Brief an die Hebräer* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1949), pp. 285 f.: "Im Unterschied von der hellenistischen Weisheitslehre und vom Alexandrinismus (Philo) lebt Hb in bestimmten apokalyptischen Denkformen des Urchristentums und in dem Bewusstsein, in der Endzeit zu leben . . . Hinter der Welt-und Geschichtsauffassung des Hb steht die Apokalyptik, nicht die griechische Philosophie oder der orientalische Mythus."

knowledge. It is the starting point from which one goes on to attain true knowledge of the ideal world. Faith, for Philo, is an epistemological tool. For the author to the Hebrews, faith is something which conquers kingdoms, through which the mouths of lions are stopped and foreign armies put to flight. It is something for which men are willing to be tortured, suffer mocking and scourging, imprisonment, stoning, being sawed in two, killed with the sword. For faith men will go about in skins of sheep and goats, wandering over deserts and mountains, in dens and caves of the earth.[27] This is no intellectual or ecstatic factor in the theory of knowledge. It is the commitment of a person's life to the eschatological calling, through which he is given power to carry out his task in this age as in that age which is to come. To speak of Platonic or Philonic influence here is to miss the central thrust of the epistle. "There are not two faiths, one of which looks to the future and believes that in the future good will come from God—an apocalyptic faith; and another, which penetrates beyond the world of phenomena to that of timeless and ideal truth—a 'Platonic faith.' There is but one faith, an eschatological faith which is convinced of future good because it knows that the good for which it hopes already exists invisibly in God."[28]

The final point in the argument, that of the allegorical method of interpreting the Old Testament, is hardly an either-or situation. It is certainly true that the author of Hebrews, as the apostle Paul, occasionally employed allegory in his use of the Jewish Scriptures. This was good rabbinical practice, and it ought not to surprise us if we find evidence of it in the New Testament.

And yet there is a marked difference between the allegorical method of Philo and that of the writer of Hebrews. For Philo historical facts are of little importance. The important thing is the "spiritual meaning," the philosophical idea. The "deeper meaning" of a person, an institution, or a story has only a logical connection, if that, to the event itself. Philonic allegory is divorced from history. For Philo, the intercession of the high priest becomes a sort of picture of the ascent of God through the agency of the Logos. The New Jerusalem is figurative of the condition of the soul when it is at last set free from the bondage of ignorance and passion.

In Hebrews, on the contrary, allegory—or better, typology—is rooted in history. The reality and the significance of the historical fact is never denied. Rather, the fact that it actually happened is what gives it significance. When Christ enters history, he does not come suddenly and unannounced, with no relation whatever to the past. The same God speaks to us through him as spoke to our fathers throughout history, yet now in a more perfect way (1:1). All through history his way had been planned, prepared by God's past acts through men, events, institutions. The forms and imagery of the Jewish ritual system are for Philo nothing but an opportunity to speculate on the inward communion of the soul with

27 Hebrews 11:33-38.
28 Barrett, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

God. For the author of Hebrews the ritual itself is good and important, because in showing that sin stands in the way between men and God, that somehow it has to be removed, it points forward to the work of Christ (10:3).

If there is allegory in Hebrews, it is allegory with an eschatological rather than an idealistic orientation.

Three of the more vigorous voices insisting on the eschatological interpretation of the epistle are those of William Manson in his little book, *The Epistle to the Hebrews,* C. K. Barrett in his article "The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews" in the recently published Dodd *Festschrift, The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology,* and Otto Michel in his *Der Brief an die Hebraeer* in the Meyer series of New Testament commentaries.

We close with a quotation from C. K. Barrett.

> The author of Hebrews, whose Greek style is so different from that of most of the New Testament, may well have read Plato and other philosophers, and must have known that his images and terminology were akin to theirs. He had seized upon the idealist element in apocalyptic, and he developed it in terms that Plato—or, better, Philo—could have understood. But . . . in all this the eschatological imagery is primary, as it must always be in any Christian approach to philosophical discourse. If the eschatological, rough, crude, and intractable as it may appear, is abandoned, there can be no guarantee that the unique act of God in the weakness, humility, and agony of his Son will remain central, or that the conviction will be maintained that through this act all things were made new and the powers of the age to come were released.[29]

29 *Ibid.,* p. 393.

More on a Preposition in the Nicene Creed

By William H. K. Narum

WITH all due respect to Howard Bream's article, "On a Preposition in the Nicene Creed," in the Quarterly for August, 1957, I should like to take exception to the conclusions he arrived at and argue the position he attacked.

Prof. Bream contended in his article that the statement, "And I believe one, holy Christian (Catholic) and Apostolic Church," should be changed to "And I believe *in*," etc. His argument might be summed up in this fashion: (1) The parallelism of the Creed is destroyed by the omission of the preposition "in." (2) The use of the "in" is based on the Lutheran conception of the church (for which he cites the Apology, IV, 7). (3) The earliest form of the Nicene Creed has the "in," and so does the Greek Orthodox Church to this day. (4) The reasons adduced in the Western churches for the omission of the preposition are unacceptable. (5) Use of the present form may lead to erroneous inferences. As over against this argument, I should like to argue that the Western usage without the preposition will avoid more problems than a change would, and that the Western usage is better left as it is. But, first, let us examine Prof. Bream's arguments.

1) Prof. Bream argues that the parallelism of the Creed is destroyed by *omission* of the "in." The contrary was the argument of Western theologians like Augustine, for, as they saw it, it is the *presence* of the "in" that destroys the parallelism. It is obvious that two different parallelisms are being argued here. Prof. Bream's parallelism is that if one says, as of God the Creator, that "I believe in" and then says "God," and then "who," etc., so one ought to say, "I believe in," and then say "the church," and then, "which is one," etc. Aside from the fact that Prof. Bream reverses the phrases in the latter, the point of Augustine and others is that the parallelism rightly extends only to the three persons of the Godhead. Because the church as a believed reality is not in the same category as the Triune God, they omitted the "in." I doubt that one can argue parallelism as such, for the whole issue is: How far does it extend? And I would agree with Augustine that on the basis of the Apostles' Creed there are three basic articles, not four.

2) Prof. Bream argues next that the use of the "in" is "based on the Lutheran conception of the church." The citation he makes from the Apology (IV, 7) reads: "Thus also the church is defined by the article in the Creed, which teaches us to believe that there is a 'Holy Catholic Church.'" I fail to see where this accords with the use of the preposition "in," for the *that there is* conveys exactly the notion that one is not to believe *in* the church but to believe that there is a church. Luther argues similarly, and in his *On the Councils and the Churches* says explicitly that

to say "I believe one holy Christian Church" means "I believe that there is a holy Christian people," or "that there is on earth . . . no more than one, holy, common Christian church." Now, which of the two usages (I believe, or I believe in) better accords with the "that there is?" It can be granted that in the English language we also use "I believe in" to mean belief in the existence of something, but both in context and out of it, "I believe in the church" suggests trust in the church. In context, since the previous uses of "I believe in" clearly do convey the notion of trust in the Triune God, it is wiser to avoid parallelism which can suggest trust in the church. Out of context the phrase "I believe in the church, which," etc., is even worse. The Lutheran conception of the church, therefore, is better served by the omission of the "in," for as Lutherans we agree with Augustine that we do not put faith in the church, or worship the church. There has sprung up in our century a kind of "romantic" understanding of the church which likes to use a phrase like "I believe in the church," of which I shall speak later.

3) Prof. Bream then argues that the "in" appears in the earliest form of the Creed, and is still used in the Greek Orthodox Church today. This is a fact, and I do not deny it. But because it was the earliest form is certainly no argument, for the *filioque* clause was also omitted in the earliest form of the Creed. Should we then join the Greek Orthodox on this point, too, and omit it? Maybe the earlier form gave ground for misunderstanding, and that is what the Western theologians have argued. Calvin admitted that the Greek form of the Creed probably contained the preposition "in," but agreed with Augustine and others that their reasons for omitting it were proper: "For we declare that we believe *in* God because our mind depends on him as true, and our confidence rests in him. But this would not be applicable to the church, any more than to "the remission of sins" or "the resurrection of the body" (*Institutes,* IV. 2). In the Apostles' Creed we do not say, "I believe in the church." Rather we say: "I believe in the Holy Ghost" and then pause and say, without an "in," "the holy Christian (catholic) church." Augustine stressed the importance of the caesura between the words "Holy Ghost" and "the catholic church" in the Apostles' Creed as determining the manner in which one confesses the Nicene Creed as well.

4) Prof. Bream argues that the reasons given by Western theologians for the omission of the "in" are not acceptable. He says, for one, that these theologians make an illegitimate distinction between the divine and the sub-divine which it is not the intention of the Creed to express. Now, the Creed is the confession of the church, surely, and one cannot speak of what the Creed intends until this is formulated. One must speak of what he who confesses the Creed intends, and the Western theologians argued that the intention of those who confess is confused by use of the same preposition in regard to the church as in regard to God. It would be easy to slip into the idea that one's attitude to the church is of the same type as one's belief in God. Therefore, in order to make the Creed say what should be

intended by the church, the "in" is omitted. Such a revision also occurred in the Nicene Creed with the *filioque* clause, and the argument of the West was similar.

But Prof. Bream also argues that theologians like Augustine or Rufinus were guilty of artificial exegesis, typical of the time. Thus Rufinus is cited and his argument impugned by saying that he was not arguing about realities but hanging his artificial exegesis on a point of grammar. A criticism like this, however, does not really argue the issue—it wants to predispose us against the man who argues, or his way of arguing, rather than to discuss the cogency of his argument. Besides, such a charge cannot be substantiated or refuted. Who knows that it was artificial? For it can be argued that a point in grammar can make a great deal of difference theologically (as, e.g., the *homoousia-homoiousia* controversy), and this in fact was the point of Rufinus. And when Prof. Bream must argue about prepositions, he, too, is liable to the same charge.

5) Prof. Bream lastly argues that incorrect inferences can be drawn from the omission of the preposition. Thus he cites an explanation from an Anglican source of the Nicene Creed's statement on the church: "I believe there is one, and but one, Catholic or Universal Church, which is built upon the foundation of the Apostles, and maintain the doctrine which they taught." Prof. Bream comments that the first part of this explanation is like Melanchthon's *Apology,* but the reference to maintaining the doctrine "seems to be an inference from reading it without the preposition "in." Now here I would dispute Prof. Bream's exegesis. I do not see why the whole burden of the clause about maintaining the doctrine should fall upon the omission of the "in" at all. In almost any Anglican or Roman Catholic formulary, the reason adduced for maintaining doctrine is due to the exegesis of "apostolic" or "catholic." After all, the Greek Orthodox Church would say the same thing, and there the "in" is present.

Thus I cannot feel that Prof. Bream has proved his case. On the contrary, I believe that the omission of the "in" should be preserved, both for the negative reasons already cited, and for certain positive reasons, among which one of Prof. Bream's points can be used in behalf of the omission of "in"—namely, that erroneous inferences are likely to follow from its presence.

Allow me, first, to cite a contemporary theologian who is universally respected, Karl Barth:

> *Credo in Spiritum sanctum,* but not *Credo in ecclesiam.* I believe in the Holy Spirit, but not in the Church. Rather I believe in the Holy Spirit, and therefore also in the existence of the Church, of the congregation.
>
> *Credo ecclesiam* means that I believe that here, at this place, in this visible assembly, the work of the Holy Spirit takes place. By that is not intended a deification of the creature; the Church is not the object of faith, we do not believe *in* the Church; but we do believe that in this congregation the work of the Holy Spirit becomes an event.[1]

1 *Dogmatics in Outline,* tr. G. T. Thimson (London: SCM Press, 1949), pp. 142 f.

Luther, as already cited, and as Prof. Bream agrees, used the Western formulation. The point of Augustine, Luther, Calvin, or Barth is that the church is something believed all right, but *not* believed *in*. It is a reality which must be believed—it is not something seen—for we believe these ordinary people gathered in a building in the name of Christ to be the people of God, the church, and there is only one church no matter how many organizations or how many congregations. This is what we believe—but we do not believe *in* the church, that is, we do not arrogate to it the authority which belongs to the Triune God.

Prof. Bream says that no one reading the Creed in English would find the omission of the "in" a serious problem. Perhaps not. And yet if we can convey by the omission of the "in" that belief with respect to the church is different from belief with respect to God, why not do so? Furthermore, both forms (I believe, or I believe in) need explanation so as not to lead to misunderstanding, and I would argue that the "I believe in" leads more easily to serious misunderstanding than the "I believe." Both in the Creed and lifted out of it, to say "I believe in" does convey the sense of "trusting in." If an emendation were to be made at all, perhaps adding the word "exists" to "And I believe one, holy, catholic and apostolic church" might be better. Even so, this would have to be explained too. Creeds were not meant to explain themselves.

That the "I believe in" form can lead to erroneous ideas about the church has been shown by Prof. Ernst Wolf, of Göttingen, in an essay entitled "Sanctorum Communio."[2] The entire essay is a discussion of developments in our times leading to a romanticization of the concept of the church. The very first tendency he discusses is precisely the one we are talking about, namely, a tendency to insert the preposition "in" (or re-insert it) in the article about the church in the Nicene Creed. After a long discussion of the reasons of Western theologians for omitting it, Prof. Wolf says that the desire to insert the "in" even in the text of the symbol is not without importance as a beginning point for a "romantic" understanding of the church, for a "salvatory faith in the church" (*Heilsglauben an die Kirche*): "Such an unconscious-conscious 'faith in the church' is more easily and more meaningfully adapted to the theological language of Catholic thinking than to Reformation thinking."[3] He points to three Roman Catholic theologians who have used the expression of belief *in* the church in recent writings. He cites a Jesuit, L. Köster, who writes: "Credo in unam, sanctam, catholicam et apostolicam ecclesiam. Thus the Catholic Christian believes." Or Erich Przywara is cited as arguing, just as Prof. Bream does, that the original form of the Nicene Creed contains the "in" and this reveals to Przywara how the church is better understood as the "body of the Trinity," and thus to be believed in. Another writer, Söhngen, is quoted as saying that Protestant misunderstanding is due to thinking that the

2 In *Peregrinatio* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1954), 279-301.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 282.

Roman Catholic believes in the church next to God, but it is rather that the *credere in ecclesiam* (Söhngen's words) is an expression of one's faith in God."

But even Lutherans have slipped into an unconscious (or conscious?) use of the phrase. Wolf cites a 1953 conference of theologians from the Lutheran World Federation at Loccum, Germany, where it was said: "The church is the earthly form in which the Holy Ghost reveals himself to us. Therefore we also believe *in* the church." Thus it is not a question of a Lutheran or a Roman Catholic use of the term, apparently. A French Jesuit, Henry de Lubac, has even argued for the omission of the term.[4] But as aforementioned, to believe *in* the church accords more with the Roman conception of the church than with the Lutheran or Protestant view.

Both forms can be misinterpreted, therefore. But it would seem that the omission of the "in" would lead to less difficulties in this respect than to insert it. I am not insinuating here at all that Prof. Bream shows "romantic" tendencies in regard to the conception of the church. It is rather that the presence of the preposition would more easily lead in that direction than to retain the present form. To avoid making the church an object of faith let us continue to omit the "in."

4 "Méditation sur l'Église" (Paris, 1953), quoted in *ibid.*

Correspondence and Comment

Confessions and Word of God

Dr. Lowell Green's article, "Toward an Evangelical Understanding of the Lutheran Confessions" in the August, 1957, number of the Quarterly has set me to thinking. The author makes a good case of the question under consideration. I appreciate his objective presentation.

I do not intend to elaborate further on this point. It is Dr. Green's reference to Article IV, Section 1, of the proposed constitution of "The American Lutheran Church" that caused me to do some thinking. It reads, "The American Lutheran Church accepts all the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments as a whole and in all their parts as the divinely inspired, revealed, and inerrant Word of God, and submits to this as the only infallible authority in all matters of faith and life." The clause "in all their parts as the divinely inspired, revealed, and inerrant Word of God" is ambiguous and needs clarification. This clause contains a theory that was formulated during the period of Orthodoxism. It is a theory of the verbal inspiration of Scripture that has been incorporated into the proposed constitution of "The American Lutheran Church." We are not on solid ground when a theory is made an article of faith.

Jesus Christ, who is revealed to us through the Scriptures, is the infallible criterion of saving faith. It is the dynamic impact of the Scriptures that Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God and that he came into the world to save us from our sins and give us eternal life. Jesus Christ is the sum total of God's revelation in the Holy Scriptures.

In his Small Catechism and in the Augsburg Confession, Jesus Christ is made the infallible criterion of Christian faith. Luther esteemed the Bible highly because it was the book that revealed Christ, the Saviour and Redeemer of lost mankind.

Section 1 of Article IV equates the Bible with the Word of God. According to my understanding of Luther's view of Scripture, it is not sound Lutheran theology to equate the Bible with the Word of God. Luther did not teach verbal inspiration of Scripture. Luther taught that inspiration of Scripture is a miracle of God which should be accepted in faith. Inspiration of Scripture is presented in Scripture as a fact. God has not told us the "how" of inspiration. Inspiration of Scripture is the work of the Holy Spirit. The Word is living and active when the Holy Spirit applies the Word so that we are brought to repentance and faith.

What is the Lutheran doctrine of the Word? It should be a challenge to American Lutheran theologians to clarify this baffling problem. A heavy burden would be lifted from the hearts and minds of many pastors and seminary students if this problem was clarified.

A. V. Neve

"Sacramental-Liturgical Revival"

Regarding the article on the liturgical revival in Lutheranism (Quarterly, November, 1957), do you not realize that Scandinavians of many backgrounds use the equivalent of the English word "Mass" in referring to a service with or without a celebration of the Lord's Supper? Why, then, do you place the word Mass in quotation marks, as though it were not quite Lutheran, when it is so frequently used, when it appears in the musical headings of the second setting of our new Service Book, and especially when it appears in our confessional literature? You will remember that the Augsburg Confession says that Lutheranism does not intend to abolish the Mass, but that it is celebrated with almost all the usual ceremonies in Lutheran parish churches.

Granted, there are extremes (St. Ambrose Society, now happily defunct, *et al.*), but any organization in the Lutheran Church which emphasizes the proper balance between Word and sacrament, and which emphasizes the development of a healthy spiritual life of prayer and meditation, is not to be lightly written off with the label "high church." A healthy love of the Lord's Supper, and its *frequent* reception, is badly needed in the American Church. We are starving for lack of frequent and devout Communions.

A pinch of incense would do good for any Protestant nose. There are, according to Holy Writ, but two odors in the next life, incense and brimstone. It would seem proper to grow accustomed to the use of the former in this life so as to be prepared for the worship of the Lamb in heaven, as recorded in the Apocalypse of St. John, in the next. And I cannot condemn the *proper* Lutheran use of incense in processions, a most ancient use, one which should certainly find its place in our funeral processions at least. Luther's *Formula Missae* speaks of incense; let us not mock what Luther approved.

As a member of the Suomi Synod, and as a young man of 25 who intends to study for her ministry, beginning next fall, and as an intensely Finnish as well as intensely American person, I protest against the whole tone of your article. You did not fairly picture the genius of the sacramental-liturgical revival. Chasubles *et al.* ARE historic, and they ARE Lutheran. You need only go to any Swedish cathedral (and Finnish, also) or larger parish during a celebration of the mysteries to see these properly used. European parishes are less conscious of the "rightness or wrongness" of adiaphora, I believe, because of their constant traditions. Until we Americans grow up, as a church, let us not hastily condemn what others find helpful in the worship of Christ Jesus.

If adiaphora are so unimportant to you, why does the use of vestments, etc., bother you so? I seem to see a bit of Calvin in your article. If you had lived in Magdeburg in the sixteenth century, would you have been happy with the smoking censers in the Lutheran parish church? I wonder.

George A. Porthan

A Word of Explanation on the Term "Mass"

This comment on the above communication is not intended to curb

further discussion but to set the record straight as far as the Rev. David L. Scheidt's intention is concerned. As he stated in his article, it was his purpose to "offer a brief and objective description of the movement's platform as this appears from the writings of its leaders" (QUARTERLY, IX, p. 343). On this account he used many quotations.

In the course of his presentation Mr. Scheidt pointed out that there is a predilection for the use of the term "Mass" among adherents of the movement in question. This seems not to be in dispute, and it appears that for the majority of Lutherans in America the reintroduction of the term in our generation represents an innovation. The fact tthat the term was sometimes retained in the sixteenth century and afterwards does not alter this.

If it is argued that the Augsburg Confession employed the term without disapproval it must be remembered that the tone and intent of this symbol were conciliatory and that the term was in common use among those who were addressed by the Confession. However, such an assertion as "Our churches are falsely accused of abolishing the Mass, for the Mass is retained among us" (Augsburg Confession, XXIV, 1) must be read alongside the assertion that the Mass "is only an invention of men, . . . an unnecessary thing which can be omitted without sin and danger" (Smalcald Articles, Part II, Art. II, 2, 3). Obviously, as the contexts make clear, the term "Mass" is used in two different senses, in the first case with reference to the "Supper of the Lord" and "the dignity and use of the sacrament," and in the second case with reference to "the Mass in the papacy" which "must be the greatest and most horrible abomination."

All of this may serve to explain why, in the article under discussion, the word "Mass" was enclosed in quotation marks. Since the editor must share some responsibility with an author for the style employed, it has seemed proper to offer this explanation with reference to Mr. Porthan's first complaint.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

Book Reviews and Notices[1]

Labor, Industry, and the Church. By John Daniel. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1957. 228 pages. $3.

John Daniel's book on a Lutheran ethic for labor-management relations represents an important attempt to open up an area for discussion which has too long been slighted in Lutheran ethical writings. Credit must be given to him for strong convictions about the responsibility of the church and for his willingness to leave some Lutheran blazemarks along a trail whose existence many Lutherans have overlooked.

Still the book must be called unsatisfactory. For two major reasons. First, despite an array of official statistics about the economy, the methodology is essentially a biblical-deductive approach in which certain key Scripture passages and doctrinal formulas serve as "principles" to be applied to economic life. Somehow the resulting judgments leave this reader with a feeling of unreality, of oversimplification, of a basic failure to catch the complexities, tensions, ambiguities, and dilemmas of the market-place, the assembly line, the board room, the union hall, and the conference table.

Second, despite lengthy bibliographies at the end of the various chapters, the treatment of many of the historical developments and of important characteristics of both the labor movement and the business enterprise remains superficial. Thus one can hardly deal with Weber's thesis about the relationship between the Protestant ethic and capitalism in two pages, citing the very dubious authority of H. M. Robertson as a "refutation." Daniel shows, in fact, that he has not caught the essential point that Weber makes about "modern capitalism," an economic form Weber carefully distinguished from earlier forms of business enterprise, specifically from those Robertson quotes against him. Nor does Daniel show any acquaintance with the primary literature on this subject, e.g., Puritan sermons on vocation, William Ames' book on *Conscience and the Cases Thereof,* or Samuel Williard's lengthy exposition of the seventh commandment in *The Compleat Body of Divinity,* probably the definitive theological textbook of American Puritanism.

Similarly, while citing Elert's criticism of Troeltsch's description of Luther's ethics, Daniel seems oblivious to the history of nineteenth century German Lutheranism, to which Troeltsch's criticism was much more relevant than it was to Luther. He fails to see the connection between the Confessional Awakening's failure to understand the dynamics of the rising labor movement and its alignment with conservative reaction or of its use of the Inner Mission as a paternalistic alternative to a realistic social ethic. It was the theology of this kind of Lutheranism which occupied the place of honor in the seminaries of Lutheran synods of German origin in the United States.

As a matter of fact, an understanding of the historical development of economic ethics, its changes and compromises in the context of the socio-economic history of the past four centuries, would need to dig much more deeply than Daniel did into sermons, devotional literature, religious periodicals, diaries, official records, and so forth. Daniel would have been well advised to skip the history and concentrate more intensely on the anguish and the ambiguities of our contemporary industrial civilization.

Behind these short-comings lies the fact that Daniel has imposed much too narrow and rigid limitations on his theological investigations. He sees fit to dismiss Catholic and Calvinist ethics in a few paragraphs and tends to disparage the programs and proposals of other Protestant denominations. Evidently the Lutheran label seems necessary to both ethical systems and concrete programs before they receive serious consider-

1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

ation. And here his criticism, when voiced, seems muted and timid; one keeps seeing the ghost of the *reine Lehre* peering over his shoulder.

Perhaps a part of the reason can be found in the foreword, which suggests that Daniel's book was carefully screened for "orthodoxy" in order to qualify for publication. Under these circumstances no doubt it is too much to have expected a more dynamic approach. The encounter between faith and the facts can hardly be a fair fight when one of the participants has one hand tied behind his back.

Considering the anxiety evident in the foreword about tackling an area where it is sometimes difficult to cite relevant Scripture passages, let alone clear "proof passages," one should underline Daniel's pioneering spirit. One should also recognize that in this shadowy arena the ecclesiastical ghosts are not the only ones that haunt us. In other circles cultural and economic spirits play a similar role. We therefore owe Pastor Daniel our thanks for opening up the field for discussion.

KARL H. HERTZ

Christian Ethics. By Georgia Harkness. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. 240 pages. $3.75.

It is to the credit of any author that he states specifically the audience to which he addresses himself and the viewpoint from which he writes. Professor Harkness believes that her book will be "intelligible and helpful to college and seminary students and also to thoughtful laymen and ministers concerned with the inevitable problems of Christian decision" (p. 8). She states explicitly the frame of reference within which she writes. Christian ethics is not the best in the moral philosophy of all ages and places, nor the moral standards of Christendom, nor the ethics of the Christian church and its many churches, nor the ethics of the Bible, nor the ethics of the New Testament. Christian ethics centers rather in "the ethical insights of Jesus." Other frames of reference are not automatically rejected but are held to be valid only as they are consistent with and exist as applications of the moral insights of Jesus.

That such an approach to Christian ethics is neither possible nor desirable is evident from Miss Harkness' own treatment in Part I, where she devotes as much or more attention to the discussion of "The Covenant, the Law, and the Prophets" and "Ethical Perspectives of the Early Church" as she does to "The Ethics of Jesus." It is corroborated by Part II, in which the discussion of concrete ethical problems is only occasionally based essentially on the actual words or thoughts of Jesus.

Although the author expresses a desire to write within the context of historical and critical biblical scholarship, she shows little evidence of familiarity with either the current issues or the literature in this field. Instead of seeing in the Old Testament the revelatory history of the people of God, she would like to pick out "the ten commandments," "the great moral insights of the prophets," "the matchless devotional poetry of the psalms" (p. 26). Instead of granting to the form critics that we have in the gospels the inseparable combination of historical record and evangelistic witness, Miss Harkness often draws a sharp line between Jesus and the early church and not infrequently chooses Jesus over Paul in good nineteenth-century style. She feels quite free to reject the Pauline-Reformation view of sin and believes that she is being consistent with the teaching of Jesus when she says, "This is why a little child, even though self-centered by nature, is not a sinner, and sin is 'original' only in the sense that the natural self-centeredness of childhood, if uncurbed, becomes sinful as the individual matures to the point of responsible decision" (p. 95 f.).

Constantly seeking to steer between two extremes, Miss Harkness claims to stand somewhere between liberalism and neo-orthodoxy on the problem of sin (p. 97), somewhere between Bishop Nygren's emphasis on *agape* and A. C. Knudson's position of "self-realization through self-sacrifice" on the problem of self-love (p. 105). On the problem of justice, the author rejects Brunner's position of love as limited to individual relations and justice as the norm elsewhere, and believes Niebuhr's position of love as an "impossible possibility" to be a dichotomous view which in fact elevates justice rather than love as the determining principle of social ethics. Miss Harkness' own defi-

nition states that justice is "the 'harmonious relation of life to life' as this harmonious relation is determined by concern for other persons in *agape* love" (p. 189).

There are helpful discussions of "Marriage and the Family," "The Ethics of Economic Life," "Christianity and the Race Problem," "The Christian Conscience and the State," "War, Peace, and the International Order," and "Christian Ethics and Culture." But if one is asked about the real contribution of this book one is hard pressed to state it. It is well written, and, discounting vestiges of a rather musty liberalism, contains some good discussions of current ethical issues. However, there is little here that has not been said as well or better elsewhere. Professor Harkness begins her book with a question. "Why produce another book on Christian ethics when the library shelves are already full of them?" In the opinion of the reviewer, her book does not adequately answer this question.

JAMES H. BURTNESS

Encyclopedia of Morals. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 682 pages. $10.

To an already impressive list of dictionaries and encyclopedias, Vergilius Ferm, of the College of Wooster, now adds the *Encyclopedia of Morals,* a volume made up of substantial articles on a wide variety of topics related to moral behavior.

A serious attempt has been made to include not only the views of ethical theorists, but also some concrete studies of communal living. For the latter the editor has included the findings of the anthropologists rather than those of the sociologists. As a result, one finds articles of approximately equal length, for instance, on the morals of the Zuni Indians or the Aboriginals of Yirkalla as one does on Christian philosophy. The reader ought not to expect special consideration for Christian or even religious morals, however, since this is clearly not the editor's intention. The names of Albert Schweitzer and Karl Barth do not even occur in an index of almost a thousand names, and Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and Anders Nygren receive four, three, two, and one incidental reference respectively. An interesting comparison is A. J. Ayer, who is treated in a major article, and for whom the index includes over forty references.

Articles on major philosophers and ethical systems, including treatments of such areas as Current Soviet Morality and Moral Philosophies of China, make this encyclopedia a valuable addition to the standard reference works. The articles are written by a group of fifty-two well qualified scholars and are almost always both informative and authoritative. Select bibliographies appended to each article and a careful system of cross-references add to the usefulness of this volume as an excellent starting point for the investigation of many areas which relate to moral behavior.

JAMES H. BURTNESS

The Ten Commandments. By Solomon Goldman. Edited and with an introduction by Maurice Samuel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 226 pages. $3.75.

This little volume is part of a monumental series on the Bible which the late Rabbi Goldman did not live to finish. Though it is only a part of the third volume which was to have been on Exodus, it is a self-contained work, providing a careful literary analysis and exegetical study of Ex. 19:1-20:21.

The material is presented strikingly as a kind of one-act drama with a prologue, recounting the preparation of the Israelites for the theophany at Mt. Sinai (Ex. 19), the drama proper with its divine monologue in which the Decalogue is dictated to Moses (Ex. 20:1-17), and the epilogue, describing the people's response to the divine revelation (Ex. 20:18-21).

Inasmuch as these were the last lines that Rabbi Goldman lived to write, the present volume has been edited and prepared for publication by the distinguished Jewish writer Maurice Samuel, who has also written the preface, in which he discusses the nature and meaning of the Revelation at Sinai and provides a brief resume of Goldman's views on the documentary hypothesis as it relates to the account of the giving of the Ten Commandments to Moses.

It is at once evident that Goldman is not in sympathy with the rationalistic and tendentious approach of the Wellhausen School, although he presents its conclusions fairly

and does not reject them *in toto*. He is concerned, however, that this revelatory account which he considers the very basis of Judaism and Christianity be not robbed of its profound spiritual power and significance in the history of religion and civilization.

The discussion is divided almost equally into two main parts. Part I, entitled *Text and General Commentary,* presents Rabbi Goldman's own simple straight-forward translation and includes a detailed discussion of the original form, authorship, date, and composition of the Decalogue, as well as a cogent analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic features which have endowed these simple commands with their unusual power. Part II, entitled *Textual Commentary,* presents a detailed phrase-by-phrase, often word-for-word, exegetical analysis of the text, in which pertinent Hebrew terms have been transliterated. It is especially here that the breadth of Goldman's interest and the wide range of his reading in ancient, medieval, and modern sources, both Jewish and Christian, is evident. Significant quotations from the Talmud, ancient Church Fathers, medieval commentators, and modern biblical scholars and philosophers elucidate richly and cogently the text.

A fine spiritual warmth is manifest throughout this volume, with little of Jewish bias; and although it is to be expected that the author would lack an appreciation of the evangelical approach to the Decalogue as reflected in the teaching of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, yet he has presented the material in such a way that any reader will find new and deeper significance in this great revelatory section of Scripture.

ROBERT H. BOYD

Christian Living. By Stephen F. Bayne, Jr. Greenwich: The Seabury Press, 1957. 341 pages. $2.50.

Christian Living is fifth in a series entitled "The Church's Teaching," sponsored by the Author's Committee of the Department of Christian Education of the Protestant Episcopal Church. This committee is made up of fifteen members, including such men as Professor Joseph F. Fletcher, Dean James A. Pike, Canon T. O. Wedel. Though the books are written by individuals, and addressed specifically to parish laymen, they grow out of the carefully edited conversation of a select group of men who are known both for their competency as thinkers and for their skill in translating technical terminology into simple and colorful language. The result is a very rare combination of delightful style, clear presentation, and serious attack on the problem.

Witness, for instance, the following statements concerning the impossibility of abdicating one's humanity. "Indeed, Christianity is very far from being anti-intellectual or anti-rational—quite the contrary is true. But we share Christ's impatience with 'iffy' questions, with guesswork and idle dreams. We start not with what man might be or ought to be or might have been, but with what he is" (p. 10). "You are what you are, and you have no alternative save to begin there. Both Popeye and St. Paul have a healthy and basically Christian attitude toward this—'I am what I am' says one, and the second adds 'by the grace of God.' Both start where surely all mature manhood starts, with the willing and glad acceptance of the given circumstances of our life" (p. 15). "Our choices come to us, trailing long streamers of history behind them. They are themselves the result of other choices, made by other men. They incorporate past good and past sin. They involve other people and still other choices. They are sticky and brittle, and they cannot be molded to suit our convenience" (p. 21).

Taking as his basic theme the notion of "responsible freedom," Bishop Bayne develops this idea carefully in Part I, and it is immediately apparent that the reader will be offered no simple solutions to complex problems. Black and white choices are recognized to be, rather, shades of grey. "The Christian's choices are not different choices; they are the same choices that man has been making from the beginning, but they are made with a greater awareness of their importance and of all that is involved in them, and with a profoundly deeper loyalty. . . . Christianity brought no new choice or new law. What Christianity gave to the pagan world . . . was a NEW SETTING for that choice" (p. 6). This new setting came into being through the life and work of Jseus Christ. "Thus the supreme moment of freedom in the Gospel is the moment of

ıe Cross . . ." (p. 47), and it is this mo-ıent which leads us into responsible freedom ı our personal life, family, and work (Part I), in church, community, and nation (Part II), and in national and international life (Part IV). Throughout the book, the author loes not supply easy answers for our thical dilemmas [but rather seeks] to supply ıe fundamental raw material on which hristian attitudes are based" (p. vi).

Christian Living is written unashamedly ithin the Anglican tradition for the in-ruction of laymen within this communion.)ne ought not to be surprised, therefore, hen appeal is made to canon law (p. 80 *passim*) or when the word sacrament is sed in a broader sense than that to which utherans are accustomed (p. 113 ff.). hough solutions may at times be questioned, is rarely in this volume that the problem not clearly and honestly stated. This is ırely one of the finest of current attempts) produce a "lay theology," and it is no onder that the existing volumes in this eneral series are already the best selling ooks ever produced by the Protestant Epis-opal Church with the one exception of the 3ook of Common Prayer.

The book is well-edited, contains a classi-ed bibliography of nearly two hundred ooks, a short index, and the general index) the entire series of *The Church's Teaching.* Thrifty readers will be interested to know hat the book has also been published in a aperback edition.

JAMES H. BURTNESS

When I Became a Man. By Theodore Parker Ferris. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 228 pages. $3.75.

The book under review was read over a eriod of weeks—and those weeks some veeks ago! This is not cited as a virtue, but does give perspective. In this case the ackward look establishes three continuing udgments: that the book is definitely timely, ieeting a real situation and need, that the uthor is a man of unusually sensitive spirit nd possessed of a delightfully direct style, nd that, while generally positive in its posi-ions and statements, the book does not close ut rather opens doors to further thought.

The volume is an outgrowth of the author's preaching and teaching ministry in Trinity (Episcopal) Church, Boston, and of his participation in two radio programs. More specifically, it constitutes a formal recognition of the fact known to any parish pastor that "there is a lag, so to speak, between what people feel and think religiously and what they think and believe intellectually" and that for countless thousands "the world they live in and the God they believe in simply do not go together, and the incongruity of their religion and their education is a major problem." It is this fact that makes the "appeal for mature thinking on the part of Christian people" so timely, while the attempt to relate this re-thought faith to life as it is faced day by day (the second part of the book) gives the study added relevance.

To meet this grave problem in the language of "church-speak" (as it is termed in a recent issue of Valparaiso University's *Cresset*) or through the use of established but esoteric theological terms would be to make defeat almost certain. But, ever mindful that he is seeking to address "the average enlightened citizen of a modern democracy," Dr. Ferris uses straight-forward language, very apposite illustrations, and uninvolved sentences. The result is a quality and degree of persuasiveness that carries the reader along to rather complete acceptance of the author's viewpoints.

The twenty-five brief chapters are definitely evangelical in their over-all emphasis at the same time that there are numerous evidences of a more or less liberal commitment and some places where a more certain note might have been blown. Nevertheless, if its purpose is to be attained, if it is to be read as widely as it is hoped it may be, this is probably both necessary and good and tends to stimulate rather than stifle individual and independent thought. The reviewer can say, in conclusion, that he can think of scores to whom, standing in need of just such a sympathetic study, the recommending or giving of the book would be a decided service. Moreover, many a pastor could learn from it how to present his thoughts with new understanding and acceptability to the many who want to understand and accept.

HENRY H. BAGGER

The Library of Christian Classics. Vol. X: A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham. Edited and translated by Eugene R. Fairweather. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 457 pages. $5.

Attention has been called in earlier numbers of THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY to previous volumes of this series which have appeared.

The editor and translator of this volume is associate professor of Dogmatic Theology and Ethics in Trinity College of the University of Toronto. He is a priest of the Church of England in Canada.

The writings here translated are grouped by centuries. The outstanding name in the eleventh century, of course, was Anselm of Canterbury. His *Proslogion* and *Cur deus homo* are here presented, together with some letters and excerpts of other writings. There are also two brief excerpts from Eadmer, Anselm's biographer.

The representatives of the twelfth century, besides Abailard and Peter Lombard whose works would be expected, are the St. Victor leaders (Hugh, Richard, and Adam), Ivo of Chartres, Gratian, John of Salisbury, Anselm of Laon and his school, and Stephen Langton.

In the third section are excerpts from Bonaventura, Matthew of Aquasparta, John Duns Scotus, and Ockham. Aquinas will receive separate treatment in Volume XI. Albertus Magnus is omitted.

Each section is introduced by a competent bibliography which cites published texts, translations, biographies, and treatises. There is also an introduction for each section, describing the conditions of the century concerned, the problems facing the writers, and the importance of the views they expressed. There is also a general introduction evaluating scholasticism as a whole. The translation is in fluent English.

Much of the contents of the volume has previously not been available in English at all, and not easily accessible in Latin. The items selected for inclusion are fairly representative of most of the authors. In order to cover the scholastic period, only excerpts could be given in most instances. Yet they are sufficient to give a taste of the period. The student who desires to probe further will find the introductions and bibliographies to be very valuable guides.

W. D. ALLBECK

Luther's Works. Vol. 13. Selected Psalms II. Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1956. 451 pages. $4.50.

In his *Preface to the Psalter* (1531) Luther enthusiastically expressed his esteem of the Psalter as the finest book of examples of the saints, as a little Bible which "puts everything that is in all the Bible most beautifully and briefly," but above all because it contains the words of the saints, "how they spoke with God and prayed, and still speak and pray."

Luther loved the Psalter because it was peopled with men of like passion as himself, men who doubted and did not hesitate to voice their doubts, who feared, struggled, hoped, believed, and gave tongue to their hopes and fears.

Volume 13 presents Luther's exposition of seven psalms—68, 82, 101, 110, 111, 112. As to form they are comprised of devotional tracts, classroom lectures, and one, Psalm 110, a sequence of expository sermons in which the preacher simply broke off at a given point and took the matter up again in the next sermon, with little formal recognition that any break had taken place. There seems to be little in either style or content to differentiate between lecture in the classroom and sermon in the pulpit. What is common to both forms is Luther's masterful exposition of Scripture, his profound awareness of implications, and his deft application of Scripture to the affairs and concerns of the day.

Psalms 82 and 101 are taken by Luther to be a kind of *Fürstenspiegel,* a mirror for reigning princes, yielding counsel for the guidance of kings and rulers. Luther took the occasion to make pungent observations on life at court; the expositions also contain a few earthy examples of his rough peasant "humor." Princes are not generally given to scholarship, so that these pages might be "love's labor lost" save for the fact that the observations apply with general validity to those who are called on to lead in other than princely capacity.

The other psalms are construed in the context of faith, and specifically of the Christian faith. Of Psalm 110 Luther writes, "Here, as nowhere else in the Old Testament Scriptures, we find a clear and powerful description of [Christ's] person, who he is, . . . and of his resurrection, ascension, and entire kingdom." In Psalm 111 Luther compares and contrasts Passover and Eucharist. Psalm 90 Luther takes as having been written by Moses, and here he finds "pitiful words of sadness." "How gloomy and dark it is there, with all kinds of troubled outlooks on the wrath of God."

As in Luther's other writings, one finds much here that is so dated as to be of interest only to the historian, but that amount is surprisingly little, and how much there is that is still as relevant as the day it was written. Above all, one senses Luther's overwhelming devotion to the Christ of whom the Old Testament bears witness.

An excellent job of translation appears to have been done. One is not conscious of reading a translation. The index is well articulated. The editors appear to have nodded in omitting the text of Psalms 68, 90, and 111 while supplying it in the cases of Psalms 82, 101, 110, and 112.

JOHN W. RILLING

The Theology of Calvin. By Wilhelm Niesel. Translated by Harold Knight. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 254 pages. $4.

The author is a well known Calvin scholar who, with Peter Barth, edited a very useful set of Calvin's selected works. The present work on Calvin's theology appeared in German in 1938, and is now available in an English translation. As such it does not sufficiently take into account some important Calvin studies of the intervening years, including a provocative criticism of its thesis in Dowey's *Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology.* Nonetheless, Niesel's work remains the most comprehensive single treatment of Calvin's theology as a whole.

The author believes (rightly, in the judgment of this reviewer) that Calvin studies have all too often failed to understand the Reformer because they have not begun with the controlling center of his theology—the living God in Jesus Christ. Niesel here offers a fresh and lively interpretation of Calvin's entire teaching by seeing each doctrine through its Christological center. He does this by following, in the main, the order of the last edition of the *Institutes.* This reviewer's only complaint is that Niesel overstates his case, particularly in the matter of the knowledge of God through general revelation, for here Calvin's own order in the *Institutes* is an embarrassment to him. One wonders whether the author always distinguishes Calvin's view of Scripture from that of Karl Barth.

With this reservation, however, let it be said that the main thrust of Niesel's interpretation is both sound and very much needed. Calvin is not the scholastic theologian that later tradition has made of him. It is indeed high time that specific attention be given to the Christological center of his thought, especially when we try to discuss his view of predestination.

Protestant theology may rejoice that the heart of her witness—seen here in the heart of Calvin's faith—is being rediscovered in contemporary thought and worship. Dr. Niesel rightly insists that in every aspect of doctrine Calvin is concerned with only one thing—the God revealed in the flesh. Among other things, this lively and important book should make for fresh communication and further exploration between Lutheran and Reformed theologians.

JOHN FREDERICK JANSEN

Selected Letters of John Wesley. Edited by Frederick C. Gill. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. $4.75.

John Wesley was a prodigious letter writer. About 2,700 letters are extant. Many are only short notes, written in a hurry on a journey, but many are long epistles. This volume of 244 pages with index contains 275 letters distributed over 50 years, from his undergraduate days at Oxford in 1741 to the very year of his death 1791. That is, they cover a space of fifty years. Some years are represented by only a single letter, the more critical times by several letters. But every year is represented. They are addressed to a vast number of people, including his mother, wife, sisters, brothers, nephews and

nieces, William Law, Wilberforce, letters bordering on the romantic to a young widow who did not accept his approaches, and especially to Sophy Hopkey. Also to the Countess Huntingdon, to the king, prime minister, and judges, marching orders to preachers, charges to stewards, letters to societies dealing with property, letters asking for financial support of some worthy cause, and, of course, a large number of letters dealing with personal spiritual problems. The selection seems to be fairly well balanced.

A large number of them are supplied with short explanatory introductions. The letters are so connected chronologically that they constitute an autobiography of one of the greatest men of modern church history, and also give a firsthand insight into the early history of Methodism. Wesley's letters, together with his journal, are the important sources for our understanding of Wesley and of early Methodism. This sort of autobiographical material gives a much deeper insight into the man and the movement than a biography can give. But some previous knowledge of the life of Wesley is needed in order fully to benefit from this book.

These letters reveal the extraordinary zeal, consecration, and energy of John Wesley. One wonders how a single man could, for so many years, maintain control and direction of such an extensive evangelical movement, involving hundreds of preachers, mostly lay preachers, assistants, stewards, chapels, and houses, and covering England, Scotland, northern Ireland, and the American colonies including Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. The letters revealed a minute oversight of this vast undertaking. How this was possible for a man who was on the go continuously, who traveled on horseback, later in a carriage, about 5,000 miles a year, preached a couple of times a day, met with classes, had numerous conferences and, besides, carried on a voluminous correspondence, is hard to grasp, especially since it was done by a man with no robust constitution, who for quite a number of years spoke of himself as being on the verge of the grave.

The one important thing for John Wesley is the proclamation of the Gospel. The Gospel is to him the message of justification by faith. Time and time again he points to justification by faith as his real message. Closely connected with this is, in Wesley, the doctrine of universal atonement. The purpose of his *Arminian Magazine* is, according to his statement, to proclaim and defend the latter doctrine. For Wesley it was urgent and necessary to proclaim this message of salvation. It was this that justified all the sacrifices and self-denials by Wesley and his followers. For, according to Wesley, the Gospel was preached, at the time, neither in the established church nor in the dissenting churches. In the state church it was a matter of neglect; in the dissenting churches positive error blocked the preaching of the Gospel. The error was, in Wesley's opinion, Calvinism. The magnanimity of the man is revealed in the fact that while Wesley parted company with Whitefield on account of his Calvinistic theology, he never gave up his personal friendship for his old associate.

Along with justification by faith, the sole authority of Scripture is emphasized against the "churchly order" which plagued him. However, with Wesley justification is not limited to forgiveness. It involves a transformation of life. The Gospel, according to Wesley, also produces sanctification, which he often defines as being of a Christlike mind. Christ, when believed, not only delivers from guilt; he also delivers from sin and produces a life in holiness and love, for his morality is by no means of a negative nature. Putting the chief emphasis on the fruit of justification in us, sanctification is characteristic of the term Wesley gives the message of the Reformation. It is within this area that the Christian life is lived, where its battles are fought. John Wesley has no use for what he calls half-way Christians who want Christ as Saviour but not as Lord. A Christian must be wholly committed, or he is not a Christian. A committed Christian is one who is not satisfied with intermediate goals, but who presses onward toward perfection. Striving for perfection is essential in his system.

Wesley had many burdens and crosses to bear. Members of his own family became dependent on him. Perhaps his most humiliating cross was his sad experience with his wife, who seems to have been crazed by jealousy. Wesley was not only imperious,

he could also at times be tactless. Perhaps he was not as circumspect in dealing with women as he admonished his preachers to be. There are things in these letters which seem to indicate that.

But his great burden was in connection with his work. It did not always proceed in the glorious manner in which it appears to us. Besides external opposition, which could become violent, there were internal difficulties caused by friction between personalities and there were those who caused bitter grief and disappointment—also financial difficulties, as usual in Christian work.

Wesley's rule was personal and often arbitrary. With a high-churchly background, submission was to him a key idea both in religion and in politics. The idea of democracy in church work seemed foreign to him. His letters are often peremptory. He requires unquestioned submission. In this respect he resembles Dominic and Loyola. Not all had enough Christian humility to knuckle down to this kind of authority. There were factions, rivalries, and defections. All this appears in the letters. One wonders how this frail little man could bear so many personal crosses in addition to an unbelievable amount of work and in addition to the heavy responsibility that lay upon his shoulders to bring the Gospel to his fellow men, which he considered his calling.

IVER IVERSEN

The Coming World Civilization. By William Ernest Hocking. New York: Harper Brothers, 1956. 200 pages. $3.75.

In his latest book Hocking ventures a forecast on the shape of things to come. He envisages a world civilization emerging wherein by "reciprocal osmosis of thought, technique, and law" traditional barriers between East and West are being broken down and broken through. But the coming civilization is threatened with an imbalance, for the controlling factors in it are science and technology (which "migrate" faster than religion), and these may well usher in a thoroughly secularized world society.

More specifically, the dangers that threaten the coming civilization are precisely the dominant features of our contemporary world. They are (1) the growing power of the state, which, while assuming more and more prerogatives of control, reveals at the same time its weakness in the crucial area of motivation; (2) the widespread "night view" of the sciences, by which is meant a view of the universe bereft of meaning and value; and (3) the drift toward subjectivism in philosophy (existentialism), leading to relativism and psychologism.

These weaknesses, he thinks, can be partly remedied by encouraging developments now taking place in these areas themselves. The state needs to recognize more than it has in the past that religion, the only effective resource of motivation, must be given freedom to pursue its own end, which is to relate the individual to the Infinite. Only so can the state succeed in gaining the support it needs to cope with its increased responsibilities. Science needs to recognize that the "night view" is not inherent in its search for truth, but an arbitrary limitation self-imposed for the sake of objectivity. It needs to come to terms with a larger view which includes a teleology. Philosophy (by which Hocking means idealism), which since the time of Descartes has been threatened by solipsism, has now come to terms with empiricism. Chastened and reconstructed, it can now become a strong contributing factor in the area of motivation so sorely needed in our day. Theologians need to recognize this. Existentialism itself, he thinks, in the writings of Marcel and through the impact of his views on philosophers like Gilson and Maritain, is moving toward a more balanced synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity.

But the real solution to the threat of imbalance in the coming world civilization lies in religion, more specifically in a kind of cosmic mysticism that "unites the soul of man with the whole." Idealism has always stood for this. A mystic is one whose "spirit has made its solitary leap to God, like a tongue of flame out of the midst of the fire." Religion begins in solitude, but this solitude has within it the possibility of relating the soul to the "depths of the universe" and of refreshing the springs of motivation so necessary for living in an ordered society. This kind of religion is universal by its very nature, and is the only kind that will meet the need in the coming world civilization. "The true mystic will recognize the true

mystic across all boundaries and will learn from him" (p. 141).

This leads to the question of the nature of Christianity, which is both a particular religion tied in not only with Judaeo-Christian history but also with Western culture generally, and a religion that is above history in the sense that it negates cultural limitations. It is a "concrete universal." While Hocking thinks that the real nature of Christianity cannot be grasped apart from the historical context that gave it birth, he does not think this need necessarily limit the universality of its outreach. Christianity has always assumed both a critical and a flexible relation to the cultural forms within which it has functioned, leading to the view that it can shed its Western dress and assume the garb of the Orient and still remain true to its original genius. At this point, at least to this reviewer, Hocking appears inconsistent, for when he summarizes the "essence" of Christianity, he makes no mention of the historical events in which it became actualized, nor of Him who is its "essence" (p. 108). His summary seems to negate the very point he was so careful to argue in the pages preceding.

It goes without saying that Hocking is impatient with all ecclesiastical and theological barriers that would stand in the way of a recognition of common elements in all religions. He does not want to disparage "localisms" which would have the effect of severing religion from its supporting historical roots. But he does want to insist that such divisions need to be integrated into a larger totality as disclosed to the mystic.

This book is definitely not one that will commend itself to the prevailing trends in Christian thought, nor to the rank and file Christians who constitute our churches. In a sense, the book is an anachronism. It is hard to avoid the impression that Hocking has not advanced beyond his position assumed in *Rethinking Missions,* published some thirty years ago. Most Christians will find it difficult to recognize their own faith in the mysticism he sets forth in these pages. Perhaps for those who think there is real hope in the "Perennial Philosophy" now being advocated by such people as Toynbee, Huxley, and Isherwood, this book speaks their language. But for those who are actually engaged in the task of bringing Christ to the nations, the writings of Henrik Kraemer, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich speak more relevantly to the issues of the day.

But this is not to say that Hocking is not worth reading. He is. He writes with deep passion and critical acumen on the larger issues that confront all thinking Christians in our day.

STANLEY L. OLSEN

The Call of the Minaret. By Kenneth Cragg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 376 pages. $6.25.

The Muslim countries are attracting a great deal of interest, and well-written books on Islam and the Islamic countries are welcome and valuable. The book under review is such a book. The author, who is professor of Arabic and Islamics at Hartford Seminary Foundation, editor of *The Muslim World,* and formerly adjunct professor at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, is an authority on the Arab countries and on Islam, as this book amply shows.

The title indicates the author's wide outlook. From the minaret the muezzin calls the faithful to prayer five times each day, to "come to the good." What is this "good" which the Mosque offers? The one God, the prophet, the holy book, the brotherhood of the faithful, the privilege of prayer? Yes, and all that goes with the religion which for thirteen centuries has held the people of the desert together in one large family, and which has given inspiration to conquest on a large scale. How was it possible for obscure dwellers in the Arabian desert to fan out as conquering armies to the Pyrenees and to the Himalayas? The answer is usually summed up in one word: Islam.

What is really going on in the Muslim world? The desert is changing, and this is not merely a surface change caused by the supplanting of the camel by the automobile. It is true, one still sees the beggars, the flies, the peddlers as of yore, but there is a strange stirring among the followers of the prophet. This is true among the students in Muslim universities, among Arab politicians, even among the teachers of Islam. Does this stirring mean an awakening or revival? Or

does it mean an approach to the philosophy and way of life of the West? The recent history of Turkey might indicate the latter, but the experiment in Turkey is so far rather unique among the Muslim states. Reading this book is a sort of a pilgrimage through the strange world of present day Islamic thought and practice.

What should be the Christian approach to the Muslim? The approach which the Crusaders tried proved a failure. So far the modern missionary activity of the church among the Muslim has not met a wide response. The titles of the chapters in Part III indicate the author's idea of approach, and these chapters show an understanding of the situation and an insight into the present conditions which one seldom meets with in a book on this subject. A meeting in candor and mutual understanding is possible. The Christian in his contact with the Muslim must demonstrate that he not only brings a doctrine about God, but that he lives a God-filled life.

JOHN E. GRONLI

The Christian and the World of Unbelief. By Libuse Lukas Miller. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. 240 pages. $4.75.

From one point of view, this is a very pretentious book. It purports to set forth a Christian evaluation of contemporary thought in philosophy, science, ethics, art, and historiography. Even if Mrs. Miller takes much for granted, as she does, on the part of the reader relative to a knowledge of the going trends of thought in those areas, it still appears to be too pretentious an undertaking. The book consists of six chapters, each of which might well deserve a whole volume for adequate treatment. But this impression of pretentiousness is mitigated somewhat as one discovers what the author is about. She is attempting to set forth, as honestly and as clearly as possible, *her own experience* in relating her faith to contemporary thought. Whether Mrs. Miller expected her effort to achieve more than this I am not sure. Seen in this light, it becomes a highly valuable transcript of one person's intellectual attempts in finding one's way around in a world of unbelief. She succeeds in conveying the impression of a very perceptive mind that has come a long way in understanding the traditional Christian faith, the world of unbelief in which that faith must live today, and the way in which such a mind can relate the two.

The book is written in an engaging style that invites much underlining if not actual quotation. It moves on an existentialist base, consistently within traditional Christian and biblical categories. It reveals an "at-homeness" with current trends of thought in all the areas covered. It points up sharply the issues the Christian confronts in contemporary thought together with their ambiguities, complexities, and ultimate implications. However much one may want to disagree with this or that conclusion, one must respect the author for the clarity of her thought and for the Christian concern that informs all she writes.

It would be unfair to a book of this nature to assess its value as over against more objective apologetic works, like those of William Temple or Alan Richardson. It was obviously not intended to serve an apologetic purpose, at least not directly. As she says in the preface, she is concerned with exploring the relevance of the faith rather than with making a defense of it. She rarely mentions the names of writers she has in mind when developing points of view. Her generalizations often become over-simplifications. Her constant probing into attitudes and motives that are held to lie back of criticisms of unbelievers often leads one to think the argument has only an *ad hominem* application. But these things may not be real weaknesses in the kind of book the author purports to be writing.

STANLEY L. OLSEN

The Study of Missions in Theological Education. Vol. II. By Olav Guttorm Myklebust. Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke, 1957. 413 pages. N. Kr. 29.50.

Vol. II of Myklebust's study follows hard on the heels of Vol. I (see QUARTERLY, VIII, 93) and treats developments since 1910 with greater fullness. As in the earlier volume, so here, the author's major concern is the place of Missions in the training of Protestant ministers in the principal countries of the West. He demonstrates that in America,

especially, there has been an increasing tendency to establish chairs and departments of Missions in schools of theology (pp. 290-292), and he points out that this is more characteristic of schools of the Reformed than schools of the Lutheran and Anglican traditions (pp. 318-324).

While acknowledging that missionary interests are also cultivated in other ways (lectureships, student study groups, etc.), the author shows little sympathy for the proposal to introduce missionary emphases into existing biblical, historical, systematic, and practical courses rather than add new courses in Missions (pp. 36-37, 63-64, 289, 326). Myklebust's position runs counter to the general recommendations of the "Niebuhr Committee" which has recently studied theological education in America and whose three-volume report was not accessible to him (see below). One might also wish for a fuller analysis of the reasons for the success of some schools in stimulating missionary interest without special courses in Missions—one missionary out of every twelve alumni during the first hundred years at Union, one missionary out of every thirteen alumni during the first hundred years at Princeton (pp. 87, 88).

This is not to minimize the importance of the present study, for its value lies in its painstaking assembly of detailed and reliable information which has not hitherto been available. Intelligent curriculum revision will require a consideration of Myklebust's findings.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

The Ministry in Historical Perspectives. Edited by H. Richard Niebuhr and Daniel D. Williams. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 331 pages. $5.

This is one of the three books sponsored by the Survey of Theological Education in the United States and Canada that was undertaken in 1954 by the American Association of Theological Schools. The other two volumes are *The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry* (1956), by H. Richard Niebuhr, and *The Advancement of Theological Education* (1957), by Niebuhr, Williams, and James M. Gustafson.

The express purpose of the present volume is to show what the ministry has been in the past in order to analyze the issues concerning the ministry in the church's life today and so to provide a basis for making intelligent decisions concerning the training of the ministry for tomorrow. For this purpose the editors present contributions from eight of the leading church historians in our country today. There is a chapter each on the ministry in the primitive church, in the ante-Nicene church, in the patristic church, in the Middle Ages, in the time of the Reformation, in the modern church, in the Puritan age, in America up to 1850, and in America during the past century. All of the chapters are richly documented and most of them carry a bibliography in addition.

This is not another study of the *doctrine* of the ministry but an effort to ascertain what new demands are made today upon theological education. The method is to illuminate the total sweep of the Christian ministry through the ages, asking how the minister was chosen or "called," how he was trained, what his professional status was, what his relations were to church and state, and how variously he practiced his ministry or priesthood or pastoral office. The editors comment in their Introduction: "In the search today for a more adequate theological education a discernment of the richness, originality, and flexibility of the church's provision for its leadership may prove of special significance."

Perhaps the most vivid impression that the reader receives is that of the astonishing variety of function, the almost infinite complexity and adaptability of the ministerial office from age to age, from land to land, from tradition to tradition. Interesting also are the various kinds and degrees of distinction between clergy and laity. Much light is thrown upon present issues in theological education by surveying the line between the preaching, priestly, and teaching offices of the Christian minister. History shows the folly of drawing that line too sharply, and the editors remark: "In our day theological schools have as a major concern their responsibility for a ministry which recognizes the full dimensions of the Christian community. It is dangerous to think of the church's life in the narrow

erms of any one function, however meri-orious in itself it may be."

Of chief interest to American readers are he last two chapters. Sidney E. Mead's hapter on "The Rise of the Evangelical Conception of the Ministry in America (1607-1850)" is intensely interesting reading. The transition from the European con-eption of the ministry to something dis-inctly new and American, the persistence f the idea of apostolic succession even mong rabid dissenters and amid the pro-iferation of new forms of the ministry, he upsurge of lay control and the develop-nent of congregational polity everywhere, he far-reaching effect on the ministry of he separation of church and state, and the biding influence of revivalism on the Amer-can ministry as a whole—these are a few f the items that carry forward the story f the transition to the "evangelical" idea f the ministry. The Lutheran reader will e confused a bit until he realizes that Mead, nfortunately I think, almost completely dentifies "evangelical" with "evangelistic." Mead also traces the changes in the prac-ice of ordination, in the social sources of ninisters, in their social status, in their raining, and in their preaching.

Dean Michaelson, of University of Iowa School of Religion, writes the last chapter, "The Protestant Ministry in America: 1850 o the Present." His emphasis is upon the variety of the types of ministry and ministers hat have emerged from the religious and cultural pluralism of the last hundred years. Many ministers during this period have felt called to identify the Gospel or the Kingdom of God with a culture or a movement or a cause in this world, and their preparation and preaching has varied accordingly. Others have felt called to challenge this or that aspect of the rapidly changing, complex American society. So we have the Liberal Minister, the Fundamentalist Minister, the Minister as Social Reformer, the Urban Minister, the Rural Minister, the Lay Minis-ter, Women Ministers, the Negro Minister, the Immigrant Minister, the Missionary, and the Ministry to Institutions. Each one is described in the historical context. The changes in theological education are also traced, from the tendency to emphasize the pragmatic and de-emphasize language studies to the various offerings in electives and an emphasis on field work, from the ecclesio-centric to the socio-centric to the recent re-vival of interest in systematic and exegetical theology and in the biblical languages. Again the social sources and status of the ministers are traced. And the last chapter of the volume concludes: "The spirit in the ministry today appears to be to achieve as full a grasp of gospel and world as pos-sible and to achieve the most effective available application of the one to the other."

This broad survey of the Christian minis-try through the ages sets the ministry of our day in the illumination of the historical perspective. It contains many rich suggestions concerning theological education and min-isterial training in our day. It sets the ministry in the context of the forces that have shaped the church through the cen-turies, and it raises many vital questions concerning the ways in which the church and the ministry can cope with their funda-mental task in the world today.

ABDEL ROSS WENTZ

Emotional Problems and the Bible. By George H. Muedeking. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956. 188 pages. $3.

The author tries to answer two questions: "How much psychiatric help dare I accept if I am a Christian?" and "Has Christianity any help to give in the mixed-up world of desires and fears in which I live?"

The questions are practical, and the author deals with them in a practical way. He makes no display of psychological learning, nor does he attempt to build bridges between modern abnormal psychology and theology. He starts from the emotional problems of modern man and asks how evangelical re-ligion can help. The chapter titles suggest the contents of the book: Can the Bible help? Anxiety can be cast away. Guilt will not stay buried. The domestication of hatred. Freedom can be enjoyed. The secret ally of creativity. Inferiority does not belong. Strangers no longer. The sunlight of faith.

It is obvious from the way the problems are treated that the author knows his sub-ject and is a man of practical experience. The psychologist observes and asks the

questions, but the pastor gives the answers. He writes with clarity, simplicity, and concentration with no heavy theological or psychological terminology. The book can be recommended to pastors and students of theology as a superior introduction to the problems of pastoral counseling.

EDMUND SMITS

The Family and Mental Illness. By Samuel Southard. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. 96 pages. $1.50.

This is the ninth in a series, The Westminster Pastoral Aid Books, edited by Russell Dicks. The whole series should be in the parish library or book corner as a wide range of typical problems is covered by competent authors: alcoholism, aging, marriage, the handicapped, dying, etc. They are all in non-technical layman's language, useful as program helps and discussion material.

The author is professor of Pastoral Care, Institute of Religion, Texas Medical Center, Houston, clinically trained in general and mental hospitals, and is a Baptist minister. He seems to write from first-hand experience in mental hospital chaplaincy work and within the context of a wholesome and co-operating inter-professional relationship.

Real help is offered to families of the mentally ill both in the general attitude of acceptance and objectivity toward the illness and the tangible steps that can be taken in bringing the patient to the helping resources he needs. Many ministers panic when one of their parishioners (or one of their own relatives) has a "nervous breakdown" and seems to need psychiatric care. Unless the pastor can himself accept mental illness objectively, he can hardly help his people find proper referral and help.

The role of the family in the crises of the illness, in the necessary co-operation during treatment, and as a support in convalescence is helpfully outlined with numerous explicit case illustrations. The relevance of the Christian faith, its hope of reconciliation, and its strengthening support are made obvious.

DAVID BELGUM

Where to Go for Help. By Wayne Oates. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. 118 pages. $2.

The editors of the Westminster Pastoral Aid books evidently felt the need for a book in the series to guide people to the proper sources for help in their various needs. The idea is good. And Wayne Oates is a good man to do the job. Anything coming from him has proved sound and helpful. This book is no exception.

Actually the book is more than information concerning "where to go for help." Oates addresses himself to the people who have problems, and intersperses his information concerning where to get help with help itself from his own store of insights and experience.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I Oates discusses the role of the great helping professions—those of the minister, physician, lawyer, teacher, social worker, psychologist—together with suggestions concerning how to select proper representatives of these professions.

In Part II he describes the need for help in the problem areas of human existence—premarital guidance, marriage conflict, sexual difficulties, birth control, sterility, unwed parents, adopting children, "problem" children, cerebral palsy, mental retardation, the problem drinker, mental illness, and aging—and tells where to go for help and how to get it.

Throughout the author educates the layman to the value of the minister and of the fellowship of the Christian congregation in helping him in these problem areas. The book is a handy and thorough reference for the many national, state, and community resources for the welfare of people in their specific needs.

From the point of view of the practical, I have one criticism. A work of this nature should be a part of each home. If its 118 pages were concentrated into fifty pages (and it could be done) and put into pamphlet form to sell for 25c rather than book form at $2, I believe local churches would order them for their people. As it is, Oates's fine effort will probably be purchased mainly by pastors. But it is good that they have it.

WILLIAM E. HULME

Christian Essays in Psychiatry. Edited by Philip Mairet. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 187 pages. $4.50.

A concerned group of psychiatrists, theologians, and one educator, representing Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Methodist communions, met for two years to discuss the implications of the Christian faith for psychiatry and vice versa. This British group has successfully attempted a stimulating inquiry in the area of human problems where theology and psychology overlap.

Although the essays presuppose considerable background in psychoanalytic theory and will be provocative for the psychologically sophisticated, there is also a clear introduction for the pastor who wants a sympathetic and constructive orientation to the field of psychotherapy. Many of the unnecessary conflicts between theology and psychiatric theory and practice have been reconciled by these writers who stand with one foot in each discipline attempting to communicate the benefits of each to the other.

A thoroughly evangelical discussion of guilt from both the theological and psychological point of view opens up the important distinction between "guilt" and "guilt-sense," that which is available to the conscious mind and that which has been repressed into the unconscious. Generally, the systems and theories of Adler and Jung seem to be more easily integrated into Christian pastoral care than those of Freud, although if Freud's philosophical speculations can be set aside, there is much valuable insight from his clinical discoveries that is of direct and practical help to the alert pastor.

The essay entitled "The Development of the Religious Attitude in Children" is exceedingly helpful for anyone interested in Christian education and the development of the child's thought patterns. It is clearly shown why children must not be treated simply as miniature adults.

DAVID BELGUM

Johann Sebastian Bach. Translated by Oliver C. Rupprecht. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1957. 149 pages. $1.50.

This is an excellent translation, with annotations, of Gurlitt's German *Johann Sebastian Bach, der Meister und sein Werk,* first published in 1949. The book follows the traditional approach to Bach. He has by now thoroughly come into his own in all fields of his art and in all places. Any book, therefore, on any phase of his genius is welcome material on Bachiana, and this one is most certainly so. But it is not a book for the layman. Its highly technical approach, style, and vocabulary make it suited primarily for professional musician and technician. As such, it seems to us that it ought to rate more highly than a paper-covered manual such as this. It is doubtless an effort to make Bach available to as many as possible by means of a curtailed biography at a modest price. And so, more power to Concordia Publishing House and Mr. Rupprecht! However, in view of the plethora of technical books and analyses of Bach, on the one hand, and the dearth of good, stimulating, "human interest" books on him, beamed at Mr. Average Man, on the other hand, one could almost wish that this time the publishers had given us the latter.

One of the unique features of this book is its evaluation of Bach's service in the field of organ building. This is of course to be expected from a biographer who is not only one of Germany's leading musicologists but also an outstanding authority on organs as well. Bach as a technician, contrapuntalist, and musician receives fine and adequate attention, even though the book is short. His contribution in the field of "well tempered" scales and the like, and his biography purely as a biography, receive less emphasis. This book is well timed in view of the concerted effort to re-publish all of Bach's music, to succeed (we suppose) the Bach Gesellschaft and (possibly) the Peter's edition.

LAURENCE N. FIELD

Familiar Hymns With Descants. By Donald D. Kettring. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 40 pages (with music). $1.10; five or more, 90c each.

The judicious use of a soprano descant (an obligato-like part) can add a thrilling touch to a congregational hymn. Descant singing is designed to lift a hymn "from a perfunctory repetition of a hymn tune through four or five stanzas to the rich and

overwhelming spiritual experience it deserves to be." The usual procedure is to have the choir sing in unison on the melody with the congregation on the final stanza, and let the sopranos add an upper dimension of tone by means of a part which soars above the rest and provides a climax to the hymn. The congregation must be forewarned not to quit singing, for if they do the descant loses its point of being something added to the hymn, not a substitute for it. Usually, when prepared for it, congregations have taken to the practice with enthusiasm and discovered that the overall singing improves.

Mr. Kettring is a thorough church musician with many years of experience. The descants he submits here have stood the test of usage in his choirs. The Lutheran purchaser of the collection would do well, however, to check the hymns included against his own hymnal to see how many he could use. Most of the hymns would probably be included in the average American Lutheran hymnal since they are hymns which have become popular in all American churches. There are 33 in all. Even if only 25 were of use in a given situation, the collection might still be counted a worthwhile, and not too costly, musical addition to a choir library.

GERHARD M. CARTFORD

Hymns and the Faith. By Erik Routley. Greenwich: Seabury Press, 1956. 311 pages. $6.

"In order to tell the truth about anything, it is necessary to attend not only to its origin but also to its end." Thus Routley begins his preface to this book, which is his effort to bring an increased recognition to the hymn, not as a bit of poetry which is interesting because of its author or the circumstances of its writing but because of what it says. In his own words he says further that his purpose is "to elucidate the occasional obscurity, and, by reference to Scripture and the church's teaching, to throw light on our traditional Christian beliefs as they are adorned by traditional Christian songs."

There are 49 chapters in the book, and each chapter deals with one hymn. The hymns were selected by the author on the basis of a survey he made of the most popular hymns of English Protestantism. He says specifically that they do not all represent his own choices. However, the strength of his study lies in this very fact. His aim is to examine the hymns most used by the people to try to discover what is unique, or what is of particular merit in them; and he goes on to say that his greatest satisfaction in the task was to discover that these hymns form a "conspectus" of the Christian faith. "Without straining the texts by an inch it has been possible to say something about all the cardinal doctrines of the church." This would seem to provide a sufficiently worthy *raison d'etre* for one more book on hymns.

Routley, who is an English Congregational minister and one of England's foremost hymnologists, deals only with the texts in this book. To exclude the melodies is an obvious decision since many hymns receive different melodic treatment in different hymnals. Lutheran readers of this review may wonder how much relevance hymns chosen by a churchman in England will have to their situation in this country. To satisfy himself on this point the reviewer made a check of the hymnals of the three largest groups of Lutherans in the United States. Of the 49 hymns only 5 did not appear in any of the hymnals. Most of the hymns appeared in all three, a few in only one of the hymnals (and not always the same one). This is really not surprising when one considers the extent to which American Lutherans have gone in adopting the English hymns of the Protestant bodies which surround them.

GERHARD M. CARTFORD

Wedding Music. By Regina Holmen Fryxell. Rock Island: Augustana Press, 1956. 30 pages. 25 cents.

This little pamphlet is intended as a handy guide for the hard pressed clergyman who would like to improve the musical standards of the wedding service but does not know where to turn for specific suggestions, and for the diligent church musician who is seeking to vary the musical fare of the wedding-goer (and, incidentally, to rescue his own sense of self-respect).

In the first seven pages of the booklet Mrs. Fryxell discusses some of the general

principles which ought to be borne in mind when wedding music is being planned. The remainder of the booklet is devoted to a list of specific musical selections which are suitable for a church wedding service. These include organ, vocal, and instrumental music, plus suggestions of hymns from different hymnals which are suitable for congregational or solo use. There is also a short list of pieces playable on small reed or other one-manual organs.

GERHARD M. CARTFORD

The Christian Year. By Edward T. Horn, III. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957. 243 pages. $3.75.

The author sketches the background of the observances that make up the church year. In many cases the festivals are of pre- or non-Christian origin. Just as Christ gave new meaning to time by his coming to earth, so certain observances which had existed prior to his coming were transmuted and continued their existence within the Christian church with entirely new meaning.

This is typical of the progress of the church through the centuries. As the Spirit lives and works in the people of God, they gradually transform everything they touch. Occasionally, of course, the process works in reverse, and the people of God are subtly corrupted. From time to time, therefore, a winnowing takes place to sift good from bad. The Reformation was such an event. Nevertheless, throughout history the church has steered a course which has led to an avenue of agreement in which the greater percentage of world Christendom—Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Lutheranism—is comparatively united.

The book divides itself into two parts. The first part deals with the foundations and history of the Christian Year, its relationship to the Sunday service, and the use of liturgical colors. The second part takes the individual seasons of the year and discusses them in detail. The author takes exception to the Lutheran and Episcopal custom of naming Sundays after Trinity, a custom apparently based entirely on early popular usage in northern countries. He prefers the Roman Catholic custom of naming Sundays after Pentecost. He feels that Pentecost, which commemorates the establishment of the church and is a historical festival antedating by centuries the establishment of the festival of the Trinity, purely the celebration of a doctrinal idea, ought to have precedence in a calendar which otherwise is devoted in its main outlines to actual historical events. The last chapter is devoted to a discussion of the value of saints' and holy days, a subject which is emotionally charged for most Protestants but which the author handles in a very convincing manner.

The book is easy to read and concise enough to be read by the busiest parson, who, being a servant of the church of Jesus Christ on earth, could conceivably profit from the perusal of a history such as this of the language and practices of the church in the liturgy.

GERHARD M. CARTFORD

Exposition of Zechariah. By H. C. Leupold. Columbus: Wartburg Press, 1956. 280 pages. $4.

It is good to have a detailed commentary on Zechariah. And there is much here that is helpful. There is a fine appreciation of spiritual values and illuminating discussion of many difficult passages. Unfortunately there are many things, also, which cannot command confidence. And there are inconsistencies and technical flaws.

As we might expect, Dr. Leupold defends the unity of the book. He rejects the view that the clear differences in the background of the two sections (chapters 1-8 and 9-14) imply different authors and a considerable separation in time.

His attitude to critical scholarship appears clearly in this comment about 4:6-10: "To interpret this text as it stands takes but half as much effort as must be put forth to make the new arrangement plausible—thus proving it to be more reasonable as it stands." Actually, the "easy" way of "solving" difficulties is very likely to be superficial and erroneous. However, he makes profitable use of suggestions by critical scholars on many details. And of course some of his objections to proposals by critical scholars are quite justified.

He quotes approvingly Barnes's statement about the visions: "Few or none of the de-

tails can be treated as significant." Yet he often goes to great lengths to devise such interpretations, with results that are dubious and improbable.

His translations and his comments do not always agree. Thus in 3:2 his translation is the accepted one, "The Lord rebuke you"; in his comments he says that the verb is not an optative, but means "He rebukes" (the latter is proper if it is God himself speaking, the former if it is the angel). In 3:5, for a Hebrew word which occurs twice, he uses first "turban" and then "mitre"; and then says he prefers the latter. In 5:3 he translates "be cut off," then says the word should not be rendered thus, but means "purged out." In 14:5 he has "him" in the translation, "Thee" in the comments.

There are rather numerous typographical errors—mostly small, but including the placing of three lines of type near the bottom of p. 21 in the wrong order. (Yet he dismisses as fantastic all claims by critical scholars that disarrangements occurred in the Hebrew text! He also rejects, with a few minor exceptions, all suggested emendations of the Hebrew text—although most scholars agree that there are considerable corruptions in it.) In his translation of 6:13 a very important phrase is omitted; so are lesser ones in 2:3; 2:4; 2:11; 8:8. Disturbing typographical errors in the translation occur also in 1:11; 1:14; 10:9; 12:5. He gives a wrong Scripture reference on p. 38—there is no Josh. 5:31.

For the most part the thoughts are clearly expressed. But occasionally a sentence is difficult. Thus the discussion of 6:13 is confused in statement as well as illogical in thought—probably because the author is trying to read into the passage a meaning that does violence to what it actually says.

There are various passages which he interprets as specifically predictive of Jesus Christ, whereas properly there is only a secondary application to Christ. Here, as in other prophets, we find statements which dealt primarily with contemporaneous events or general principles, but which furnish "illustrative parallels" to events in the life of Christ.

The author is overly fond of "prophetic perfects," making such interpretation sometimes where it is unwarranted. Thus in 2:6 he renders: "I shall spread you abroad"—indicating victorious future expansion, instead of the simple factual statement, "I have scattered you (in exile)," which it obviously is (the meaning of the verb itself is involved here too; he says "scatter" is impossible, but it occurs in Ps. 68:14 and Eze. 17:21; it never has the idea of increasing). Concerning this same verse, he says that those who were still in exile are urged to flee from the impending destruction of Babylon; but there was no such destruction impending in 519 B.C.—a fact which he totally ignores.

The author says that the angel of the Lord (1:11-12; 3:1-6) is the second person of the Trinity—a view which was popular in the early church; he offers only very flimsy "proof" for this interpretation. In this connection his statement on p. 126 should be noted: "The prophet has so fully identified himself with the Lord for whom he speaks that he finally speaks in the very person of the Lord, identifying himself with Him." Now, I doubt that this is actually the case in 6:9-15, on which this comment is made; but if the author believes such identification is possible, then there can be no force whatever in his claim that, because the angel of the Lord "identifies Himself with the Lord" (p. 38), he therefore is truly Deity. He also claims that "me" in 2:8, 12; 4:9; 6:15 is the angel of the Lord—although the term itself does not occur at all in these chapters and there is no good reason to suppose the angel is present in these visions.

In 3:1 the author rejects the obvious picture that Joshua stands as a sinner before the Judge and claims that he "is *minstering* (italics his) unto the angel of the Lord . . . engaged in the duties of his office."

In discussing 6:1-8, although sometimes he says "four chariots," as the text does, he also advances the ideas of four *groups* of chariots and of *five* chariots or kinds of chariots in trying to explain the somewhat confused account—stubbornly refusing to admit any textual corruption.

Concerning 4:2 the author says: "The 'lampstand' was the church of God as she gives light through the seven lamps, that is—*seven* being the number of divine operation—by the power that God supplies." Here an important interpretative canon is presented

a parenthetic phrase, which is poor pro-
dure. And that phrase is so obscure that I,
least, can get no clear idea as to what it
ans. And he offers no proof or support
atever for this queer statement. As to the
npstand being the church, he says, "Rev.
20 places this interpretation beyond the
ssibility of a doubt: 'the seven candle-
cks are seven churches.'" But such "ana-
gy of Scripture," as he calls it, obviously
no analogy at all; not only are the two
sions totally different, but also "churches"
d "the church" are not at all the same.
this same vision, we may note that, in
phasizing the branches of the two olive
es, he quite fails to explain the trees
emselves. And he says that "these 7" in
10 refers, not to anything in this vision at
, but to something in a different vision
amely, to the "eyes" in 3:9—using his
n very improbable interpretation of that
ssage, noted below). This is totally inde-
nsible—the phrase must find its point of
ference in the vision to which it belongs.

On p. 162 the author makes a general re-
ark about chapters 9-14: "and 'Judah'
viously refers to the Christian church."
ortunately, however, he does not consist-
tly follow such an extreme allegorical
ea in his further comments, but interprets
least some of the passages in terms of the
e-Christian situations and events.

In 12:10 the author insists on the reading
Me whom they have pierced" (which is
und in most Hebrew MSS. and most an-
ent versions), in spite of the explicit testi-
ony given in John 19:37 for "him"—which
curs in a considerable number of MSS.
d in the Talmud and is required by the
nse of the passage; his interpretation is
ry forced and improbable.

Among various other interpretations which
em incorrect or at least very dubious, we
ay note: 3:8 is a specific prediction of
sus Christ in his priestly office; in 3:9
e seven "eyes" are not jewels or carved
cets on the stone but the eyes of God—
d "upon" the stone means "directed to-
ard" it (a force which the Hebrew prepo-
tion sometimes has with a verb of motion,
t which seems totally unjustified here);
6:13 the rendering "He shall be a priest
on his throne" (properly "A priest shall
be by his throne"); in 9:1, Hadrach is Persia (rather than a place in Syria).

This is a valuable book for the student. But the interpretations must constantly be weighed critically.

HAROLD L. CREAGER

Christology and Myth in the New Testament. By Geraint Vaughan Jones. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. 295 pages. $4.50.

This is a book of unquestionable value. After we have heard and read so much discussion and speculation *about* the concept of myth and *about* the program of demythologizing, this author boldly tackles the task of *carrying out* this program. He tries to apply the procedure of demythologizing to the most important field of biblical theology, namely, to Christology.

The problem is formulated in many different ways throughout the book: If we must demythologize, how can it be done? Can we discard the statement and retain its intention? If myth concepts are not accepted, what to do with them?

Naturally enough, the author takes his starting point from the views of Rudolf Bultmann, whom, however, he criticizes in various respects. He regards Bultmann's way of procedure as too subjectivistic: the New Testament not only gives a picture of the human situation over against God, but it tells truth about God, if often in mythological form. Furthermore, he regards Bultmann as much too sceptical with regard to the historical value of the Gospels, which to him are much more trustworthy as historical reports, even more biographical in character than Bultmann will admit.

The argument develops in four parts; the first two, presenting the principles of his inquiry, discuss the concepts of myth and history, the substance and the interpretation of myth. The third part applies the method of demythologizing to the field of Christology and singles out three aspects of New Testament teaching as distinctly mythological; the doctrine of Jesus' pre-existence which is closely connected with the belief that Christ is the agent of creation, the Virgin Birth, and the objective conquest of evil by Christ. A fourth part states the indispensability of

mythological language for the purpose of the Christian kerygma.

We have to be grateful for the undertaking as such, but the way it is carried out gives rise to some questions.

1. Throughout the book we miss a clear definition of the concept of myth, though a number of distinctions are drawn. The difference between mythical and mythological thinking is stated, the first being an ingredient of primitive civilization, the second the mythical elements that survive in the realm of more highly developed intellectual thought. Another distinction is made between legendary myth (e.g., the story of the Tower of Babel) and metaphysical myth (the religious interpretation of historical facts mixed with mythical elements, as the author finds it in the field of Christology). But there is no clear statement as to *what* stories or thought elements in the New Testament we ought to regard as mythical. We find an enumeration of the mythical elements on page 249: "We are left with the birth narratives, the story of the preexistent Son of God, 'coming down' to redeem man from the malignant power of the demons, conquering them on the Cross, and eventually 'ascending' to the 'right hand of God'; and we are offered the picture of Last Things in terms and images which bear no relation to the historical reality which they of necessity transcend because they speak of what lies outside historical times." This enumeration strikes the reader as somewhat arbitrary, even more so since a different list is given on page 275. Why are just *these* elements singled out as mythological?

Another instance: The author calls the story of the woman clothed with the sun (Rev. 12) "the only example in the New Testament of the genuine myth" (p. 266, note 1), whereas in another context he seems to regard the birth narratives as distinctly mythical ("Yet if there is an outstanding instance of myth in the New Testament it is this," p. 182). It is obvious that the author does not go nearly so far in applying the label of myth as Bultmann does, but nowhere do we get a clear statement of what is myth and what is not. On some issues the judgment differs in different parts of the book. E.g., in Part II, ch. 4, we get the impression that demonic forces are regarded as a mythical element ("it is here that the mythical character of the idea becomes apparent," p. 217), whereas elsewhere the author writes: "As for the miraculous and demonic it must be frankly admitted that not enough is known of the physical and paraphysical world to be dogmatic about it" (p. 244). We get the impression that the author himself is vacillating in his judgment concerning myth or nonmyth, and this uncertainty seems very understandable and even justified. But the argument would be clearer if this point of uncertainty would have been stated in principle.

2. Another question: is a myth a veiled truth or an error? Also on this point the book contains some contradictions. Of course, the whole argument rests on the insight—which many people still do not grasp—that a myth is something different from a fairy tale; "the myth is a divine word, not a human invention" (p. 260). Yet the way it is treated is different in various parts of the discussion. In Part III we get the impression that those concepts which are recognized as mythical have for this very reason to be regarded as erroneous. Once the author quotes with agreement William Temple, who regards a literal acceptance of Phil. 2:5-11 as "dangerously close to mythology" (p. 86). Here then mythology is regarded as a danger. In the fourth part, however, we find strong statements in favor of the myth as an indispensable means of religious expression. "If this story [namely, the *Heilsgeschichte,* which is regarded as presented in near-mythical form] is removed and there are substituted for it bare propositional or theological statements, the truth which Christianity proclaims is confined more or less to doctrinal formulas or dogmatic affirmations. The depths out of which emerge new and continually creative restatements of faith would no longer be fully available" (p. 259). "Any attempt to speak of God which renounces a picture, myth, symbol, or analogy tends to result in a negative or apophatic theology" (p. 272). On acoount of these differences in the evaluation of the myth we find a certain ambiguity in the reasoning: the myth is reinterpreted but at the same time eliminated. We are not quite sure what the ultimate purpose is: to reinterpret or to eliminate? Certainly both do not necessarily belong together; one may well interpret the

meaning of an event without discarding the way in which it is told.

In this connection another fact is striking: the author, in his judgment about the relevance of the New Testament books for our faith, shows a distinct predilection for the Synoptic Gospels, obviously for the reason that they seem to show the comparatively smallest amount of mythological thinking. But again, if the myth is really indispensable for religious expression, why is a religious book better if it contains fewer myths?

On the whole the book gives the impression of a very deep and honest wrestling with the problem of myth and its interpretation. And a wealth of observations and remarks is found in the book that present valuable contributions to a consideration of the problem. This is especially true concerning Part IV with its positive evaluation of mythical expression. But at the same time one has the somewhat painful feeling that the argument often moves in a circle and does not come to tangible results. The problems are formulated and reformulated over and over again, but at the end one misses clear answers. Is the trouble perhaps that this whole line of arguments suffers from a certain fruitlessness? This reviewer feels that the problem of New Testament and myth—at least in some of its aspects—might find a simpler solution, namely, that we acknowledge the fact that the New Testament message is mixed with mythical elements, most of all in the eschatological staetments, which more than the rest are dealing with subjects that defy a literal expression in terms of human experience and reason, that we refrain from the attempt clearly to separate the mythical from the historical or rational (which is impossible in itself—and this fact accounts for many of the uncertainties in our book), and that we do not regard the mythical element as "literally untrue" by definition but as the expression of a truth that goes so far beyond human perception and the possibility of exact expression and representation in human language that it can only be expressed in the pictorial and symbolical language of myth.

Such an approach would make unnecessary the attempt to subject biblical stories and formulations to a critical process which—as our author also feels—robs the statements of their true content. He himself asks near the end of his book (pp. 277-278): "How far then can demythologizing proceed . . . without depriving the Christian faith of such non-historical symbols? . . . Probably not very far, for a radical demythologizing will doubtless result in the discarding of the essentials of the kerygma as well as of what is peripheral to it." It is time to do away with the term "demythologizing" altogether, and instead to speak of interpretation of the mythical element together with the historical. Thus we would overcome the defeatist attitude with which we often speak of mythical elements in the Bible. We would realize anew —if such a naive statement is permitted— that after everything is said, what was good enough for Paul and Silas is still good enough for us.

PAUL LEO

The Geography of the Bible. By Denis Baly. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 304 pages. $4.95.

Such excellent books on the historical geography of the Holy Land have been appearing on the market recently that one might question the value or need of another book on the subject. Mr. Baly, who has spent twenty years of continuous study of Palestine, fifteen of which have been spent in the land itself, traversing every part of the country by every means of conveyance, convincingly demonstrates that there is a place for such a volume. For he has provided valuable information of a primary geographical nature not given in the excellent historically-centered volumes of Filson-Wright, Grollenberg, and Kraeling. Mr. Baly concerns himself strictly with the physical features of the Holy Land as they relate particularly to the Bible.

Although lacking the literary brilliance of George Adam Smith in his *Historical Geography of the Holy Land,* Mr. Baly has written a book which most nearly approaches the character of that classic study. By his keenly perceptive use of Scripture, he is able to make the Bible come alive in a new way through comments like the following: "One of the loveliest sights of the Palestinian scene is the picture of a group of

farmers on the threshing floor outside a village rhythmically tossing up the golden grain in the long rays of the evening sun, so that the chaff is blown away by the wind but the grain falls back in a glittering cascade onto the ground. It is this picture which the Psalmist had in mind, when he said that the wicked were 'like chaff which the wind drives away' (Ps. 1:4; cf. also 35:5; Job 21:18; Hos. 13:3) and later John the Baptist, who said of the Messiah that 'his winnowing fork is in his hand, to clear his threshing floor, and to gather the wheat into his granary' (Luke 3:17; Matt. 3:12)."

The geographical features of the Holy Land have been treated under two main headings, general and regional. In the general section such subjects as geology, climate, water supply, vegetation, animal life, agriculture, trade routes, distribution of population are discussed. In the regional section Mr. Baly surveys in detail the physical features of every part of Palestine, devoting chapters to areas such as coastlands and valleys of the Cis-Jordan, the hill country (Judah, Samaria, and Galilee), the rift valley of Jordan, the hills of the Trans-Jordan (Bashan, Gilead, Ammon, Moab, and Edom), and the deserts surrounding Palestine on the east and south. Accompanying the text are ninety-seven photographs, all Mr. Baly's own, carefully chosen to illustrate especially those features of the country less commonly known. The popular, better-known views of Jerusalem and the lake of Galilee have been avoided, whereas many less well-known views of the country east of the Jordan have been included. Besides the photographs there are forty-seven maps, charts, and line-drawings, illustrating in detail not only the various areas of the land but also providing valuable information in graphic form of such subjects as rainfall, relative humidity, temperature, trade-routes, geological features, and the like. The geological map is the only colored map in the book.

Writing with the conviction that a study of Palestine must take seriously the nature of the biblical argument as expressed in the "Book" which found its literary expression in the "Land," Mr. Baly permits his faith in the God of the "Book" to shine through without becoming superficial in examining scientifically and technically the whole environment of the land in which the Bible arose.

ROBERT H. BOY

The Essenes and Christianity. By Duncan Howlett. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 217 pages. $3.50.

Howlett aims at making a contribution to the second stage in the discussion of the significance of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The initial stage of excited discovery, it is said, needs to be supplemented by more "balanced and careful considerations." This book, however, does not try to present a scholarly investigation, but rather consists of a non-technical type of speculation based on previously published material. Howlett, a Unitarian minister in Boston, surveys the basic facts about the Scrolls, and then proceeds in a popular, fast-moving style to try to answer questions about the origin, history, and program of the Qumran Community (which he simply labels as Essene) and its relation to the early church.

It is the part of the book dealing with the meaning of the similarities and differences between the Qumran Community and the early Christians that will be of the greatest interest to most readers. Unfortunately, this is also the weakest section of the work. Acting on his claim that "it has been the boldest spirits who have come nerest (sic!) to the truth in every case" (p. 165), the author writes boldly about "startling" parallels in the practice of communion, "amazing similarities" in structure, and a "close connection" between the Essenes and the Jerusalem church. The following statements are typical: "This organizational know-how of the first Christians came from the Essenes" (p. 186). "The Messiah in whom the Jerusalem church believed appears either to have been an Essene himself at one time or to have been greatly influenced by them probably through John the Baptist" (p. 185). "The Christian Church had only to appropriate for its own use the main elements of the Essene movement and then to add its own special emphases and interpretations" (p. 186). In view of the non-scholarly nature of his work, Howlett does not attempt to pro-

vide any real documentation to support these provocative claims. It will be interesting to see to what extent future studies back up his conjectures.

RONALD M. HALS

The Voice of Conscience. By Alfred M. Rehwinkel. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1956. 189 pages. $2.75.

In this expanded and revised edition of his classroom lectures, the professor of Christian Ethics at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis seeks to clarify the concept of conscience and of fundamental morality. The conscience is discussed in a wide range of contexts, such as the Bible, everyday life, the confessional. There is much valuable information here. The treatment of Roman Catholicism as a danger to the freedom of conscience is thorough, well-documented, and evidences an extraordinary awareness of Roman Catholic literature.

The author's conception is inseparably tied to his belief in an absolute and universally binding moral law. This leads him to speak of the fact of conscience as a proof for the existence of God, and to think of sin in almost exclusively moralistic categories. The following is typical: "But once the validity of the Moral Law becomes doubtful and man's moral responsibility to God is weakened or even questioned, then sin ceases to be sin and the Gospel becomes meaningless . . . [and] the whole structure is bound to collapse before long."

One might wish that theological lines were more finely drawn. Nowhere are the many options for the understanding of this difficult phenomenon of conscience carefully laid out and critically examined. Actually, the book is not so much a clarification of the concept of conscience as it is an apologetic for an absolutist ethic. It would have been particularly helpful, for instance, if the author had entered into conversation with those Lutheran theologians who are suggesting that the notion of natural law be given up altogether.

The book is indexed and contains a bibliography of seventy books.

JAMES H. BURTNESS

The Bright Cloud. The Bible in the Light of the Transfiguration. By J. R. MacPhail. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. 185 pages. $3.50.

The author demonstrates that the Incarnation was in character with all of God's method of operation in both Testaments: using the common things and transfiguring them so that men could behold his glory. He follows the method of Scripture in developing the material; his outline is roughly the history of salvation. He rightly observes that Scripture is full of theology, and to survey the Bible without noting that is to miss the point. Hence he pauses frequently to illustrate theological concepts implicit in the story of salvation.

A. C. RUETER

Modern War and the American Churches: A Factual Study of the Christian Conscience on Trial. By Ralph Luther Moellering. New York: The American Press, 1956. 141 pages. $2.75.

In this "tract for the times" the author reviews the judgments expressed in the major American church bodies since 1939 with respect to World War II, the Korean War, and the so-called cold war. He comes to the conclusion that with few exceptions Protestant and Roman Catholic churchmen yielded to social and political pressures and followed rather than guided public opinion. There is much truth in the contentions of the author, and he has rendered a service by disturbing our consciences and preparing us for new days of decision which lie ahead. He has no positive program to propose but is content to call our past judgments into question in order that we may at least recognize them for what they were.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

The Choirmaster's Workbook. Edited by Dayton W. Nordin. Rock Island: Augustana Press, 1956. 200 plus pages. $2.50.

The reader is referred to the review of Volume 4 of *The Choirmaster's Workbook,* which may be found in the QUARTERLY,

Vol. VIII, p. 188. The comments made there are applicable to the present edition of the book. Some minor differences might be noted, however. Dr. Matthew Lundquist, the well known church musician, has written the introductory article to the present volume. There is a new listing of publishers' best selling anthems as well as their latest releases. In the main body of the book, on the weekly scheduling of music, the editor has adopted the church year calendar and begun with the first Sunday in Advent. In addition he has added on each page a brief explanation of a particular Christian symbol or the significance of certain Sundays. This is still the sort of book that most church musicians would find useful.

GERHARD M. CARTFORD